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The farther backward you can look the farther forward you are likely to see. 
Winston Churchill 
 
Work [innovation] is the medicine for poverty. 
A  Yoruba Proverb 
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Abstract 
The sociology and economics of the conduct of international e-health technology 
transfers (IeTTs) is examined. Most African countries are perennial recipients with 
variations in their domestic e-health utilisation, development and implementation. We 
identify, explore, and demonstrate how complex and interlinked global, continental, 
national and subnational actions and institutions condition their national e-health 
implementations.  
Multidisciplinary literatures are from national e-health implementations, national 
innovation system (NIS) interactive learning, international technology transfers, global 
development and globalisation. Methodically, a unique combination of middle-range 
and moderate Science and Technology Studies constructivism, NIS institutionalism and 
Deleuzian poststructuralist narrative is employed.  
The conduct of IeTTs is characterised by technological path-dependency, history, 
complexity, power, politics, multiple identities, self-interests and contestations in 
complex global and transnational interactions. Recipients‘ exercises of National Agency 
mirror their varied domestic technology acquisition dynamics and trajectories.  
Successful transfers are institutionally conditioned by interactions of global geopolitics, 
fragmented continental governance and national reticence. Agential asymmetry that 
results, accounts for why most recipients are variably struggling in their technology 
acquisitions.   
The exercise of National Agency is paramount. National economic size and maturity of 
extant national innovation capacity can determine if a recipient can acquire domestic e-
health innovation and industrial competences. Actions taken by National governments, 
can strategically determine if technologies are accumulated and technical knowledge 
assimilated, for addressing the challenges of technology inappropriateness, 
incompatibilities and obsolescence encountered during subnational utilisations.  
We contend that implementing a national e-health infrastructure is a long-term and 
large-scale institutional engineering endeavour. Cumulative advantage explains 
difference between Schumpeter and Schumacher on e-health technology design and 
production. A Schumpeterian domestic industrial model of hi-tech e-health technology 
development, rather than a cosmopolitan Schumacher consumerist one, is proposed. 
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Whilst, appreciating that Schumacher on incremental accumulation and assimilation 
from small-scale technological implementations can be instrumental.  
Uniquely, we identify that global geopolitical contention between global west and east 
economies and competitive global markets and global technoeconomic changes can 
either condition scale and depth of domestic acquisition. Nevertheless, these conditions 
and events have historically and contemporaneously shaped global e-health innovations.  
In a Schumpeterian evolutionary sense, Satcom technologies that powered e-health 
services in the past are now being substituted by mobile ones. This technological 
transition is bringing about a convergence of consumer electronics (i.e. Smartphones) 
and lifesciences industries, driven by a combinatorial biomedical, telecommunication 
and computing e-health innovations. 
With these findings, an innovation-based macro-societal perspective is proposed for 
studying e-health implementation, as opposed to the prevalent information-based micro-
behavioural studies. Further contributions to academia and policy are made to ICT4D, 
Global Health and m-health practices.  
Policy recommendations are made to national, continental and global institutions on 
how to foster national technology acquisitions. Recipients are encouraged to learn from 
incremental domestic e-health implementations in global technology frontiers. Their 
share in intellectual property rights accruing from global-subnational e-health co-
innovations must be repatriated.  
We conclude by proposing a global collaboration framework to guide and to foster 
cooperation amongst those involved in the conduct of IeTTs. Symmetry – an alignment 
of vertical hierarchical and diffuse horizontal complex sociotechnical interactions, 
though, not as the implied flat, circumscribed and cyclical dynamics of actor network 
theory, is proposed. So, an alignment of the constitutive diverse and competing interests 
and identities, is deemed strategic, to foster domestic accumulations and assimilations.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Globally and nationally, the rapid diffusion of telecommunication, computing and 
biomedical technologies in health systems is transforming how care is delivered. 
Together with technologies from genomics, mobile computing, antibiotics and vaccines, 
e-health technologies provide exciting and potential tools for providing innovative 
medical care in the 21
st
 century. Inspired by global technology optimism, countries from 
around the world are formulating national e-health policies and are implementing 
national e-health initiatives. This is a welcome development, and African countries are 
not being left out of this trend of globalisation.   
For most African countries, e-health provides a technological platform for providing 
and extending quality and efficient healthcare to its teeming and geographically 
dispersed population. E-health
1
 is needed as one of the tools for addressing the myriad 
challenges facing healthcare delivery in Africa. Most of the countries have also 
formulated national e-health policies and are aspiring to implement national e-health 
initiatives, and are dependent on international e-health technology transfers (IeTTs). Not 
least because, being a recipient of technology transfers is needed for and contributes to 
domestic innovation capacity acquisition. However, little research has been conducted 
on the depth, scale and variation of such African countries‘ acquisitions from IeTTs.  
This study is underpinned by four years collecting multiple and messy qualitative data 
during fieldwork and in participating in fora and meetings in Africa at national and 
international levels on e-health innovation (design, invention and production) and 
utilisation. Our immersion in the policy and technical spaces of eHealth, science and 
technology, Global Health, and international development meetings, conferences and 
fora, and in contributing to e-health policy-making at national and international levels, 
is evident in the thesis. The immersion has revealed an inherent complexity, ambiguity 
and uncertainty in the conduct of IeTTs in Africa. It has made our appreciation of how 
the development and utilisation of e-health technologies can be re-interpreted as an 
                                               
1 The author‘s view of e-health use and development was partly shaped by attending series of meetings 
and conferences organised by the Telemedicine and eHealth section of the Royal Society of Medicine. 
These have been useful in the appreciation of the scope, scale, benefits and risks of e-health use and 
development.  
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innovation system cutting across subnational, national, continental and global 
institutions.   
1.2 Defining e-health 
There are many definitions of e-health in the health informatics literature.  A systematic 
review carried out by (Oh, Rizo, Enkin, & Jadad, 2005) identifies 51 different meanings 
of e-health as defined by different actors, academic institutions, professional bodies, and 
funding organizations, with no single and accepted definition. With multiple definitions 
of e-health come different meanings ascribed to it by plural actors and organizations 
from various and diverse perspectives, geographies and contexts that are involved in its 
development and utilisation.   
The preferred definition is provided by the World Health Organisation. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) defines eHealth as the secure and cost-effective 
transmission and exchange of health data and information either locally or at a 
distance (World Health Organisation, 2004). According to the WHO, e-health is made 
up of different functional sub-sets such as telemedicine, electronic health record (EHR), 
m-health  (World Health Organisation, 2011). This definition captures the functional 
element of e-health but it does not demonstrate the social, cultural and political impact 
of networks of actors and organisations in the development and utilisation of e-health 
technologies from the context of international technology transfers (ITTs). Even if ‗at a 
distance‘ implies that an exchange of health data occurs trans-nationally and 
internationally, it does not also explicitly highlight the relevance of e-health 
technologies in the transfer process.  
The following definition from (Eysenbach, 2001) provides a holistic conceptualization 
of e-health from the context of international technology transfers: 
“eHealth is an emerging field in the intersection of medical informatics, public health 
and business, referring to health services and information delivered or enhanced 
through the Internet and related technologies. In a broader sense, the term 
characterizes not only a technical development, but also a state-of-mind, a way of 
thinking, an attitude, and a commitment for networked, global thinking, to improve 
health care locally, regionally, and worldwide by using information and communication 
technology” 
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This definition appreciates and captures the scope and scale of the complex interactions 
that occur in the development and utilisation of e-health from an international and 
transnational context. It implies the conduct of an international e-health technology 
transfer involving multiple stakeholders in a global space (involving actors and 
organisations across different geographical and organisational boundaries). As such, it 
draws attention to the commercial, economic, social, cultural and political aspects of e-
health. However, the definition is narrowly focussed on utilising the Internet for 
transferring e-health services and not the transfers of material e-health technologies. In 
addition, it does not explicitly show the trend of converging computing, 
telecommunication and biomedical or health technologies (Viziteu, 2008) in the way 
that (Kaplan, 1987) demonstrated in historical narrative of national e-health 
implementations in the USA.  
For the thesis, we define e-health by combining these different views.  
E-health is defined as the use of computing, telecommunication and biomedical 
technologies for the transfer of health information and data and for the delivery of e-
health services either from one point to another or within geographically dispersed and 
culturally, socially and politically diverse networks of actors and organisations 
involved in their implementation, development and utilisation.  
1.3 Global state of National e-health implementations  
Countries from around the world are implementing their national e-health initiatives 
(mostly focussed on EHRs), and are underpinned by a health information-based strategy 
of capturing, gathering, storing, sharing and personalising health data (Castro, 2009). In 
general, it can be observed that innovation -based strategy is marginalised in these 
debates. Little or no attention has been paid in both policy and academia, in a 
Schumpeterian industrial sense as in (Kaplinsky, 2011; Lundvall, 2007; Mazzucato, 
2011; Muchie, 2008; Nelson & Nelson, 2002; Sharif, 2006; Windrum & García-Goñi, 
2008), to system and product innovations.  
Current policy debates in technology frontier countries are on the safety, effectiveness 
and efficiency of the utilising e-health technologies, in order to ensure positive patient 
outcomes and optimal health system performance (impacts). A common observation in 
these debates is that of the complexity and risks entailed in successfully aligning the 
interests and preferences of involved multiple and diverse actors, organisations and 
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technologies. A need for consultation and consensus before and during implementation, 
were unforeseen by governments, policymakers, regulators and managers – this has 
been costly and causes of uncertainty. Genuine public and academic interests in the 
security and privacy of health data are also dominating the policy spaces. The 
translation of policy into implementation has been dogged by public and political 
concerns of data protection and security in England (Trisha Greenhalgh, Russell, 
Ashcroft, & Parsons, 2011; Sheikh et al., 2011). A parliamentary review (Jolly, 2011) 
on the implementation of Australia‘s ambitious national e-health initiative is also 
another prominent example.  
In the USA, just four years after the introduction of its national technoeconomic growth 
stimulant: the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health act 
(HITECH) (Buntin, Jain, & Blumenthal, 2010; Kaplan & Harris-Salamone, 2009), its 
healthcare impacts is coming under critical policy appraisal (Kellermann & Jones, 
2013). In England, the debate has been dominated by politics and economics. The 
incumbent conservative government has reformed the hitherto creaky National 
Programme for Health IT in NHS (NPFiT), partly because of the prevalent austere 
macro-economic environment. In addition, partly due to a critical and probing policy 
reviews of the implementation has received from the academia and the public, for 
example by (W. L. Currie & Finnegan, 2011; Trisha Greenhalgh, et al., 2011; T 
Greenhalgh & Stones, 2010; Klecun, 2011; Takian & Cornford, 2012). However, in 
England, a new policy debate is emerging. This is about a contested, political and 
economical debate that is surrounding the evaluation of the Whole System Demonstrator 
project, a large-scale of e-health (telehealth and telecare) services experimentation
2
 . 
In these global technology leading countries, the raging policy debates have split 
academia, industry and policymakers into opposing camps on the right choices of 
national e-health infrastructural and spatial scales. Generally, debates have 
dichotomously centred on either the choice of ‗large-scale‘ or ‗small scale‘ 
implementation. A ‗middle way out‘ approach (Coiera, 2009) acknowledges that 
                                               
2 The author‘s perception of Whole System Demonstrator project was partly shaped by and attending 
Telemedicine & eHealth 2012 - 3 million and rising: Integrating care, mainstreaming technology 
conference by the Telemedicine and eHealth section of the Royal Society of Medicine.  
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building a national e-health infrastructure, is an incremental and modular technology 
accumulation process (Heeks, 2006). The jury is still nevertheless undecided on how to 
convert ambitious national policies into large-scale national e-health implementations. 
Costly policy debates seem not to be evident with Asian countries such as South Korea 
(Lee, Min, Shin, Lee, & Kim, 2009) and Malaysia (Mohan, Omar, & Aziz, 2002), 
which are more pro-innovation in theirs.  
Nevertheless, an optimistic picture of national e-health implementation is visible in 
international policy space. Continental e-health policy frameworks are being put in 
place to foster and encourage national and transnational cooperation in the European 
Union (Karopka, Frank, & Blank, 2012; A. Lang & Mertes, 2011). An international 
cooperation between the USA and the European Union (EU) is also being put in place 
to foster bilateral trans-Atlantic e-health technology transfers, trade and innovation 
(Friedman, Iakovidis, Debenedetti, & Lorenzi, 2009). Even the World Health 
Organisation, has published a National eHealth Strategy Toolkit (World Health 
Organisation, 2012) to guide its member states in formulating their national e-health 
policies and action plans. 
The literature on national e-health implementation in health informatics is still 
emerging. Studies such as on Denmark and Norway (Aanestad & Jensen, 2011; Bergmo 
& Johannessen, 2006; Ellingsen & Monteiro, 2012), US (Coiera, 2009; Kaplan & 
Harris-Salamone, 2009), and on England (W. Currie, 2009; W. L. Currie & Finnegan, 
2011; Klecun, 2011; Sheikh, et al., 2011; Takian & Cornford, 2012) have 
conservatively examine e-health technology development and utilisation from an 
information society and healthcare service utilisation perspectives. They have combined 
views from health service research, management, organisation science, work studies and 
information system disciplines.   
The studies stress the complexity and uncertainty that characterise the building of large-
scale national e-health technology infrastructures. The unique and complex combination 
of organisational, sociological and cultural factors is commonly highlighted. Not least, 
because, the dynamics of the systems cyclically and constantly work to align multiple 
and divergent institutional interests and needs in an actor network theory sense 
(Sunyoung Cho, Mathiassen, & Nilsson, 2008). As national e-health implementation 
dynamics occurs in dependent staggered and protracted innovation stages (W. L. Currie 
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& Finnegan, 2011); which requires that relevant, strategic and institutionalised 
interactions amongst national governments, industry and healthcare providers evolve 
and concretise (Coiera, 2009; Klecun, 2011; Takian & Cornford, 2012) in a medium- 
and long- time scale.  
There has, however been a limited analytical focus on the underlying and supporting 
hardware and physical infrastructure from an innovation system perspective. How 
innovation or industrial capacity can practically solve encountered problems of 
technological inappropriateness and obsolescence, is not addressed. Nevertheless, the 
information-based analysis of e-health has provided us with an understanding of how 
fastidious health systems are, in the process of developing and utilising e-health 
technologies. For instance, issues of low utilisation of e-health technologies and 
organizational inertia are identified as typical barriers at hospitals and clinics. Limited 
reference to innovation aspect of e-health implementation is identified in health 
informatics – related publications such as (S. Cho & Mathiassen, 2007; Sunyoung Cho, 
et al., 2008; Nicolini, 2010), even though a fixation with studying software design and 
production predominates. These have reveal to us that e-health technologies have to be 
regularly invented and upgraded, in order to meet and respond to, the demanding and 
complex and diverse nature of clinical care.  
The study of technology in health informatics is conservatively focused on EHR 
software design and utilisation. Analyses have narrowly examined complex and 
contested process of software design, its associated issues of data standards and 
interoperability in national implementations (Aanestad & Jensen, 2011; Coiera, 2009; 
Ellingsen & Monteiro, 2012; Halford, Obstfelder, & Lotherington, 2009; Johannessen, 
Obstfelder, & Lotherington, 2012; Kaplan & Harris-Salamone, 2009; Larsen & 
Ellingsen, 2012). The investigation of development and utilisation of converging 
biomedical, telecommunication and computing technologies, if investigated from multi- 
–theoretical  and -levels dimensions (Frank W Geels, 2007; Wyatt & Balmer, 2007), has 
not received its due attention in health informatics.  
The global e-health landscape we have scanned that the societal importance of, and 
interests in, large-scale e-health technology systems is widespread. Issues of technology 
complexity and uncertainty, and of policy concerns and controversies in such debates, 
have not been extensively covered in the health informatics literature, but this have been 
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a preoccupation of science and technology studies (STS) at the interface of technology 
and health (Lehoux & Blume, 2000; May, 2006). Such issues of public concern with e 
health technology choices and options, and their transnational and international transfers 
and utilisations, are covered in the thesis.  
1.4 Introducing Africa: Innovation and Governance 
The institutionalisation of science, technology and innovation (STI) in Africa is 
progressing, but there are rooms for improvement. According to the first published 
African Innovation Outlook report (Brundenius & Mawoko, 2010), some African 
countries such as South Africa and Nigeria have made considerable progress in 
fostering domestic innovation. Nevertheless, across the continent, the report identifies 
that there is a considerable room for improvements in committing more finances and 
developing skilled human resources in order to further institutionalised innovations. In 
this respect, technology pan-Africanist (Forje, 2006; Lall & Pietrobelli, 2005; Muchie, 
2004; Ymele, 2011) call for ‗developmental state‘ – that fostering or forging domestic 
innovation is a process of nation-building.  
The African Development Bank (AfDB) African Statistical Yearbook 2010 puts 
Africa‘s population slightly over one billion people, making it almost at par with 
populous countries such as India and China, but occupying 15% of the global landmass. 
Nearly the same numbers of Africans are living on far larger landmass. The low 
demography-geography ratio could make e-health a cost-efficient method for delivering 
healthcare to the continent‘s dispersed and far-flung rural and urban populations. Africa 
is the world‘s largest geographically homogenous continent with 53 countries. Few are 
isolated small island states and many of these countries are small sparsely populated 
landlocked countries, which are surrounded by coastal neighbours.  
The sparseness of demography and vastness of geography in Africa highlights the 
strategic utility and importance of employing e-health for supporting and modernising 
healthcare delivery. For example, telemedicine for extending and giving access to 
quality healthcare to disperse population or utilising EHR systems for gathering, 
analyzing and disseminating clinical and population health data from disperse and 
remote locations.  
The continent is linguistically, culturally and ethnically diverse; for instance, a country 
like Nigeria has up to 250 diverse ethnic groups speaking almost 300 local languages. 
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Contemporary Africa as a whole can be classified linguistically along neo-colonial 
leanings. As a result, African countries are either English speaking or French speaking 
in their regional aggregation, international geopolitics and national political, intellectual, 
and societal configuration. This linguistic distinction is highlighted because there exists 
a pan-African e-health infrastructure for French speaking African countries 
(Geissbuhler, Bagayoko, & Ly, 2007). Administratively in Africa, policy directives are, 
ideally, consensually formulated by the cooperation of continental, regional and national 
political institutions.  
 
Figure 1.1 Map of Africa showing its constituents  
Continentally, the African Union (AU), supported by its independent arm, the New 
Partnerships for Africa‘s Development (NEPAD) Planning and Coordinating Agency 
(NPCA), provide political and technocratic impetus into socio-economic policy in 
Africa. The African Development Bank (AfDB) is a bank in the mould of World Bank, 
driving economic and financial policy formulation. In addition, the United Nations 
Economic Council on Africa (UNECA) plays a leadership role, in promoting the 
adoption of policy on STI for sustainable socioeconomic advancement in Africa. Either 
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collectively or individually, these institutions collaboratively formulate policies and 
implement developmental programmes with regional and national institutions.  
Regionally, African countries are grouped into geo-economic or political aggregations. 
Known as Regional Economic Communities (RECs), these geopolitical aggregations 
are instituted to foster common developmental policies formulation amongst their 
member states; to ensure economy of scale for infrastructure development, innovations, 
attraction of investments and for trade facilitation. These aggregations occur on a 
geographical basis, so for example, West African countries REC is known as Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), while their southern African 
counterparts make up the Southern African Development Community (SADC). ESCA 
(standing for the Commonwealth Regional Health Community for East, Southern and 
Central Africa) is an odd example of a regional socioeconomic aggregation working to 
foster common responses to health challenges.  
Nationally, African countries through representations to these continental and regional 
bodies make contributions to collective policy formulations and decisions. Commonly 
developed governance models tend to influence national developmental policies, and by 
extension international cooperation.   
1.5 Africa’s healthcare challenges 
E-health has an enormous potential as an appropriate and timely technology for 
addressing health problems in African countries, according to African Ministers of 
Health in 2011 (African Union, 2011, Annex 1, Article 9). The Africa Health Strategy 
(African Union, 2007), a policy choice also reiterated in 2011 report (ibid.), has a goal 
to improve Africa‘s population health through equitable access to essential health 
services by the year 2015 in order to contribute to the socioeconomic advancement on 
the continent. To achieve this laudable policy objective, Africa‘s health systems need to 
be strengthened through global collaborations and cooperation as stated in the Africa 
Health Strategy for 2007-2015. The strategy recognises the role e-health can play in 
achieving the set goal.  
MDGs (Millennium Development Goals) are social goals and targets instituted by the 
United Nations (UN) in September 2000 (United Nations, 2000). Three of the eight 
MDGs are targeted at eradicating or controlling certain diseases with high socio-
economic impacts. These are: 
32 
 
1. To reduce child mortality from childhood diseases  
2. To improve maternal health from associated causes 
3. To combat HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis (TB), and Malaria 
The Africa Health Strategy 2007-2015 (African Union, 2007) developed, as response to 
these Global Health challenges paints the health picture of the continent in statistics.  
For example, the HIV/AIDS epidemic on the African continent is extremely alarming. 
2.4 million Africans have died from AIDS, however an estimated 3.5 million new HIV 
infections was recorded in 2002 and HIV prevalence is reported to be as high as 30%.  
The strategy documents further reported 800,000 deaths in children under the age of 
five from AIDS-related diarrhoea, plus 500,000 from measles and 1.2 million from 
pneumonia. Further, the report cited that Malaria causes one million deaths annually, 
600,000 of which are children under age five. Tuberculosis has also achieved the level 
of a public health problem with 300 cases per 100,000 population and 600,000 annual 
deaths reported in the affected population.  In addition, Africa is reported to have the 
highest maternal mortality rate in the world with about 1000 deaths per 100,000 live 
births recorded.  
If no urgent action is taken, it is estimated that 7.5 million new born babies will die by 
2010. The burden of these diseases has a negative impact on health systems and the 
wider society in Africa. For example, the reports attributed 1.3% decrease of national 
economic growth of severely affected countries to malaria incidences. In addition, high 
mortality from AIDS has resulted in the loss of many qualified health personnel. The 
study identifies that Africa‘s health system‘s ability to cope with the consequences and 
effects of MDGs related diseases burdens is limited by financial and global migration - 
a massive brain drain that has led to the loss of its highly skilled health workers. This 
massive brain drain within the health systems of most African countries is also 
compounded by the internal rural–urban and external local-international migration of 
qualified health personnel (African Union, 2007). Statistically speaking, Africa is 
reported to have 10% of the world population but bears 25% of the global disease 
burden managed by only 3% of the global health workforce (African Union, 2007).  
These figures presented above are to illustrate vividly the poor state of public health in 
Africa and to highlight the need for exploring alternative strategies for healthcare 
delivery in Africa. Moreover, the rising threat of chronic or non-communicable diseases 
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such as diabetes, cardio-vascular disorders and cancers to socio-economic growth has 
become a policy concern (African Union, 2011). The public health risks of underfunded 
and neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) on the continent must also be recognised.  
The AU report admitted that limited progress has been made so far with meeting the set 
targets of MDGs. However, the report also documented that the poverty rate is falling, 
HIV/AIDS incidence is decreasing and child mortality is also reducing. Nevertheless, 
health-related burdens are still high, and the report concluded that Africa‘s survivability 
depends on developing, and investing in, its domestic institutions, infrastructures and 
innovations.  
1.6 Cosmopolitanism in Global Information Society 
The development and utilisation of  ICT innovations as the 8th  Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) (Gilhooly, 2005; United Nations, 2000) encourages 
technoglobalism, a term inspired by Fritsch, 2011. However, we define it as the design 
and production of technologies in frontier countries and their transfers to developing 
countries through formations of global partnerships, in the frame advocated by (Sachs, 
2003). It implies that the former should support an equitable global order with regard to 
trade and the provision of technology to the latter. Nevertheless, the technology 
optimism implied in the liberalistic views of non-states – global actors and 
organisations and multinational companies, dominate the policy space (Fritsch, 2011, 
pp. 37-38). The optimism of the cosmopolitan stems from the exaggerated impacts of 
technology, in national survival and prosperity, in human progress, and in the 
globalisation of socioeconomic interactions, are just too simplistic. The contention that 
a possession of domestic innovation capacity can determine national utilisation of ICTs 
(James, 2002; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006), is alien to the cosmopolitans; and, the 
inherent political and techno-economic complexity of globalisation is wished away. 
Similar optimism is found with cosmopolitan e-health implementations in Africa.   
Numerous ingenious and life-saving e-health (including EHR, telemedicine and m-
health) inventions have been developed for tackling these MDG diseases and are 
predominantly funded by and designed by research centres outside the continent, and 
manufactured by companies outside the continent. M-health technologies are currently 
the main preoccupations of the cosmopolitans in the conduct of IeTTs in African 
countries. M-health experimental initiatives conceived on the back of explosive growth 
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in mobile telephony; and, they usually equip health workers with mobile phones for 
health data collection and access to clinical decision support information (Mechael, 
2009). Mostly 1
st
 generation mobile phones and to a lesser extent, Smartphones are 
being utilised. Accordingly, implementations in Africa have been dominated by a 
proliferation of small-scale initiatives. A recently published meta-evaluation 
(Tomlinson, Rotheram-Borus, Swartz, & Tsai, 2013), has however highlighted the 
knotty challenge of functionally and spatially scaling up of such small-scale 
experimentations.  
The ‘doing it all for me‘ being promoted for developing e-health technologies in the 
context of global development, is exemplified by (Allen et al., 2007; Asamoah-Odei et 
al., 2007; Blum, 2002; J. Braa, Monteiro, & Sahay, 2004; Cartwright, 2000; Fleishman 
et al., 2010; Gerber, Olazabal, Brown, & Pablos-Mendez, 2010). Their implied inherent 
cosmopolitan agency, stresses the imperative to study domestic technology acquisition 
dynamics, variations and trajectories in recipient African countries. E-health hardware 
and software invented by well-meaning global actors are being implemented in many 
African countries, for health data collection, remote clinical diagnosis and for delivering 
virtual e-health services, for example in (Fleishman, et al., 2010). A major problem that 
has been identified with these technologies is that they have not diffused widely within 
the national health systems of the recipient countries, strongly because of certain 
technological and societal constraints (Kifle, Mbarika, Tsuma, Wilkerson, & Tan, 2008; 
Meso, Mbarika, & Sood, 2009; Ouma & Herselman, 2009).  
A study of why and how these technologies are struggling to diffuse nationally is what 
this thesis is all about. Most of the papers cited in this section, mostly adopted an 
information-based approach in their studies. None had addressed e-health 
implementation in Africa from an innovation/industrial and international technology 
transfer perspectives, as national innovation theory (NIS) theory (Arocena & Sutz, 
2003; Forje, 2006; Freeman, 2002; Lall & Pietrobelli, 2005; Lundvall, 2007; 
Mazzucato, 2011; Muchie, 2008; Sharif, 2006) inform. That nations must imperatively 
become entrepreneurial and activist in the spirit of NIS, so as to survive, succeed and 
prosper in the age of technoglobalism, was well articulated by these authors.  
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1.7 International e-health technology transfer 
Globalisation has different meanings to different people. Some favour economic or 
financial integration, others are enamoured by its political convergence and uniformity, 
while some see the benefits of social or cultural proximity and affinity as a canvas for a 
‗new world order‘ (Cerny, 2000). A cosmopolitan constitution of globalisation3, is 
identified by Cerny (also identified by Fritsch, 2011, pp. 37-38) – its dynamics are 
characterized by complexity and multiplicity of disproportionate and rapidly changing 
actions of global and national state and non-state actors and organisations. The way 
globalisation works, when it comes to who benefits, is akin to ‗fortune favours the 
brave‘. It tends to favour those seen as more strategically predisposed and positioned, 
i.e. global technology leading nations and the multinationals that produce and utilise the 
technologies.  
The role ICT plays in the globalisation of virtual e-health services over the Internet and 
other telecommunication technologies cannot be disputed (Blum, 2002; Cartwright, 
2000; Edworthy, 2001; Frenk, 2005; Mandil, 1998; Rigby, Birch, & Roberts, 2000; 
Sinha, 2000). The utilisation of transferred e-health technologies must not be narrowly 
limited for exchanging health information or data trans-nationally, but essentially for 
delivering diagnostic and therapeutic services in developing countries, (Blum, 2002) 
advocated.  
                                               
3 The author‘s view of the development and use of e-health technologies in the age of globalisation was 
shaped partly by attending series of policy meetings at the Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(Chatham House) Global Health Security and Governance between 2008 and 2011. A classical case to 
illustrate the manifestation of geopolitics in the global development landscape was during the last global 
influenza pandemics in 2009.  This case gives an insight into ‗global-national‘ divide in the global 
development landscape. As the world was gripped in the fear of a potential global economic and security 
threatening pandemic, a request was sent from the World Health Organisation to the Indonesia national 
government to share viral specimens for global science and for the production of vaccines (The author 
was present at the Global Health Security conference at the Chatham House in 2010, when the Minister of 
Health from Indonesia presented and defended her country‘s ethical position). However, the Indonesian 
government ethically declined; on the basis that a global mechanism should be instituted to ensure that 
economically less fortunate developing countries have access to the vaccines to be developed from the 
specimen at affordable prices. Whether Indonesia had the right to decline in the face of a global crisis is a 
matter for a different debate, but it is important to point out that geopolitics and self-interest manifest in 
the conduct of international biomedical technology transfers. The Indonesian government national action 
was a negotiation for an affordable and fair transfer of global health technologies in the face of 
international diplomatic, altruistic, corporatist and mercantilist self-interests (Irwin, 2010).   
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Several international e-health initiatives have been implemented in the last two decades 
by global actors to improve healthcare in developing countries. Back in 1995, the 
international governmental organisation (IGO) G8, made up of the eight biggest 
economic and technology superpowers, initiated the now defunct G-8 Global Healthcare 
Applications Subproject-4 (G-8 GHAP-SP-4) (Lacroix et al., 2002). There is no 
evidence to indicate that the G-8 project was ever implemented. International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), another IGO, also has a history of implementing e-
health  in Africa (International Telecommunication Union, 2007; Trotter & Kawasumi, 
2004). In 2008, the American Telemedicine Association instituted a Global Forum on 
Telemedicine (Pak et al., 2008) for mobilizing  USA efforts, aimed at  tackling Global 
Health challenges.  
The authors identified different social, economic, ethical workforce, political, cultural 
and infrastructural factors that can either hinder or enable the transfers of virtual e-
health services to developing countries. However, with the exception of (Blum, 2002; 
Mandil, 1998), the authors have primarily focussed on studying international transfer of 
e-health services; and have largely neglected the international trade implications i.e. the 
regulation of the transnational transfers of software and hardware.  
Most of the above cited authors, narrowly focussed on the issue of ‗digital divide‘ to 
explain that infrastructural differences between developed and developing countries will 
hinder the latter in the conduct of virtual IeTTs. This thesis, however, is focussed more 
on the transfers of material e-health technologies, mostly on the development and 
utilisation of computing and telecommunication technologies. In addition, this thesis 
also addresses constraints to and conditions against domestic technology acquisition, a 
strategic topic largely ignored in this body of literature.   
1.7.1 International e-health technology transfers in Africa 
The conduct of IeTTs in African countries is emerging in different forms. IeTTs have 
emerged in the forms of North-South and South-South e-health partnerships, employing 
e-health as a global development tool in Africa. Such partnerships are being formed by 
governmental and non-governmental, public and private actors and organisations from 
developed and emerging economies, usually with African national and continental 
governmental organisations. For example in Africa, the European Space Agency (ESA) 
sponsored pan-African e-health initiative (Asamoah-Odei, et al., 2007) is employing 
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telemedicine, a subset of e-health, as a means of contributing  to the eradication of  
Global Health problems  in Africa. Likewise, the emerging global south economic 
power, India, has followed suit (Telecommunications Consultants India Limited, 2007). 
The Digital Solidarity Fund (DSF), an international digital divide alliance, planned to 
implement an ambitious ‗1000 Telemedicine Units for Africa‘.  
The conduct of an IeTT embodies economic, cultural, political, infrastructural and 
organizational factors (Blum, 2002; Cartwright, 2000; Frenk, 2005; International Space 
University, 1994; Meso, et al., 2009; Sinha, 2000). As such, transferred e-health 
technologies can disrupt existing local practices, because they transcend international 
geographical, economic, social and cultural boundaries. Such embodiments can make 
domestic acquisition difficult for recipient countries. By their nature, the conduct 
usually involves the endorsement of actors and organisations at the continental level and 
those of recipient African countries.  
The influx of transferred e-health technologies into Africa is a welcome development, 
as it provides an opportunity for acquiring domestic technical knowledge and for 
accumulating technologies. However, because of the complex interactions that the 
involvements of multiple actors bring to the conduct, it is recognised that it is 
paramount for African countries to exercise their national agency.  
The exercise of national agency
4
 is defined from the context of a national innovation 
system (Arocena & Sutz, 2003; Freeman, 1995, 2002; Lundvall, 2007; Muchie, 2008; 
Sharif, 2006). African countries and their national governments must put in place 
measures (policies, institutions, resources) to ensure that transferred e-health 
technologies are accumulated, and at the same time they assimilate the required 
technical knowledge. With no reference to e-health, (Chataway et al., 2009; Quaye, 
                                               
4 The author‘s view of the exercise of national agency in the implementation of national e-health 
programme was shaped partly by attending series of policy meetings organised by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat in Asia and Africa between 2009 and 2011. The opportunity presented itself to compare 
progress on national e-health implementation amongst African countries and their Asian counterparts. It 
was observed that Asian countries such as India and Malaysia were more advanced in their 
implementation when compared with African countries such as Nigeria and Uganda. There are two main 
insights we gained to explain the difference between Asian and African countries. The first is that the 
leadership role of the national governments of the Asian countries is evident both in policy development 
and in programme implementation. The second is a striking observation that these Asian countries in 
contrast with their African counterparts are less dependent on international technology transfers. They 
possess and are still acquiring domestic e-health technology competence.  
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1996) pointed out that a disjoint between health and industrial policies is making 
African countries passively dependent on importation of biomedical devices and 
instruments. The authors of the paper implored African countries to build their domestic 
innovation capacities and institutions so as to develop biomedical technologies, 
appropriate for serving and meeting their local needs.  
This assertion is backed by the review of an evaluation report, financed by the World 
Bank, carried out on a problematic internationally-sponsored e-Learning initiative, 
politically endorsed at continental level and implemented in 16 African countries 
(Farrell, Issacs, & Trucano, 2007). The authors discovered that the proactive role of 
national governments recipient countries, in the process of domestic implementations, 
could have ensured that the projects did not struggle to be sustained, which is what they 
observed. For instance, they identified that national governments could have fostered 
multi-sectoral collaboration amongst the diverse national ministries that were involved 
in their domestic implementations. How African countries can acquire e-health 
innovation competence, in the wake of globalisation
5
 could be a daunting task, as most 
are ‗technology laggards‘ (Forje, 2006; Lall & Pietrobelli, 2005; Ymele, 2011). 
1.7.2 Policy perspective on e-health in Africa  
Limited progress has been made in the implementation of national e-health initiatives in 
African countries. Only one country, South Africa, can be said to have made some 
progress in this regard, especially in the area of implementing e-health (including 
telemedicine, m-health and EHR) projects (Gulube & Wynchank, 2002; Kachienga, 
2008; Mars, 2009; Ruxwana, Herselman, & Conradie, 2010). This is despite the 
importance of e-health technologies for addressing health problems in Africa having 
long been recognised. At the African Development Forum (ADF) of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) conference in 1999, e-health was 
identified as essential for meeting Africa‘s health and other socio-economic goals 
(Economic Commission for Africa, 2004). Recently, continental policy directives from 
                                               
5 The author‘s view of African countries‘ limited agency in international global agenda was shaped partly 
by attending series of policy meetings at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) 
meetings on African Affairs between 2008 and 2011. We gained insight into the complexity, politics and 
power relations in the debates on global aid, diplomacy, trade and national development in Africa. We 
observed that limited mention is made of technology transfer in these debates.  
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the African Union (African Union, 2009, 2011), reiterated this policy and encouraged 
its member states to employ e-health technologies for addressing their national health 
needs. However, the impacts of the implementation of e-health initiatives in African 
countries have not been encouraging so far.    
A report AFR/RC60/5 (World Health Organisation, 2010a) on the state of e-health 
implementation in African countries released by the WHO Regional Office for Africa, 
gives insights into why this has been the case. The report laments the fragmented, small 
scale and experimental nature of existing e-health initiatives in African countries. The 
report identifies challenges that militate against successful national scale-up of 
transferred e-health technologies. Those that are of relevance to this thesis are:  
1. Uninspiring national leadership and poor organizational coordination which 
threatens large-scale adoption of technology transfers.  
2. Difficulties in keeping up with rapid global technoeconomic changes.  
3. Financial constraints at the national level that limit the procurement of 
technology from the global markets.  
The aim of these continental policy directives is to create incentives for African 
countries to start shifting away from passive dependence on IeTTs and to start scaling 
up small scale subnational pilots by mobilising domestic resources and expertise. To 
transit from being dependents of transferred e-health technologies to a sustainable 
national implementation, another document AFR/RC60/R3 (World Health Organisation, 
2010b) from the WHO African regional office recommends that transformation is 
required in economic, political and social spheres of the countries. African countries are 
also encouraged to exercise national agency in acquiring technologies from IeTTs. In 
addition, the countries are encouraged to mobilise domestic finances to build smart 
international partnerships and to formulate appropriate national e-health policies.  
The goals set by these continental governmental bodies are at odds with the realities of 
most African countries‘ limited technological innovation capabilities (Forje, 2006; Lall 
& Pietrobelli, 2005; Muchie, 2004; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006). Most African countries 
do not consider domestic innovation strategy in the implementation of their national e-
health initiatives. For instance, a review of national e-health policies of African 
countries (Ministry of Health Rwanda, 2009; Ministry of Health Zambia, 2006; 
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Ministry of Medical Services & Ministry of Public Health Services Kenya, 2009) 
reveals that no such strategy is being considered.  
1.8 Technology in e-health implementation in Africa 
Historically in Africa, national scale-up of small-scale implementations have been a 
policy and technical challenge in African countries. An explanation is that they were 
driven by cosmopolitan actors and organisations and are predominantly built on 
international technology transfers. Past and present cosmopolitan e-health initiatives in 
Africa range from small to large-scale implementations. Small-scale ones are usually 
subnational implementations at rural and urban clinics and hospitals in African 
countries. Whilst, large scale ones are often pan-African in space and reach; and, are 
either the development and utilisation of open–source software such as Open MRS 
(Allen, et al., 2007) or DHIS (J Braa, Hanseth, Heywood, Mohammed, & Shaw, 2007; 
J. Braa, et al., 2004) or intra-continental (Asamoah-Odei, et al., 2007; 
Telecommunications Consultants India Limited, 2007), and national (Geissbuhler, et al., 
2007; Geissbuhler, Ly, Lovis, & L‘Haire, 2003; Mars, 2009; Nchise, Boateng, Mbarika, 
Saiba, & Johnson, 2012), telemedicine initiatives.  
Long before the advent of mobile phones and GSM, telemedicine services either based 
on fixed satellite or ISDN telecommunication infrastructure (Aloo, 1988; Asamoah-
Odei, et al., 2007; Crump, 2006; Demerliac & Metzger, 1984; Gulube & Wynchank, 
2002; Habib-Sy, 1992; House et al., 1987; Howell, 1988; Pfister, 1999; Yesufu, 1990) 
has long dominated e-health implementations in Africa. In most of these instances, 
Africa‘s clinics or hospitals are usually digitally connected to international telemedicine 
infrastructures, either located in Europe or in North America. In recent times, 
international e-health implementations in Africa are moving beyond mere participations 
in virtual teleconsultation, to the transfers of connected biomedical technologies such as 
the inventions of e-health enabled medical devices and equipments. For instance, this 
project (Fleishman, et al., 2010) implemented in Kenya and Tanzania.  
In general, the fate of most of these implementations was uncertain. Perhaps essential 
contextual social, process, input, organisational, market, and environmental factors, 
were neglected. Evaluations carried out in Kenya (Ouma & Herselman, 2009), Rwanda 
(Ministry of Health Rwanda, 2009; Nchise, et al., 2012), Mali (African Union, 2011; 
Geissbuhler, et al., 2007; Geissbuhler, et al., 2003) and South Africa (Gulube & 
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Wynchank, 2002; Kachienga, 2008; Mars, 2009; Ruxwana, et al., 2010) highlighted the 
various challenges being faced in both sustaining and scaling e-health initiatives in 
these countries. Together, they commonly identify technological, economic, social, 
financial and infrastructural challenges as causes of uncertainty. Yet, an econometric 
analysis of determinants of e-health sustainability in Africa (Kirigia, Seddoh, Gatwiri, 
Muthuri, & Seddoh, 2005) , highlighted the  strategic need of national and continental 
leaderships.  
Previous information-based quantitative studies  (Kifle, et al., 2008; Meso, et al., 2009) 
have identified certain factors that can either constrain or enable national e-health 
(particularly focused on telemedicine, an e-health subset) implementation in Africa. 
Both studies identify that the presence and depth of National ICT and e-health policies, 
sophistication and distribution of telecommunication infrastructure, and the receptivity 
of national healthcare systems, can influence sustainable national e-health 
implementations in African countries.  
Areas for reforming national ICT policies in African countries in order to speed up e-
health adoption in African countries are also suggested by (Meso, et al., 2009). These 
include improvement to national regulatory frameworks, encouraging local 
manufacturing and maintenance of telemedicine equipments, and openness to 
international trade and partnerships.  
These areas are pertinent to the study of IeTTs in African countries. However, these 
studies take a narrow positivist approach to identifying predetermined national factors, 
and not on examining conditions that can constrain domestic e-health technology 
production and acquisition. In both studies, a careful reading suggests that only certain 
domestic factors that can constrain national adoption are identified; despite, the 
impression that the studies assessed e-health technology transfer. The studies do not 
identify or assess actions, events and conditions at national and international levels that 
can constrain acquiring domestic e-health innovation capacity. Moreover, the studies do 
not identify and examine factors and actions at national, continental and global levels 
that can cause such. 
1.9  National e-health implementation in Africa  
Certain factors that can contribute to successful implementations of e-health in Africa 
countries have been identified by (Bowman, Bell Jr, & Nyambura Ndung'u, 2009) from 
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an Information Society policy perspective, in a chapter from a book titled Science, 
Technology and Innovation for Public Health in Africa. The book chapter (pp. 123-
144), interrogates the states of national e-health implementations by reviewing national 
ICT policies and by interviewing government officials from national ministries of 
selected African countries. By identifying certain deficiencies of national capacities, the 
authors share similar views to those expressed  from the perspective of national 
innovation system in Information and Communication Technology for Development  
(ICT4D) in Africa (Kraemer-Mbula & Muchie, 2006; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006).   
The authors identify that e-health utilisation is a strategic investment for African 
countries to make to ensure that their populations have access to quality, effective and 
affordable healthcare services. Most of the e-health services (mostly telemedicine and 
m-health), identified were implemented by national governments (public sector), both 
local and global private sectors and by well-meaning non-governmental organisations 
and donors. However, the authors identify that most of the African countries only give 
e-health a mere mention in their national ICT policies.  
To rectify this anomaly, national governments and their public and private sectors must 
work together with continental (referred to as ‗regional‘ in the book, and given a 
passing mention) organisations, to ensure that sustainable e-health services are 
delivered. National governments in particular, in the view of their economic growth 
strategies, must make considerable investments to upgrade domestic ICT infrastructure 
and industry, so that the adoption of e-health can increase in their countries. Moreover, 
fostering of South-South and North-South partnerships is also recommended for 
acquiring technologies and expertise.  
Bowman et al., (2009), reports that few African countries have translated their e-health 
policy ambition into reality, because most are hindered by deficiencies in certain 
national capacities. Deficiencies in telecommunication and energy infrastructures, low 
national income per capita, technology regulation, and lack of skilled human resources 
are identified as hindering national scale-up.  
There are three gaps that this thesis will attempt to fill from the perspectives of national 
innovation system (NIS) and the role of technology in global development. We take the 
view that global digital technology divide is a reflection of the lack or immaturity of 
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domestic innovation capacities in developing and African countries (Freeman, 2000; 
James, 2002; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006).   
1. The authors highlight and recognise that a technological gap exists between 
industrialised and African countries (Bowman et. al., 2009, pp. 124-125), which 
can constrain sustainable national e-health adoption in the latter. However, they 
fall short of explicitly encouraging African countries to foster domestic e-health 
innovation capacity acquisition in the manner implied in NIS perspective, for 
example by (Forje, 2006; Juma, 2006). They assume that a possession of a 
domestic ICT industry will occur, without inevitable and conscious national 
technology accumulation and assimilation actions.  
An encouraging sign that domestic industry in biotechnology (that shares similar 
technological complexity with e-health), is emerging in some African countries 
(Chataway, et al., 2009; Juma, 2010), demonstrates that African national 
governments should strategically start considering the same approach with e-
health innovations. African policymakers are being encouraged to foster and 
forge domestic biomedical and biotechnology innovations and industries 
(Chataway, et al., 2009).  
2. The authors recommend that African national governments should adopt an 
incremental approach for implementing their national e-health initiatives, even 
in the face of the passive consumption of technologies provided by dependence 
on international technology transfers. They neglect to identify how passive 
dependence on IeTTs can hinder the translation of set national policy ambition 
into reality in their countries, in the face of the realities of African countries‘ 
limited technological innovation capabilities (Forje, 2006; Lall & Pietrobelli, 
2005; Ymele, 2011).   
3. Bowman et al., 2009, could not appreciate the complexity inherent in dealing 
with diverse actors and organisations at global, continental, national and 
subnational levels in the conduct of IeTTs. They were not exposed to the e-
health policy landscapes at national and international levels and did not have the 
privilege of the amount of data we have at our disposal. The authors did not 
explicitly identify and state how instrumental the institutional actions of actors 
and organisations at global, continental and subnational levels, can be.  
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We have experienced policy debates on e-health development and utilisation with 
influential international governmental organisations (IGOs) such as the World Health 
Organization, the United Nations, the International Telecommunication Union, the 
European Commission, the Africa Union (AU), United Nations Economic Council on 
Africa, and the Commonwealth Secretariat, as listed in Appendix A and others 
referenced in the body of the thesis. We noticed that in these policy debates, discussions 
pertaining to national technology acquisition in recipient countries were not always 
entertained.   
On this basis, the thesis will make academic and policy contributions to national e-
health technology development and utilisation in African countries.  
1.10 STS, Narrative, National Innovation and Globalisation 
The thesis is inspired by the moderate and middle-range Science and Technology 
Studies (STS)
 6
  constructivist view on the role of technology in global development 
(Sismondo, 2010, pp. 195-201) and the role of technology in the complex global 
geopolitical interactions (Fritsch, 2011). Middle-range in that a multi-level and multi-
theoretical perspectives are combined together to address complex society and 
technology problems (Frank W Geels, 2007; Roberts, 2012; Wyatt & Balmer, 2007). It 
is moderate in that technology exercises agency in complex transnational interactions 
(Fritsch, 2011, p. 38-39).  
                                               
6 The author's view of Science, Technology and Innovation studies was developed partly by attending a 
series of research meetings in the UK. These presented an opportunity to understand how STS theory can 
be used for studying complexity and uncertainty in the use and development of technology in the context 
of globalisation. Academic discussions at Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) workshops 
such as Technology for Health Systems Strengthening – Product Development Partnerships research 
consortium in 2009 and 2010 at the Open University, and the Social, Technological and Environmental 
Pathways to Sustainability (STEPS) launch of the ‗Innovation, Sustainability and Development: A New 
Manifesto’ at the Royal Society, London, were very useful. Also useful was to attend ‗Beyond Scaling 
Up: Pathways to Universal Access‘ (organised by the group "Future Health System  Innovations for 
Equity") in the 2010 workshop organised by International Development Studies, University of Sussex and 
also attending the International Workshop on Users, Innovation and Healthcare Technologies at the 
Freeman Centre for Research and Innovation Management, SPRU, University of Brighton.   
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Both Fritsch and Sismondo (ibid.) share the view on the instrumental roles of 
technologies in a society‘s socio-economic advancement in the wake of globalisation. 
Sismondo explicitly mentions that the utility of national innovation system (NIS) theory 
(Baskaran, 2005; Forje, 2006; Freeman, 2002; Lundvall, 2007; Mazzucato, 2011; 
Muchie, 2004, 2008; Sharif, 2006) for conceptualising  and understanding national 
technology acquisition in developing countries; even though, he suggested STS 
constructivism for micro-studies. Rather, Fritsch (2011, p. 36) investigated complex 
macro-interactions as global technoeconomic advancement contributes to the prosperity 
and survival of countries and peoples.  
STS research according to (Sismondo, 2010), investigates how scientific knowledge  
and technological artefacts are constructed – how scientists and technologists build 
socially situated knowledges and things. It is about studying the conduct and process of 
techno-science. STS can trace its origin to the social construction of technology (SCOT) 
and actor network theory (ANT) (Sismondo, 2010, pp 98-103). SCOT for example, has 
been employed for studying the trajectory and consequences of the development and 
utilisation of computerised systems and their associated infrastructures and institutions 
(Kling, 1992).  
The cyclical nature of interactions implied in both theories is evident in health 
informatics literature, for example (Chiasson, Reddy, Kaplan, & Davidson, 2006; 
Sunyoung Cho, et al., 2008; T Greenhalgh & Stones, 2010; Kaplan & Harris-Salamone, 
2009); however, are unsuitable for understanding the institutional structures in 
interactions of collectives that are either competing or cooperating in the invention and 
production of technologies. In addition, both are limitedly suitable for micro- case study 
method; and, are not capable of generalising findings and engaging fully with 
complexity of a subject matter, in a way that middle-range STS  (Frank W Geels, 2007; 
Wyatt & Balmer, 2007) will do.  
SCOT, because of its utility for studying the transfer of a technological artefact, will be 
improper for investigating the agential asymmetry that exists between national 
technology producers and consumers (Klein & Kleinman, 2002, p. 38). Such agential 
asymmetry can be difficult to identify and study, if either SCOT or other STS theory 
such as how actor-network theory (ANT) is used. They are presented by (Geels, 2007, 
pp. 630-635) as descriptive and not analytical, mostly suitable for micro-level, localised 
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and action-oriented study of complex sociotechnical interactions driving an innovation 
systems. Similar deficiencies was found with ANT by (Robert, 2012, pp. 39-44) making 
it not too suitable for identifying and studying complexity and hidden or invincible 
agencies of the events and actions of technoglobalism. Both are not suitable for 
studying complex national innovation system in the face of confounding technological 
complexities and controversies (De Laet & Mol, 2000, pp. 225-227). Therefore, their 
suitability for investigating innovation policy is weak.  
Our use of STS constructivism is broader than what Fritsch and Sismondo advocated. 
We combine moderate and middle-range STS constructivism and NIS institutionalism 
(Klein & Kleinman, 2002; Nelson, 2008; Nelson & Nelson, 2002) and Deleuzian 
poststructuralist narratives (Sikes & Gale, 2006 and Gale, 2010) to study the 
transnational development and utilisation of e-health technologies. Such combination 
was advocated by (Juma, et al., 2001) for using social theories to inquire into policy 
issues of socioeconomic relevance and import in Africa.  
Thus, we investigate similar complex sociotechnical interactions of those that occur at a 
‗macro-societal/institutional‘ level (Avgerou, 2003; Corea, 2000; W. Currie, 2009; F.W. 
Geels, 2004; Roberts, 2012), so as to identify and explain the hidden ‗institutional 
structures‘ (Nelson & Nelson, 2002) that underpins distributed and globalised 
interactions of the conduct  of IeTTs in Africa. The combination of methods and 
theories is suitable for studying the implications of complex, dynamic and uncertainty 
social, economic and technological issues in society. 
The study investigates institutional structures of the interactions between producers and 
consumers of technologies in the age of technoglobalism, when national technology 
acquisition is of interest. Principles articulated in the sociology and economics of 
dynamic and evolutionary theory of sociotechnical nature and process of innovation, are 
adopted. Whether a technology is implemented in a nation or service sector, the 
principles of NIS address the dynamic and uncertain process of innovation in and 
across, geographies and organisations. The objectives are to identify and explore 
institutional manifestations of forms, identities and arrangements that underpin the 
actions of the constitutive actors and organisations involved in the conduct of IeTTs, 
and which, can either constrain or condition domestic e-health technology  acquisition.  
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Following Deleuzian poststructuralist narrative method, the thesis is presented as a 
‗continuous process of creative evolution‘ (Gale, 2010), this implies that the 
constructing narratives is akin to the process of innovation itself. The use of narrative, 
not necessarily Deleuzian in nature, is a longstanding method for studying policy 
concerns of technological controversies (Jasanoff, 1996; Kling, 1992; Lehoux & Blume, 
2000; May, 2006). This is a qualitative, expressive and interpretative method – that 
engages with and embraces and connects the complexity and multiplicity of the 
technological controversies; in the way of middle-range STS constructivism. 
A narrator/ethnographer, just as innovators and entrepreneurs employ creativity to deal 
with, and overcome, uncertainties and risks in the course of an innovation or an 
engineering process. A narrator constructs new/non-traditional knowledge about a 
complex subject (i.e. the conduct of IeTTs) and a novel object (i.e. e-health 
technologies) by organising, connecting and re-presenting previously unrelated multiple 
data in new format. 
1.10.1 Research aim and objectives 
The aim of this research is to identify, explore, and demonstrate how actions taken by 
global, continental, national and subnational actors can constrain, and how exercising 
National Agency can condition African countries‘ domestic e-health innovation 
capacity acquisition. The research objectives are: 
1. To argue that a history of technological path-dependency on IeTTs is associated 
with the current immature state of an African country‘s domestic e-health 
innovation capacity; 
2. To demonstrate and explore how the actions of global actors and organisations 
can condition a recipient‘s national e-health technology acquisition dynamics and 
trajectory; 
3. To demonstrate and explore how the actions of continental actors and 
organisations can condition a recipient‘s national e-health technology acquisition 
dynamics and trajectory; 
4. To demonstrate and explore how the actions of national actors and organisations 
can condition domestic e-health technology accumulation and assimilation depth 
and scale;  
5. To demonstrate and explore  that a National government exercise of National 
Agency is imperative  for national e-health technology acquisition;  
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6. To propose and elaborate a global collaboration framework for re-
conceptualising international cooperation so as to foster a successful national e-
health technology acquisition.  
1.10.2 Organisation of thesis  
A conceptual framework that underlines the research focus is presented in Chapter 2. 
This research is presented on two levels.  
The first is descriptive and exploratory in nature and addresses objectives 1-4. It is 
presented in Chapters 3-6. We employ the STS concept of ‗symmetry‘ to give  a 
balanced view of  identifying and demonstrating how the institutional actions of actors 
and organisations at global, continental and national levels can constrain or condition 
domestic e-health innovation capacity acquisition in the conduct of IeTTs. Deleuzian 
poststructuralist narrative method as informed by (Sikes & Gale, 2006) is employed as 
most appropriate means of organising or ordering the messy and multiple qualitative 
data that we have collected. The organisation of data employs a structure of generating 
‗narrative themes‘ in the process of ordering messy data. 
The second level, in Chapter 7, addresses objective 5 and discusses and highlights 
findings from the narrative themes from sections and sub-sections of Chapters 3-6. As 
Sikes & Gale 2006 do not specify a definitive approach for analysing narrative themes, 
the discussions highlight how institutional actions of actors and organisations at global, 
continental and national levels can constrain (and also enable) national e-health 
technology acquisition  . It introduces a framework to conceptualise the complexity, 
power and politics in the interactions among multiple actors and organisations in the 
conduct of IeTTs. An argument is put forward that if African governments aim to 
successfully implement their national e-health initiatives, they must learn from what 
global technology leaders are doing.  
We employ an African adage to describe what is on offer in the rest of the thesis. It goes 
this way. If you point an accusing finger at someone, you must remember that three 
fingers are pointing back at you! If African countries had and are struggling to acquire 
e-health innovation capacity from IeTTs, a teasing question to ask is, ‗Who is to 
blame?‘ Is it correct to point accusatory fingers at global universities and companies 
that invent or manufacture technologies, or at continental bureaucrats and 
policymakers?  Are passive national governments implicated in the struggle?  This 
thesis provides the answer.  
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2 Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the conceptual framework for this thesis. The conceptual 
framework presents the literatures, theories and methods that informs why and how the 
research study is conducted. It sets out how the study explores and examines the 
institutional structures in the interactions at global, continental and national levels in the 
conduct of IeTTs. How we identify and examine their constraining or conditioning 
influences on national e-health technology acquisition variations and dynamics in 
Africa.  
2.2 Technology and Globalisation  
In technoglobalism, interactions between technology and institutional structures occur 
in the complex interactions among state and non-state actors. According to (Fritsch, 
2011, pp. 35-36), countries negotiate the highly politicised, power-driven, competitive 
and complex nature of globalisation in their technology acquisition quests. A similar 
view is shared by Cerny, 2000 in the context of ‗liberal or cosmopolitan interactions‘ 
(Fritsch, 2011, pp. 37-38). What this implies is that, the efforts of a global technology 
laggard on its national technology acquisition is not only dependent on the exercise of 
its Agency, but on how it can strategically interact with the complex configuration of 
state and non-state actors in the wake of globalisation.  
From a globalisation perspective, a transnational transfer of a technological artefact or 
knowledge as either enabled or constrained by the manifestations of the complex 
interplay of constitutive social, infrastructural, political, cultural, economical factors 
(Fritsch, 2011, pp. 38-39). According to (Sismondo, 2010, p. 201), ‗the conduct of 
technoscience should be viewed in terms of context-specific forms of knowledge and 
practice that interact in a set of globally distributed social interests‘. Moreover, a 
technology transfer embodies ‗tacit or implicit knowledge which are not readily 
available or shared‘ (ibid. p. 202). This view is in contrast to the neoliberal assumption 
implied in the international technology transfer (ITT) literature, for example in (Aloo, 
1988; Cartwright, 2000; Christol, 1974; Colino, 1968; Contractor & Sagafi-Nejad, 
1981; Cowhey, 1990; Crump, 2006; Goldsby & Boyd, 2001; Holmes, 1995; Howell, 
1988; Lambright, 1994; Nogueira, 1998; Reddy & Zhao, 1990). A cosmopolitan 
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exercise of innovation agency noted in these transfers, is in the mould that (Kaplinsky, 
2011; Schumacher, 1972; Toye, 2012) Fritz Schumacher advocated.  
The neoliberal assumption stems from the position taken that the exchange of 
technology in a global system is restricted to countries that are in contention with each 
other and that exclude other non-state actors such as International Governmental 
Organisations (IGOs) and multinationals. In addition, neoliberalism takes for granted 
the essentiality of innovation, learning and competence building in recipient countries 
of ITTs that occurs in dependent relationships of globalised interactions (Arocena & 
Sutz, 2003, pp. 176-178; Kaplinsky, 2011, pp. 194-195; Lundvall, 2007, pp. 109-110; 
and Sharif, 2006, pp. 753-757).  
It is generally taken for granted that technology acquisition can occur without an 
exercise of National Agency or by forging a functional Schumpeterian National 
Innovation System (NIS). A neoliberal assumption that forging a domestic innovation 
capacity by recipients is a linear process is, rather; challenged in the thesis. Our 
contention is that national technology acquisition can be constrained by the 
cosmopolitan, complex and uncertain globalised and transnational nature of IeTTs‘ 
conduct.  
An innovative combination of middle-range STS constructivism (Wyatt & Balmer, 
2007) in combination with NIS institutionalism (Nelson, 2008; Nelson & Nelson, 2002) 
and poststructuralist narrative (Sikes & Gale, 2006) provide an alternative ontology to 
challenge the implied neoliberalism. There are two areas of contention inspired by 
(Blum, 2002). Blum, 2002, pp. 102-107, argued Blum, 2002, pp. 102-107 that a smooth 
transfer of e-health technologies to these countries can be hindered by geopolitical 
contentions and geo-economic arrangements, international power relations, strict global 
patent regimes, technoeconomic upheavals, and unpredictable global funding 
mechanisms. The first is that the process of national e-health technology acquisition in 
Africa is a linear, non-complex and apolitical one. The second is that the relationships 
in the conduct are vertical and hierarchical.  
We are taking the view that the interactions in the conduct of IeTTs are diffuse and 
horizontal in configuration –a constitution of multiple and diverse actors and 
organisations. By studying institutional structures of the interactions between producers 
and consumers of technologies, as suggested by (Avgerou, 2003; F.W. Geels, 2004; 
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Klein & Kleinman, 2002; Lundvall, 2007; Nelson & Nelson, 2002). Investigating how 
past institutional actions and events at multiple national and international levels are 
historically and institutionally path-dependent to the present poor state of national e-
health technology capacities in African countries. The institutional focus examines how 
different collectives – each constituting actors and organisations at global, continental 
and national level, co-negotiate the development and utilisation of technologies during 
complex interactions.  
National acquisition can be shaped by prevalent technoeconomic and geopolitical 
contexts of technoglobalism (Sharif, 2006, p. 760-761 and Arocena & Sutz, 2006, pp. 
172-174). Accordingly, contestations, conflicts, competition, power asymmetry, 
compromise, politics, cooperation arise during complex interactions between producers 
and consumers. In such interactions, the material nature of technologies can determine a 
country‘s domestic innovation capacity acquisition dynamics and trajectory.  
2.3 Technology transfers and National Innovation System 
From the perspective of global development, domestic technoscience is viewed as a 
national action (Sismondo, 2010, box 17.1, p 191). Furthermore, in the wake of 
globalisation, the proactive role of a national government is the tested means of 
ensuring technology acquisition certainty (Fritsch, 2011). Contributing to a long-
standing policy debate on developing countries‘ domestic innovation dynamics,  
(Kaplinsky, 2011) noted an instrumentality of a endogenous Schumpeterian engine in 
the rapid technoeconomic growth of emerging global East economies such as China and 
India. A remarkable feat, given it is occurring in the face of an enshrined global 
development redistributive policy preferred by cosmopolitans. 
The Schumpeterian engine explained by the NIS theory, instructs that the possession of 
endogenous innovation capacity is essential for fostering domestic invention, 
engineering and manufacturing (Baskaran, 2005; Bauer, Lang, & Schneider, 2012; 
Freeman, 1995, 2002; Juma, 2006; Juma & Bell Jr, 2006; Achim Lang, Schneider, & 
Bauer, 2012; Lundvall, 2007; Mazzucato, 2011; Mohan, et al., 2002; Muchie, 2008; 
Nelson, 2008; Pavitt, 1998). It represents the conduct of national technoscience and a 
codification of how the United Kingdom in the early 19
th
 century, became the most 
industrialised nation in the world and in the process, a global technology leader 
(Freeman, 1995 & 2002). Learning how to innovate and industrialise is what NIS is 
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about and it is captured in the concept of developmental state. This conceptualises in 
historical and contemporaneous term, how hitherto technology lagging countries such as 
Germany and South Korea, have become technology frontiers or leaders. Therefore, 
learning for an innovation lagging country is to acquire domestic technology 
competence from compressed and received experiences of the leaders. That is to 
accumulate and assimilate technoscientific knowledge through rapid creation of 
institutions and infrastructures of domestic innovation. Such accumulation and 
assimilation are made possible by mixing acquisitions from ITTs with domestic 
fostering and forging of innovations and enterprises (Forje, 2006; Fu, Pietrobelli, & 
Soete, 2011; Lall & Pietrobelli, 2005).  
Fostering domestic innovation is implied in the concept of ‗entrepreneurial state‘ 
(Mazzucato, 2011, pp. 63-70); which, emphasises and highlights the role of public 
sector in stimulating, organising, regulating and steering state investments into 
prioritised domestic technosciences. This aligns with the concept of developmental state 
(Forje, 2006; Muchie, 2008; Ymele, 2011), but with a slight difference in agential 
orientation. Whilst, with developmental states, as a policy imperative, technology 
lagging countries are encouraged to learn innovation; with an entrepreneurial state, the 
emphasis is for national governments in frontier countries to become innovation 
stewards, domestic ethical financiers and markets organisers. The former, foregrounds 
technology creation and accumulation; whereas, the latter is about the state taking 
innovation risks by reforming extant NIS institutions. Therefore, both can be seen as 
policy and practical articulations of Schumpeterian innovation. What developmental 
state concept explains, though, is the instrumentality of ITTs in forging domestic 
innovation assimilation and accumulation.  
The catalytic instruments, is emphasised by (Freeman, 2002; Perez & Soete, 1988). For 
instance, Sachs (2003, p. 138-139) observes how the adoption of this model ensured 
that South Korea‘s long-term participations in varied ITTs translated into successful 
national technology acquisition. Same can also be said of India (Baskaran, 2006) in how 
it incrementally developed its domestic Satcom technology industry.  
As past conduct of IeTTs in Africa were dominated by Satcom technology, for example 
(Crump, 2006; Geissbuhler, et al., 2003; House, et al., 1987; Howell, 1988; 
International Space University, 1994). Hence, it is informative to point out that the birth 
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of its global industry came on the back of a East-West geopolitical contention (Cold 
War rivalry) between the USA and the former Soviet Union (Christol, 1974; Colino, 
1968; Cowhey, 1990; Lambright, 1994; Levy, 1975; Peter, 2006). This birth accelerated 
and contributed to the successive emergence of semiconductor-based innovations. 
Subsequent computing and telecommunication technologies such as mobile phones 
became increasingly affordable and miniaturised, following a path earlier set by the 
emergence of mini and micro-satellites (Goldsby & Boyd, 2001; Irish, Paul, Shaumeyer, 
Gaither III, & Borden, 1999; Nogueira, 1998; Sweeting, 2000). Contemporary e-health 
technologies such as in m-health implementations (Briggs, Adams, Fallahkhair, 
Iluyemi, & Prytherch, 2012) reflect these historical but incremental technoeconomic 
changes.  
NIS views national technology acquisition as a long-term domestic process, 
underpinned by a country‘s innovative educational and research system, productive 
industries and technically competent human resources. This is in contrast to the well-
meaning, but cosmopolitan, short-term experimental nature of technology development, 
for example in (Fleishman, et al., 2010; Geissbuhler, et al., 2003) that characterises the 
conduct of IeTTs in African countries.  
Sismondo (2010) argues that the role of a ‗nation-state as a scientific state‘ is a feature 
of modernity (globalisation) and that ‗the state takes on the task of administering life 
itself‘, (ibid. p. 191, box 17.1). The conduct of national techno-science is what separates 
such global technology leaders such as USA, UK, South Korea, Japan and Norway from 
others, i.e. from technology laggard African countries. Sachs (2003, p.138) describes 
the acquisition process in countries like South Korea and Malaysia as a ‗kind of self-
conscious drive towards scientific and technological capacity ...‘ To point out, these 
technology frontier countries are also global leaders in national electronic health record 
(EHR) implementation and industry (Aanestad & Jensen, 2011; Castro, 2009; Coiera, 
2009; Ellingsen & Monteiro, 2012; Johannessen, et al., 2012; Larsen & Ellingsen, 2012; 
Sheikh, et al., 2011). As global technology laggards, African countries are 
technologically less competent than these countries (Forje, 2006; Ymele, 2011), and this 
can make their national e-health innovation acquisitions  very difficult to achieve. 
Such countries, according to (F.W. Geels, 2004) must develop regulative and normative 
institutions to finance and undertake domestic R&Ds, and develop technical standards 
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so as to foster domestic industrial growth. Moreover, their national governments must 
institute pro-innovation public sector behaviours, in order to ensure that regulative and 
normative institutions are properly promoted and implemented. This stresses the 
proactive roles of their national governments in ensuring ‗win-win‘ participations in 
ITTs, by mobilizing domestic and foreign finances into infrastructural and industrial 
investments (ibid. pp. 138-139). Fittingly, this view aligns with a policy view (Forje, 
2006; Juma, 2006, 2010; Juma & Bell Jr, 2006; Muchie, 2004, 2008; Ymele, 2011) on 
how African countries must acquire domestic technology capacities through the 
combined leadership and agency of their continental and national governments.  
The fundamental premise of this developmental state policy is how African countries 
can acquire and build domestic technology competence through both endogenous, and 
international, technology transfers. In the wake of globalisation, African countries are 
urged African countries to embrace and practise the principles of national techno-
science. Thus, these lagging countries must invest into civil, mechanical and electrical 
engineering capacities (Juma, 2006), urgently needed to build and repair its deficient 
and decaying physical infrastructures, such as their telecommunications and health 
system.  
The narrative of an engineering of public water provision infrastructure in an African 
country, Zimbabwe is associated with national building (De Laet & Mol, 2000). An 
incremental design and production of water -pumping devices, enabled by a catalytic 
combination of cosmopolitan and national agencies and possession of domestic 
manufacturing capacity, became a driver for a nation-wide infrastructural 
implementation. The influences of regulative and normative institutions in its immature 
NIS were transformative (ibid. pp. 235-256), for example, domestic technical skills and 
craftsmanship were reportedly improved. For example, the authors noted a domestic 
engineering that went into ensuring a temporally successful implementation of the 
country‘s public water infrastructure. Hence, this made the collective enterprise a matter 
of national pride and a contributor to the country‘s public health goals.  
2.4 Technology transfers and Globalisation 
Technology pervades our society and  is instrumental and intrinsic for creating wealth 
for nations and ensuring the wellbeing of their citizens (Freeman, 2002; Fritsch, 2011; 
Juma, 2006; Lundvall, 2007; Mazzucato, 2011; Pavitt, 1998; Ymele, 2011). With such a 
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foregrounding context of globalisation, international political contentions and 
complexity in the conduct of ITTs are inevitable, because of the plural interests and 
influences of the constitutive global networks of national and international state and 
non-state actors and organisations, asserts (Fritsch 2011, pp. 29-33). Such is evident in 
the literature on satellite technology transfers (Christol, 1974; Colino, 1968; Cowhey, 
1990; Demerliac & Metzger, 1984; Goldsby & Boyd, 2001; Häusler & Simonis, 1985; 
Holmes, 1995; Howell, 1988; Lambright, 1994; Nogueira, 1998; Peter, 2006; Zuzek & 
Bhasin, 1996) to developing countries. Though ITTs are the strategic means for aspiring 
developmental or entrepreneurial developing countries‘ domestic innovation capacity 
acquisitions, such highly complex and pluralistic nature create structural constraints for 
them, argues (Contractor & Sagafi-Nejad, 1981; Reddy & Zhao, 1990).  
The constitutive complex interactions are also detailed in NIS literature such as 
(Arocena & Sutz, 2003; Chataway, Hanlin, Mugwagwa, & Muraguri, 2010; Freeman, 
2002; Juma, et al., 2001; Lundvall, 2007; Perez & Soete, 1988; Sharif, 2006) support 
this claim. Though traditionally limited to the study of institutional forms and identities, 
such as the mercantilist and industrialist
7
 nature of ITTs, (Sachs, 2003) has in addition, 
however drawn attention to the altruistic and diplomatic nature of the conduct  in global 
development. These four institutional forms are evident in the conduct of IeTTs and 
other technology transfers in Global Health and ICT4D practises. The reality is a 
complex and contested interactions of diverse range of nations, IGOs, multinationals, 
international non-governmental organisations (iNGOs) and international development 
organisations (IDOs).  
The bodies of literature that capture global development conducts are from three broad 
disciplines (information system (IS) and science, technology and innovation (STI) 
related in parts to e-health and ICT4D and biomedical technologies transfers). Not least, 
because that the co-evolutionary history of computing, telecommunication and 
biomedicine technosciences in the US (Kaplan, 1987). They converge in investigating 
policy contexts of global development and technoglobalism and demonstrated that 
                                               
7 The ITT and NIS literature have focussed on commercial and international trade relationships in ITTs. 
They parochially focussed on the relationships of states, firms and multinationals to the neglect of non-
state actors such as individuals, international governmental organisations and non-governmental 
organisations. 
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tensions exist in the interactions of multiple and diverse institutions and technologies in 
the conduct of ITTs. That politics, asymmetric power relations, contentions, and 
complexity mediate in the interactions.   
2.4.1 ITTs and Global Health  
The cosmopolitan conduct of IeTTs shares similarity with the current conduct of 
biomedical ITTs (Chataway, et al., 2010; Free, 2004; Howitt et al., 2012; Malkin, 
2007). The transfers of connected medical devices such as point-of-care diagnostics 
largely designed and produced in technology frontier countries, are gaining prominence 
in global development policy. Global biomedical techno-scientific efforts and expertise 
are being directed at inventing technologies for addressing global health problems in 
developing countries, especially those in Africa. Though much needed and potentially 
life-saving public health interventions, such efforts have yet to yield tangible benefits in 
African countries; partly because of the inherent complexity and multi-agency 
intensiveness of the process (Ngoasong, 2010). Also as a result of an immature but 
steadily improving domestic innovation capacities of African countries in biomedicine 
and biotechnology (Al-Bader, Masum, Simiyu, Daar, & Singer, 2010; Chataway, et al., 
2009; Frew, Sammut, Siu, & Daar, 2006; Juma, 2010). If the well-intentioned and 
optimistic goal is making such technologies affordable and appropriate in the recipients 
(Howitt et al., 2012, pp. 509-510), then, the protagonists‘ preference for a Schumacher 
model of technology development hasn‘t been sensitive to the immature states of their 
domestic competence and industry. 
It must be taken into consideration that past conduct of biomedical technology transfers 
to developing and African countries, has been critiqued for breeding dependency on the 
donors and multinationals in terms of unsustainable technical and financial supports 
(Donald, 1999; Quaye, 1996). The institutional politics and power evident in the 
conduct can either constrain or condition successful technology transfers. For example, 
(Chataway, et al., 2010; Feldbaum & Michaud, 2010; King, 2002; Malkin, 2007; 
Ngoasong, 2010) have articulated that, geopolitical and geo-economic concerns and 
institutions of global mercantilism and diplomacy loom large in the interactions.   
2.4.2 ITTs and Information technology 
Uncertainty and complexity is observed in the interactions of the conduct of IeTTs in 
Africa. Similar findings are documented in the ICT4D literature, in which, agency is 
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similarly cosmopolitan as in the trans-national transfers of virtual e-Services and 
utilisation is narrowly that of digital services at subnational levels. The development 
and utilisation of the underlying software and hardware that powers virtual services in a 
Schumpeterian sense, is not typically a common topic in this literature.  
Perhaps taken for granted, the ICT4D literature, taking an Information Society 
perspective (Avgerou, 2003; Bowman, et al., 2009; Corea, 2000; Gilhooly, 2005; 
Heeks, 2008; Kifle, et al., 2008; Mbarika, Okoli, Byrd, & Datta, 2005; Meso, et al., 
2009; Pfister, 1999; M. Thompson, 2004; M Thompson & Walsham, 2010; Ya'u, 2005) 
have omitted to give due notice to Schumpeterian innovation. Similar omission is noted 
with, those on e(m)-health utilisation (J Braa, et al., 2007; J. Braa, et al., 2004; 
Cartwright, 2000; Edworthy, 2001; Fleishman, et al., 2010; Geissbuhler, et al., 2007; 
Gerber, et al., 2010; Mechael, 2009; Ouma & Herselman, 2009; Rigby, et al., 2000; 
Ruxwana, et al., 2010; Sinha, 2000; Tomlinson, et al., 2013). Whilst, collectively, these 
authors have highlighted the problem of a ‗global imbalance in the utilisation of ICTs‘ 
ala Freeman, 2000 and James, 2003; their analyses are by and large, information-based, 
action-oriented, managerial and micro-individual in orientation.  
The ICT4D authors have fleetingly mentioned the need for national technology 
acquisition in recipient developing countries. Strikingly, the exercise of agency is more 
tilted towards cosmopolitanism. Notwithstanding, Thompson & Walsham, 2010 have 
made a clarion to recognise the imperative of economic productivity and 
entrepreneurship to Africa‘s socio-economic advancement. In general, the literature has 
not treated the transfers of ICTs from a Schumpeterian innovation view. They have been 
shy to emphasise the instrumentality of domestic innovation assimilation and 
accumulation in the cosmopolitan conduct of ITTs.  
Nevertheless, few of this orientation, for example, (Avgerou, 2003; Corea, 2000; Pippin 
& Qureshi, 2011) have taken an innovation-based perspective; but, not completely 
embracing Schumpeterian notion of innovation as in national innovation system. As an 
immaturity or a lack of industrial capacity is a structural constraint in African countries. 
Avgerou (ibid.) from a macro-societal/institutional view inquired about a managerial 
conduct of an N-S IeTT; and, concluded that marked relative difference in innovation 
capacity between the technology donor/producer and the recipient/consumer, ultimately 
accounted for an uncertain implementation in the latter. Corea (ibid.) in contrast took a 
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micro-individual, behavioural view; and, presented national technology acquisition as a 
sociotechnical process – which can be hindered by stable cognitive/behavioural 
institutions of innovation. However, no mention was made of normative and regulative 
institutions cited by (F.W. Geels, 2004) as necessary for fostering sustainable 
technological and systemic innovations.  
Similarly, but with a globalisation slant, Pippin & Qureshi, 2012 is closer to completely 
embracing Schumpeter. They employed a combination of Schumpeterian ‗creative 
destruction‘ and Schumacher ‗intermediate technology‘, to study how the utilisation of 
(not invention and production of), mobile phones is creating new technoeconomic 
opportunities for entrepreneurs and small enterprises in developing a country. The 
combination of the two models of technology development and utilisation is closer to 
the approach we are adopting in the thesis (Chapter 7).  
2.4.3 National agency and Global techno-development  
In both the policy spaces of Global Health and ICT4D, the idea of a Schumpeterian 
national innovation system (NIS) is a foreign one. A possession of domestic innovation 
capacity for accumulating and adapting transferred technologies is not well accounted 
for in their respective global policies. Recipient countries are merely consumers of 
externally produced technologies in a Schumacher cosmopolitan sense a la (Kaplinsky, 
2011; Schumacher, 1972; Toye, 2012). The economics is consumerist not industrial in 
the recipients.  
Research of their conducts typically references and subscribes to Amartya Sen‘s model 
of socio-economic development that emphasises investments into upgrading human 
capital. With his preference for capability-based approach to development, it can 
explain how individuals‘ entrepreneurial spirit and learning can be acquired in a 
Schumpeterian sense (Lundvall, 2007, p. 114). Nevertheless, this is, not about fostering 
national innovation. By focussing narrowly on ICTs as inputs, Sen omits the other four 
Schumpeterian process, organisation, market and product innovations that NIS theory 
advances. It is also unsuitable for explaining the structural and dynamic nature of 
national innovation acquisition trajectory (Muchie, 2008, pp. 13-14).  
The global redistribution policy, that Sen‘s model (Kaplinsky, 2011, p. 193) informs, is 
prominent in of Global Health and ICT4D policies. In this sense, Schumacher once 
advocated for a large-scale redistributive consumption of global resources (Toye, 2012, 
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p. 395), as opposed to Schumpeterian notion of NIS. Emphasis in research and practice 
is un-developmentally tilted towards promoting consumption of transferred ICT and 
biomedical technologies a la Sachs, 2003; in a Schumacher sense. Largely omitted in 
the policy were imperatives of domestic innovation capacities in Africa needed to foster 
transformative biomedical (Al-Bader, et al., 2010; Chataway, et al., 2009; Frew, et al., 
2006; Juma, 2010) and ICTs innovations (Kraemer-Mbula & Muchie, 2006, 2009; 
Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006). A surprising omission it is, because a country‘s national 
development‘s trajectory is closely interwoven with innovations in its health and ICTs 
sectors.   
 The Global Health movement is keen to emphasise that investment into human capital 
development will automatically translate into long-term technoeconomic growth and 
progress. However, the relationship between a country‘s socioeconomic status and 
health is more complex than the implied linearity – it is a ‗chicken and egg‘ situation. 
The economic strength of a nation measured in gross domestic product (GDP) 
positively correlates with and dialectically co-determines its public health (Howitt, 
2005; van Zon & Muysken, 2007). Investments and innovations in a nation‘s health 
sector can build and equip its human resource capacities, which might in turn powers its 
technoeconomic progress, collective learning and creativity, productivity and economic 
growth. The instrumental co-determining relationship roles of domestic innovation 
capacity and health in a nation‘s developmental trajectory (van Zon & Muysken, 2007, 
p. 10-11), is explicitly missing in current Global Health policy.   
The instrumental role of ICTs as both a driver of and a foundation for an African 
nation‘s socioeconomic advancement is well documented (Bowman, et al., 2009; 
Kraemer-Mbula & Muchie, 2006, 2009; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006; Ymele, 2011). 
However in mainstream global ICT4D policy, the dialectic and co-determining 
relationship between domestic innovation capacities and how these technologies are 
invented and combined to produce novel and upgraded products and services, were just 
as noted in Global Health policy, omitted. Not least, technology frontier countries are 
concomitantly global innovation and information leaders. As those posses established 
industrial capacities in semiconductor and consumer electronics R&D and 
manufacturing (Bauer, et al., 2012; Freeman, 2002; Achim Lang, et al., 2012; Macher, 
Mowery, & Di Minin, 2007; Mazzucato, 2011).   
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To theorise how industrialisation can occur in African countries, Sen might be 
unsuitable; because, building individual capabilities alone is not sufficient to leapfrog 
from technology lagging state to that of leading or following (Muchie, 2008, p. 17). 
Capability approach seems not sufficient to make the countries entrepreneurial or 
developmental states.  
In general, in these Global Health and ICT4D literatures, it is taken for granted that the 
recipients possess or share a universal domestic innovation capacity standard as the 
donor.  Given that such capacity is essential for making feasible a successful technology 
acquisition. Rather, we need to stress particularism in the face of implied universalism. 
For instance, differences in ecology and geographical location between a technology 
leading country and a lagging African one that could potentially make domestic 
innovation acquisition difficult (Sachs 2003, pg. 136), stress the need to challenge such 
implied universalism. In this regard, it is expected that the responsibility to acquire lies 
with the recipient country in a global system:  i.e. where institutional arrangements such 
as multilateralism, regionalism and bilateralism act as mediators in international 
cooperation (Contractor & Sagafi-Nejad 1981, pp. 126-127). Such arrangements could 
be a strategic choice made by a country (Contractor & Sagafi-Nejad, 1981; Lall & 
Pietrobelli, 2005; Reddy & Zhao, 1990). It is the proactive efforts of the national 
governments that ensure that technology acquisition materialises and is not taken for 
granted during participations in the institutional arrangements of international 
cooperation, (Juma, et al., 2001) advocated.  
Proactivity is line with the concept of national entrepreneurship or developmentalism. 
In this instance, the recipient countries, through the formulation of an active policy, 
must assimilate tacit knowledge from ITTs to be able to adapt transferred technologies 
to national needs and usage, asserts (Reddy & Zhao 1990, pp. 292-294). It is this 
process of assimilation and adaptation, beyond the mere or passive adoption of 
transferred technologies, which determines successful acquisition. What contributes to 
such successful acquisition is the ability of African countries to overcome specific 
institutional structures constraints at international and national levels, assert (Forje, 
2006; Lall & Pietrobelli, 2005; Muchie, 2004; Ymele, 2011). To identify the scope of 
such constraints, the exploration by (Freeman, 2002) of how national technology 
acquisition comes from interactions within a global innovation system, is informative. 
Within which, such acquisition comes into being through complex interactions of 
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global, continental, national and subnational actors and organisations. Cross-linking 
institutionalised structures of these cross-interactions, can make assimilation and 
accumulation, difficult.  
2.5 National e-health technology development 
The sophistication of a country‘s extant domestic innovation capacity, for instance its 
medical invention and manufacturing strengths, correlates with its ability to provide 
quality healthcare to its citizens, observes (Chataway, et al., 2009; Juma, 2010; Pavitt, 
1998). Countries such as the UK, USA, Norway, and Denmark are global technology 
leaders in the implementations of national EHR infrastructure (Castro, 2009). The key 
role played by the national governments of these countries in their implementations 
resonates with what was previously identified with Asian tigers (Holliday & Tam, 
2004). The authors noticed that investments made by the tigers‘ national government 
into their domestic telecommunication and IT industries, which produced the computing 
and telecommunication technologies utilised for implementing their e- health 
infrastructures. Nevertheless, both (Holliday & Tam, 2004) and (Castro, 2009) did not 
associate  national e-health implementation with the possession of a mature extant 
domestic innovation capacity and high national economic strength. Maybe these were 
taken for granted.  
Even though the frontier countries are yet to fully build their national e-health 
infrastructures, it is noted that, by virtue of their domestic innovation capacities 
(Bergmo & Johannessen, 2006; Fujimoto & Miyazaki, 2000; Johnston, Staveley, Olfert, 
& Jennett, 2000; Kaplan, 1987; A. Lang & Mertes, 2012; Lee, et al., 2009; Spivack, 
2005), an evolutionary approach is being taken for their designs and implementation of 
national e-health infrastructures (Aanestad & Jensen, 2011; W. L. Currie & Finnegan, 
2011; Ellingsen & Monteiro, 2012). The same can also be observed with the emerging 
global technology leaders such as India in its national telemedicine implementations 
(Mishra, Kapoor, & Singh, 2009), reportedly underpinned by a long-term process of 
domestic innovation acquisition (Baskaran, 2005). Malaysia, an emerging Asian 
economy included the implementation of e-health projects in its ambitious national ICT 
blueprint drawn from the perspective of NIS (Mohan, et al., 2002).  
The acquisition and possession of such specific industries and infrastructures is what 
identifies as ‗specific state agencies, corporations, and the academic institutions – and 
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their linkages that contribute to technological growth‘ (Sismondo, 2010, p. 200). 
Instructively, most of these countries were at one time or the other participants and 
beneficiaries of IeTTs. For instance, a country such as South Korea has a history of co-
production of e-health technology in forms of North-South with Austria and China 
(Jongman, Jung, & Kim, 2005) and south-south with China and Japan (Nakashima et 
al., 2004) research collaborations. Even Norway is opening up its domestic e-health 
market to foreign competition (promoting the conduct of IeTTs), in order to drive 
further innovation in its national implementation (Ellingsen & Monteiro, 2012). 
Meaning that implementation requires a Schumpeterian industrial model of technology 
development and utilisation.  
2.6 Industrial model of e-health implementation  
The global e-health leading countries are entrepreneurial states (Mazzucato, 2011). 
They have established high-technology (hi-tech) companies and multinationals and are 
also global leaders in the development and utilisation of mobile technologies. For 
example, South Korea has Samsung, the USA has Apple and Google and the UK has 
ARM and Imagination. Their prowess in semiconductor inventions and manufacturing 
(Bauer, et al., 2012; Freeman, 2002; Achim Lang, et al., 2012; Macher, et al., 2007; 
Pavitt, 1998; Perez & Soete, 1988) have made them global powerhouses in 
Smartphones‘ and microchips‘ design and manufacturing.  
Samsung is a global pacesetter in this regard. Its industrial role in the accumulation and 
assimilation of e-health technologies, that are going into building South Korea‘s 
national e-health infrastructure, is documented (Briggs et al., 2001; Holliday & Tam, 
2004). The origin of both Samsung and ARM has something to do with the exercise of 
National Agency of the governments in their respective host countries. Public sector 
stewardship, finances and market stimulation and organisation were evident in these 
accumulations. For example, ARM‘s creation took root from a publicly funded R&D 
programme carried out by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in the 80s
8
.   
A model of national e-health technology implementation we identified with the global 
e-health leaders can be termed as industrial, according to the way they utilise 
technologies that are domestically developed for building their national e-health 
                                               
8 History – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARM_architecture 
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infrastructures. By following a Schumpeterian innovation model, they have, over a long 
period, acquired specific national technology capacities in computing, 
telecommunication and biomedical industries and infrastructures, underpinned by 
domestic competence in electronics and semiconductor  innovation and manufacturing.  
The relevance of these specific capacities in the development of their national e-health 
technologies is clearly evident with these identified global technology leaders. They 
have acquired the specific domestic innovation capacities that are instrumental and 
intrinsic for an incremental national e-health technology invention and production. 
Moreover, most have also articulated policy of investing into e-health technology 
development and implementation as technoeconomic growth drivers. 
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health act (HITECH) in 
the USA (Buntin, et al., 2010; Kaplan & Harris-Salamone, 2009; Kellermann & Jones, 
2013) is an example of such e-health technoeconomic driver. The European Union (EU) 
through the institution of similar initiatives has coordinated e-health (mostly on EHR 
and telemedicine) implementations in its member states with continental and national 
socio-economic advancement and growth (Karopka, Frank & Blank, 2012 and Lang & 
Mertes, 2011). For instance, initiatives such as e-health Action Plan, i2010, The Lead 
Market Initiatives, Joint Technology Initiatives and the EU Economic Recovery Plan 
were co-ordinately implemented. Germany (Lang & Mertes, 2012, p. 294), for example 
coordinates its healthcare and technology innovations as part of its German Hi-Tech 
Strategy for the implementation of its national e-health smartcard infrastructure.  
2.6.1 National e-health technosciences 
The e-health technology frontier countries have a long history of fostering domestic e-
health technosciences through national regulative and normative institutions. Germany 
for example has two normative coordinating research institutions: Council for 
Innovation and Growth and the Industry-Science Research Alliance are created to 
coordinate R&D and commercialisation amongst domestic companies, universities, 
consumer groups and multinationals (Lang & Mertes, 2012, 290-291). The Technology 
Strategy Board under the Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI) in England plays 
similar role in coordinating R&D on e-health innovation. Initiatives such as Assisted 
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Living Innovation Platform (ALIP)
9
 and Delivering Assisted Living Lifestyles at Scale 
(DALLAS)
10
 were designed to stimulate innovation, investments and interoperability in 
the telecare and telehealth.  
An impetus provided by these initiatives has resulted in a ‗triple-helix‘ (Johnston, et al., 
2000; Spivack, 2005)-like Government-Industry-National Health Service (NHS) 
partnership – the creation of still an unimplemented 3 million lives11 initiative. 
Nevertheless, similar innovation initiatives have not been launched in the case of 
England‘s national EHR implementation, as the USA is doing with HITECH. The long 
established conduct of combinatorial biomedical and computing technosciences by 
state-funded US National Institute of Health (NIH) laboratories (Kaplan, 1987), may be 
historically influential in creating HITECH.  
Two types of national innovation strategies are identified with these global leaders: 
federalist and centralist based on a diversity of their healthcare provision. The first, 
federalist type, where providers are mixture of public, private and community 
organisations, is found with the USA (Buntin, et al., 2010; Kellermann & Jones, 2013) 
and Germany (Lang & Mertes, 2012). In both countries, the federal government 
formulate and implement innovation strategies that dictate plans for e-health technology 
development, financing and regulation, while implementation is delegated to 
subnational (state or provincial) entities. The second, centralist type is noted with 
England‘s implementation (Trisha Greenhalgh, et al., 2011; Sheikh, et al., 2011; Takian 
& Cornford, 2012).  
The central government dictate similar plans, but also with power of implementation (at 
least the case was with the defunct NPFiT). The provision is predominantly through a 
public organisation. Both types may suit different African countries. Regardless of such 
configurational difference, national implementation in both types is driven by and built 
on possessing an extant domestic innovation capacity.  
                                               
9 Technology Strategy Board: Assisted Living Innovation Platform – 
http://www.innovateuk.org/_assets/pdf/assistedlivingip.pdf.  
10 Technology Strategy Board: Delivering Assisted Living Lifestyles at Scale – 
http://www.innovateuk.org/_assets/0511/sbri_comp_dallas.pdf.  
11 3 million lives News Release – http://3millionlives.co.uk//wp-content/uploads/2012/03/3millionlives-
News-Release.pdf. 
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2.6.2  Domestic e-health innovation dynamics 
The possession of such specific domestic technology capacities (i.e. R&D institutes and 
companies) has set these global leaders apart from laggards. What is also evident in 
these countries are the proactive efforts of their national governments in instituting 
policies and providing finances for fostering domestic e-health innovation by setting 
national standards, stimulating local industry, encouraging private and public sector 
entrepreneurships, for example in Norway (Bergmo & Johannessen, 2006) and 
Germany (A. Lang & Mertes, 2012). There exists a kind of domestic innovation 
feedback loop in these countries, similar to what (Caniëls & Romijn, 2009; F.W. Geels, 
2004) has identified with global technology leaders – that act as a ‗conveyor belt‘ 
between subnational e-health experimentations they have instituted and the 
accumulation of technologies and assimilations of technical knowledge at the national 
level.   
The cases of national e-health implementations in Norway (Bergmo & Johannessen, 
2006; Ellingsen & Monteiro, 2012; Halford, et al., 2009; Johannessen, et al., 2012) and 
Germany (Bauer, et al., 2012; A. Lang & Mertes, 2012; Achim Lang, et al., 2012), 
demonstrate that a connection between e-health technologies developed in subnational 
experimentations, utilised for healthcare service delivery in their hospitals and clinics, 
are underlined by such a feedback loop. In both countries, it is evident that the 
possession of an extant domestic innovation capacity doesn‘t necessarily translate into 
large-scale national e-health implementation. Underlining what is a well documented 
uncertain and complex nature of such an endeavour.  
A domestic dispute erupted amongst the involved multiple private and public 
stakeholders from healthcare, management and technology sectors, in Germany, is an 
example. This subsequently resulted in a reported fragmented governance of the 
national scale-up of the electronic health card implementation. An institutional 
misalignment among the funding public sector and contracted EHR Software 
Companies in Norway during implementation is noted by (Halford, et al., 2009; 
Johannessen, et al., 2012; Larsen & Ellingsen, 2012). Though large-scale 
implementation was reportedly not yet evident in Norway, the authors, nevertheless, 
reported an increase in national e-health innovations and economic activity through the 
entrepreneurial efforts of its domestic private and not-for-profit companies.  
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The presence of such a feedback loop that links together the national and subnational 
innovation systems, in the conduct of IeTTs, can make feasible an acquisition of 
domestic e-health innovation capacity in recipient African countries. An evaluation 
study carried out on an international transfer of green technologies in Tanzania (Caniëls 
& Romijn, 2009), identified that the subnational experimentations struggled to 
nationally scale-up. The authors identified that the immaturity of its NIS, and the 
passivity of its National government in fostering domestic innovation and industrial 
capacities, accounted for the reported setback.  
In general, it is not a sole or passive dependence of the global e-health leaders on IeTTs 
that is driving their national e-health implementations, but their possessions of advanced 
domestic innovation capacities. Except in South Africa, regarded as the most 
technologically advanced country in Africa (Kraemer-Mbula & Muchie, 2006, 2009), 
where they have started thinking about practising domestic e-health innovations (Van 
Dyk, Groenewald, & Abrahams, 2010), it is difficult to identify any other African 
country that has a national innovation system that is mature enough to acquire e-health 
technologies, of the kind identified with countries with an industrial model.  
South Africa as an exception has a home-grown m-health company- Cell-Life 
(http://www.cell-life.org/projects/health-care-and-testing/) which emerged on the back 
of a domestic triple-helix-like partnership. Even so, the country rated as the most 
innovative on the continent as measured by its R&D intensity (Brundenius & Mawoko, 
2010), is still struggling to ensure that subnational e-health (i.e. in EHR and 
telemedicine) experimentations (Kachienga, 2008; Ruxwana, et al., 2010) translate into 
large-scale national implementation.  
2.7 Global e-health technology divides 
The focus of the study here is such that the complex interactions in the conduct of IeTTs 
are treated as occurring within a ‗global innovation system‘, as inspired by the preferred 
STS constructivist view. The system reflects the density of the interrelationships 
amongst the constitutive diverse and multiple actors and organisations in the contextual 
interactions, as e-health technologies diffuse along global, continental   and national 
levels. In such a system, the technology acquisition capability of an African country can 
depend on the exercise of its Agency in Schumpeterian national innovation sense, in the 
process of interacting and negotiating with others (Klein 2002, pp. 41-43). An 
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interpretation is that the more a country is integrated into the system, the more likely it 
possesses similar capacity as others in the system. The converse is also true.  
The less integrated a country is, the less likely it will possess similar capacity as the 
others. What this implies is that a country is more likely to assimilate knowledge from 
IeTTs if that country possesses similar domestic innovation capacity as the others in the 
global innovation system.  
The view being presented here is akin to what has previously been highlighted in the 
seminal paper by (Juma, et al., 2001), that the possession of domestic technology 
capacities in developing countries that grapple with digital divide and Global Health 
challenges, must not be taken for granted. Especially when an ‗international 
technological dualism‘ exists in the global information and communication technologies 
(ICT) industry, where extant domestic technology capacities portend that the ‗haves‘ 
will acquire more and the ‗have-nots‘ will acquire less (Freeman, 2000; James, 2002). 
Meaning that digital divide is a manifest of domestic innovation deficiencies in 
semiconductor and electronics industry and engineering. More so, when structural 
differences in institutions of innovation between developed and developing countries in 
the conduct of IeTTs (Avgerou, 2003; Blum, 2002; Edworthy, 2001; Heeks, 2006), may 
condition if transferred technologies can be sustainably acquired in the latter.  
In technology frontier countries, the presence and maturity of extant institutions of 
innovation (Bauer, et al., 2012; F.W. Geels, 2004; Achim Lang, et al., 2012; Nelson & 
Nelson, 2002; Sharif, 2006), makes possible, a predictable and stable identification of, 
and oftentimes rapid and appropriate response to, technological uncertainties. 
Conversely, such institutions, such as manufacturing are still relatively immature in 
technology lagging African countries (Caniëls & Romijn, 2009; Forje, 2006; Juma, 
2006; Juma & Bell Jr, 2006; Muchie, 2004, 2008). Africa‘s contribution to the global 
technology value-chain measured as its share of the world‘s manufacturing output is 
‗miniscule and has fallen‘ (Kaplinsky, 2011, p. 198) considerably in the last two 
decades.  
Therefore, in the wake of globalisation, a country without such capacity would be 
constrained in its acquisition quest. Addressing this global ‗technological divide‘ might 
require that the enforcement of intellectual property rights are relaxed for developing  
countries (Juma et al., 2001, p. 635). This implies that if such a country is only a passive 
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consumer of transferred e-health technologies and at the same time not a producer of 
them, its domestic innovation capacity acquisition can be structurally constrained. 
Contributions to academic and policy debates on national e-health implementations in 
African countries and globally are made on this ground.   
As earlier identified in this chapter with global technology leaders, an industrial model 
underpins their national e-health initiatives. What implication does this finding have for 
e-health technologies in recipient African countries, who have limited domestic 
innovation capacity? Sismondo, 2010, p. 201, employs ‗cumulative advantage 
hypothesis‘ to alert researchers to see that being at the periphery of global technology 
centres shouldn‘t be a permanent state.  
Cumulative advantage – ‗large differences in status can be the result of many small 
differences‘- is employed to interpret that the industrial model identified with the global 
e-health leaders, can explain their technological advantage over most recipient African 
countries. It may also help to explain differences between African countries in how they 
exercise national agency in the conduct of IeTTs. They have incrementally acquired and 
are still acquiring domestic e-health innovation capacities from nationally funded and 
designed subnational experimentations and utilisations. In the process, they have 
accumulated and assimilated technologies and technical knowledge and competence in 
telecommunications, biomedical and computing industries. 
Lundvall,2007, p. 117 recommends to developing countries, especially African ones, 
that they must overcome organisational inertia to learn how to innovate from others. 
Seen in the light that African countries are struggling with their national e-health 
implementations, there is an argument to be made that they should learn from the 
industrial model of more successful countries. An assertion made by Fritsch,2011, p. 41, 
that countries ‗will most likely continue to play relevant role in the development and 
utilisation of new technologies‘, resonates. This implies that the exercise of national 
agency is not a replacement for a ‗cosmopolitan‘ (Lundvall 2007, p. 113) approach to 
technology development that STS constructivism (Fritsch 2011, pp. 38-39) advocates in 
the context of technoglobalism. 
2.8 National e-health technology development and utilisation 
The innovation approach to study the development and utilisation of e-health 
technologies is meagre and limited to clinical-level, information-based, action-oriented 
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and managerial-focussed leanings. Even so, few have studied e-health technology at 
national and international levels in this way. However, studies on national 
implementation such as (Aanestad & Jensen, 2011; Ellingsen & Monteiro, 2012; 
Johannessen, et al., 2012; Larsen & Ellingsen, 2012) have pointed out with the 
implementation of large-scale EHR infrastructure is an incremental engineering of 
software in bits and pieces and in leaps and bounds.  
Publications by (S. Cho & Mathiassen, 2007; W. L. Currie & Finnegan, 2011; Nicolini, 
2010) on the development and utilisation of e-health technologies, are examples of the 
few that we have identified with an innovation slant. Following a Schumpeterian model 
of innovation, insights into the evolution of computer industry (W. Currie, 2009; Hwang 
& Christensen, 2008), suggest how the introduction of computing technologies can 
drive performance of, and improve, the impacts of clinical services, only if an optimal 
alignment between healthcare service and business practises, is strategically employed. 
Requiring that all the five types of Schumpeterian innovation – industrial: process and 
product and service: organisational, input and market are needed for fostering both 
incremental and radical technological and system changes (Windrum & García-Goñi, 
2008).   
How these five innovation types co-act in the development and utilisation of an e-health 
technology is demonstrated by Kaplan, 1987, in the case of domestic transfer of CT-
Scan (a biomedical device) in the US. Cho, et al., 2007 too, studied how innovation in 
industrial, service and business systems can foster an incremental accumulation of e-
health technologies in healthcare settings. By contrast, Currie, 2009 and Currie & 
Finnegan, 2011 studied from an innovation perspective, the utilisation of e-health 
technologies in healthcare settings in the context of a national implementation. Yet, 
Currie & Finnegan, 2011 recognises that institutional market forces, political and 
economic ideologies, history, governmental and non-governmental actions and 
behaviours, can condition or cause the directionality and impact of a large-scale e-health 
innovation.  
The exercise of agency – labelled as a practise of ‗institutional entrepreneurship‘ by 
(Currie, 2009, p. 76) is nevertheless limited to sectoral organisational actors and groups 
interacting in a cyclical mode of actor network theory (Sunyoung Cho, et al., 2008; T 
Greenhalgh & Stones, 2010). Their institutional view of innovation, are rather narrowly 
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focussed on clinical-level, information-based, action-oriented and managerial-focussed 
leanings. Not as taking a far-reaching approach that foregrounds the exercising of ‗state 
entrepreneurship or developmentalism‘ in a way of instituting of a NIS in complex 
interactions of technoglobalism. For example, it articulated by (De Laet & Mol, 2000, 
pp. 288-231) in the case of a national innovation of water pumps in Zimbabwe. Where, 
it was evident that evolutionary combinations of technologies and expertise 
underpinned a collective engineering of its public water infrastructure.  
The implementation a large-scale national e-health initiative is, however characterised 
by an incremental long-term, socio-technical innovation process of engineering (Geels, 
2004, p. 898). In and during protracted implementation (Aanestad & Jensen, 2011; 
Bergmo & Johannessen, 2006; S. Cho & Mathiassen, 2007; Coiera, 2009; Ellingsen & 
Monteiro, 2012; Gulube & Wynchank, 2002; Heeks, 2006; Johannessen, et al., 2012; 
Kachienga, 2008; Larsen & Ellingsen, 2012; Sheikh, et al., 2011), suggested that the 
demanding and fastidious nature of healthcare system and of diverse healthcare 
professionals‘ needs and preferences, deserves that e-health technologies have to be 
regularly invented, and constantly upgraded. Thus, it elicits a structural comparison 
with the dynamic nature of Schumpeterian engine (Hwang & Christensen, 2008; Pippin 
& Qureshi, 2011; Windrum & García-Goñi, 2008) of creative destructionism. 
We hence, posit that a national e-health implementation is similar to engineering large-
scale technology project. It is akin to building an infrastructure by assembling and 
combining together diverse and multiple institutions and technologies in bits, parts 
pieces. In the manner of a long-term and large-scale technoeconomic (Freeman, 2000; 
Perez, 2010; Perez & Soete, 1988) change, such engineering process will pan out as a 
long wave of concurrently accumulating material or physical technologies and 
assimilating technical knowledge and skills. Of course such process is buoyed and 
supported by an extant possession of a domestic innovation capacity.   
Schumacher provides a counterfoil to Schumpeter in how technologies are acquired and 
accumulated in the sphere of international development. Both Schumpeter and 
Schumacher theories on the development and utilisation of technologies were conceived 
as critical policy challenges to established neoliberalism (Kaplinsky, 2011, pp. 194-
195). The former‘s work on ‗intermediate technology‘ (Kaplinsky, 2011; Schumacher, 
1972; Toye, 2012) insights a practical view of a ‗doing it all for me‘, consumerist and 
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cosmopolitan approach that underpins the development of most of the e-health 
technologies that are being transferred to Africa. Whilst Schumpeter model of adapting, 
accumulating and assimilating of transferred knowledge and technologies can be seen as 
an alternative.  
2.8.1  Schumacher  
Schumacher is widely noted for his quixotic ideas on green, open, affordable, modular 
and people-centred technologies as espoused in a book Small is beautiful. The title of 
which, was chosen more for its evocativeness and ‗has clouded his (Schumacher‘s) 
message‘ (Toye, 2012, p. 387). These ideas codified in a cosmopolitan intermediate 
technology model, are noted in the conduct of e-health, m-health and biomedical 
technologies transfers to African countries.  
The Schumacher idea of ‗intermediate technology came into fashion in the 70s, as 
articulated in this report  (Schumacher, 1972), and is observed in the conduct of past 
and present conduct of international technology transfers in Africa. Implicit in the idea, 
was that African countries could only be passive recipients of dated and non-modern 
equipments and devices designed and manufactured by global technology leaders. Such 
technology is produced by small-scale village industry are typically subnational and 
non-commercialised inventions and for communal utilisation. Frugal innovation that it 
represents, reads as a dated and environmentally suitable equipment or device that is in 
low capital and high labour-intensive to produce and operate.  
The report (ibid.) showcased examples of environmentally appropriate, low-capital and 
high-labour intensive technologies. For example, a case of a Nigerian teaching 
hospital‘s efforts of inventing and producing an intermediate health device; which was 
only for a localised subnational utilisation at the host hospital and with no reported 
intention any national-scale-up, was cited (p.87). A path-dependency between this past 
innovation is noted in the current cosmopolitan global health efforts, for example in 
(Chataway, et al., 2009; Chataway, et al., 2010; Howitt, et al., 2012; Malkin, 2007). 
The narrative of water pump invention in Zimbabwe by (De Laet & Mol, 2000), is a 
past example of an intermediate technology production in Africa. Similar approach was 
taken in past cosmopolitan transfer of Satcom devices in several African countries 
(Yesufu, 1990, Goldsby & Boyd, 2001 and Nogueira, 1998). Yet, despite the 
uncertainty surrounding the model‘s success (Free, 2004), a current global health policy 
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on developing frugal biomedical technologies for developing countries (Howitt, et al., 
2012, p. 509) is adopting it.  
A policy concern with cosmopolitan agency is that innovation learning – the acquisition 
and assimilation of techno-scientific knowledge by the recipient is passive. Whilst, the 
cosmopolitan agency conditions consumerist technology development trajectory in the 
recipients, in the Schumpeterian industrial model, the agency is national. Rather than 
the active learning and interaction with technology producers, which is deem 
foundational for acquiring domestic innovation capacity in NIS theory. Moreover, with 
Schumacher, there is no accounting for the explicit nature of tacit knowledge that is 
required for acquiring industrial competence. Schumpeter is about active learning, while 
in contrast, learning in Schumacher‘s model learning is passive. Not least because that 
cosmopolitanism can be at odds with, proactive national actions (De Laet & Mol, 2000, 
pp. 242-243), and with individualism (ibid. pp. 248-252) that often characterises global 
actors‘ inventions. 
On technological scales, whereas, Schumpeter is concerned with large spatial, 
geographical and functional factors, Schumacher is more concerned with minimal 
numbers of users. Schumacher concern with large-scale technology infrastructure is 
about its ‗appropriateness‘. ‗Bigness‘ – an optimal number of consumers or users an 
infrastructure can serve, as appropriate to a country‘s economic capability. The 
inclination is descriptively minimal technological institution and infrastructure as 
opposed to large-scale ones implied in the Schumpeterian industrial model. Schumacher 
is also quiet on how technology comes into being. Though, innovating to produce 
durable devices and to minimise technology obsolescence is credited to Schumacher 
(Kaplinsky, 2011, p. 195). The Schumpeterian creative destruction model of 
combinatorial and incremental technology production is not evident.  
2.8.2 Schumpeter 
The NIS theory of agency and learning presented in the preceding sections informed 
about Schumpeterian engine of innovation and the hi-tech nature of e-health industry.  
Though in healthcare innovation, a service-based approach is the typical, for example 
(Hwang & Christensen, 2008), innovations in manufacturing and consumer markets are 
usually and practically overlooked (Windrum & García-Goñi, 2008).  
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The incremental and radical nature of e-health technology development, essentially and 
instrumentally requires product and market innovations, to translate experimentations or 
inventions to viable and large-scale systems. Organisational, process and inputs 
innovations are also essential at the service, sectoral or subnational level, however. For 
example, input innovation such as the platform provided by semiconductor-based 
industries (computing and telecommunications), and emerging biomedical (lifesciences) 
one, provides raw or basic materials for a burgeoning global e-health enterprise.  
The convergence of these technologies will drive their (re-)combinations and will be 
powered by the ubiquity and consumer-focussed nature of mobile /technologies, as 
articulated in (Briggs, et al., 2012). The industrial capacity that is required for 
combining, engineering and implementing these converging technologies are also 
needed for fostering national acquisition and accumulation. Such capacity is 
instrumental for addressing a country‘s public health goals; for example, as (De Laet & 
Mol, 2000, pp 231-233 & 238-242) noted in the case of a challenging incremental 
domestic technosciences and engineering of water pump devices and infrastructure in 
Zimbabwe.  
The health of a nation is tightly coupled with its industrial and innovation capacities in a 
Schumpeterian sense (Howitt, 2005; van Zon & Muysken, 2007). Moreover, Pavitt, 
1998 argued that a nation‘s biomedical innovation sophistication strongly reflects its 
state of extant domestic innovation capacity and determines the depth of its health 
service sector‘s technology utilisation. Domestically, health service utilisation is 
determined by the quality and appropriateness of produced technologies and the 
consumer markets of an innovation system (Windrum & García-Goñi, 2008). Service 
utilisation is in turn, structurally determined by: the maturity and innovativeness of a 
system‘s (i.e. a country‘s) industrial capacity; the agency of its public and private care 
providers and policymakers; sectoral technical competence; and the receptiveness of 
consumers (ibid., p. 652). In short, national innovation capacity produces technologies 
for sectoral health service utilisation.  
The instrumental role of consumerism (not consumerist model) is pivotal for acquiring a 
domestic industrial capacity (Windrum & García-Goñi, 2008). Consumerism of 
biomedical products/technologies is on the rise, hence, suitable types of service and 
market innovations (ibid., p. 657-659), are needed. In e-health, such consumerism is 
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now being driven by the ubiquity of mobile phones (Briggs, et al., 2012). In global 
term, consumerism and mutlinationalism appears to be a driving force behind the 
production of affordable technologies such as mobile phones buoyed by the rising 
innovation power of global East economies and rapidly expanding international markets 
(Kaplinsky, 2011). From the ICT4D literature, Pippin & Qureshi (2012) presented 
mobile phones as an appropriate technology in the sense that they are less-capital 
intensive for a user or consumer to own; but, omitted to mention that their invention and 
manufacturing are not.  
The implementation of m-health innovations in Africa is benefiting from the positive 
trend of consumer adoption of mobile phones and in the process are yielding ‗reverse 
innovation‘ (Immelt & Govindarajan, 2009) to global value chain. Product innovations 
being carried out by multinationals in developing countries create values for 
international markets (Kaplinsky, 2011. p. 201). So far such conduct of reverse 
innovations, un-developmentally limits African countries as ‗outsourced R&D labs‘, the 
passive learning that transpires in our opinion, will not translate into national e-health 
technology acquisition. The dynamism of domestic market and consumerism necessary 
to drive e-health scale and industrialisation, will also struggle to emerge and evolve. On 
this note, we contend with Schumacher typified by (Kaplinsky, 2011, pp. 201-202) that 
African countries will benefit from the global production of less capital- and high-
labour –intensive devices produced by multinationals and global East economies. No 
consideration was given to recipients‘ domestic innovation assimilation and 
accumulation  and  a likely concern of technology dependency.  
To sum up, both Schumpeter and Schumacher models apply to technology utilisation 
and implementation, but differ on how innovations are acquired and accumulated. The 
former is consumerist – inclined towards technology consumption and on low-
technology design and not production.  In contrast, the latter is distinctly industrial – 
about the creation and production of both low- and high technologies. Schumpeter is 
concerned about technoeconomic changes, spaces and infrastructures; Schumacher is 
concerned with spatial, infrastructural and sectoral minimalism. However, both value 
participating in ITTs, but differ on the locus of agency and mode of learning.  
We have identified certain areas of contention by comparing Schumpeter with 
Schumacher in satisfactorily explaining how e-health technologies can be acquired and 
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accumulated. The contention stem from the ambiguity and looseness of interpreting and 
applying Schumacher‘s idea, for example, as (Toye, 2012) tried to explain in his mini-
biography. Not least that the Schumacher model might not realistically addresses the 
dynamism and challenges of technology development and utilisation in the current age 
of globalisation (Kaplinsky, 2011). The areas of contention are innovation learning, 
exercise of national agency and the nature of technology are fully discussed in Chapter 
7.   
2.9 STS constructivism, institutionalism and narrative  
In health informatics, the notion that the creation and interpretation of knowledge is 
pragmatically determined (Scott & Briggs, 2009) connects well with constructivism and 
poststructuralism. The multidisciplinary of health informatics discipline, call for a 
pragmatic mixed method approach. Our combination of theories and methods is in line 
with such methodical pragmatism and pluralism. Our pragmatic combination of plural 
methods or theories is line with STS policy-making for studying complex interactions 
of innovation systems (Geels, 2007, pp. 631-635).  
The thesis studies the conduct of IeTTs in African countries by combining moderate 
STS constructivism, NIS institutionalism and poststructuralist narrative. Such 
combination of methods or theories is synonymous with middle-range STS – making 
connections between multiple theories, audiences, levels and data through ‗multisited 
ethnographies‘ (Wyatt & Balmer, 2007). The objective is to overcome limitation of 
conservative micro- case study methods. This combination is employed to attend to the 
five research objectives listed in section 1.9.  
The study asserts that an exercise of national agency (or a lack of it) should not be 
subsumed in the clatter of competing structural mechanisms, forms, identities and 
arrangements. The study in a pragmatic manner foregrounds in a Schumpeterian sense, 
the importance of national agency in the acquisition of domestic technology capacity, 
against the backdrop of structures of technoglobalism. NIS institutionalism (Geels, 
2007, Nelson & Nelson, 2002 and Nelson, 2008) study the co-evolution of ‗social 
technologies‘ (i.e. regulative and normative rules) and ‗physical (material) technologies‘ 
(i.e. material biomedical, telecommunication and computing ones).  
The debate whether NIS is neither an academic nor policy theory (Sharif, 2006) is 
irrelevant – as its policy concern is with practical issues of national e-health technology 
76 
 
development, implementation and utilisation. Not only concerned with studying 
managerial or social aspects of an innovation system, but also demonstrate the 
developmentalist or entrepreneurial interests of nations to acquire and accumulate 
technologies for domestic utilisations. 
The identification, description and exploration of the institutional structures are 
presented as Deleuzian poststructuralist narrative, as informed by (Gale, 2010; Sikes & 
Gale, 2006). The focus is to identify and demonstrate how such structures can condition 
national technology acquisition. The thesis explains interactions of multiple actors and 
organisations, for identifying and demonstrating the manifestations of structural 
constraints. It demonstrates domestic acquisition can be conditioned by both vertical 
hierarchical and horizontal diffuse complex globalised interactions embodied in the 
conduct of IeTTs. Thus two threads run through the narratives: 
1. The process of national e-health technology acquisition is not linear but rather a 
complex interaction of multiple and diverse actors and organisations; 
2. The constraints of the complex nature of the interactions on the exercise of 
National Agency by National governments in such acquisitions. 
The intention is to identify how National Agency can be exercised in a complex web of 
interactions among a range of different subjects and institutions (Fritsch, 2011, p. 34) 
as they occur along a global-national continuum. Freeman (2002) has plotted how such 
interactions manifest in such transnational continuum. As a negotiation of interlinked 
and diverse institutional global, continental, national and subnational forms and 
identities and their manifested consequences in the complex conduct of IeTTs in the 
face of prevailing and contravening events and circumstances. A global technoeconomic 
event, for example can open up a ‗window of opportunity‘ (Perez & Soete, 1988) for a 
recipient to accumulate and assimilate technologies and knowledges. Such as the current 
global credit crunch occurring in a backdrop of exponential growth in mobile 
technology performance, provides a recipe for fostering innovations and 
entrepreneurships.  
The identification of such structural constraints is derived from the actions of the 
constitutive actors and organisations, who share common meanings (Klein 2002, pp. 37-
38). That is, they act as collectives, not as an individual entity. For instance, ‗national 
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reticence‘ is employed to capture how recipient African countries have not been 
proactive in forging domestic e-health innovation assimilation and accumulation.  
2.10 Narrative study design  
The chosen narrative method is inspired by Deleuzian poststructuralist method of 
‗rhizome‘ – ‗becoming ‗and ‗fold‘, as informed by (Gale, 2010; Gale & Wyatt, 2007; 
Sikes & Gale, 2006). In addition, it also directs the researcher‘s attention to what 
solution (i.e. policy change) can be recommended for effecting change. A narrative is 
grounded stories that raise the level of debate and help to resolve key social problems 
(Kling, 1992, p.353).  
The method is adopted for ordering, organising and presenting the messy and multiple 
qualitative data collected through immersion in the conduct of IeTTs in the way middle-
range STS theory does (Geels, 2007 and Wyatt & Balmer, 2007). Similar in a way 
Currie, 2009, pp. 75-76, suggested that ethnographic, multi-level, multi-theory and 
longitudinal studies of national e-health implementation should be investigated. As the 
ontology of STS constructivism dictates, narrative sees all knowledge as socially 
constructed (Fritsch, 2011, Sismondo, 2010, Wyatt & Balmer, 2007). Meaning that both 
the actions of data collection (production) and interpretation (writing) of knowledge are 
‗creatively‘ and narratively constructed, hence poststructuralists in orientation, with no 
distinction made between ontology and epistemology.  Both data collection and writing 
are rhizomatic – based on actual lived experience that enables a researcher to make 
sense of the world.  
Rhizomatic narrative employs rhetoric, contingency and reflexivity to articulate and 
stress ‗subjectivities and contextual circumstances and the way in which events are 
casually linked and given meaning by their connections‘, in time and space. Both the 
creation and interpretation of knowledge in poststructuralist narrative draw together 
diverse events, happenings and actions of human lives, and provide links, connections, 
coherence, meaning and sense amongst the diversity. Narrative is suitable for studying 
the consequences of the development and utilisation of e-health technologies as they are 
diffusing trans-nationally in Africa.   
The existing use of narrative for studying e-health implementation takes a managerial 
and information-based approach, and is very limited and emerging. For example, in 
their narrative inquiries (Trisha Greenhalgh, et al., 2011; Klecun, 2011; Nicolini, 2010) 
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employed discourse analysis method. In the same vein, Greenhalgh, et al. (2011), 
ethnographic work, employed Wittgensteinian approach to narrative (Sikes & Gales, 
2006), to offer a policy critique of the national e-health implementation in England.  
Such discourse analysis is often an action-oriented, micro-individual narrative inquiry.  
Narrowly focuses on investigating institutions and often parochially foregrounds 
techno-pessimism and relegates innovation. Wittgenstein‘s is different from Deleuzian 
narrative. 
The contrast between the two forms of narrative approaches is starkly presented in 
(Gale, 2010 & Sikes & Gales, 2006). Deleuzian poststructuralist narrative inquiry‘s 
orientation is towards the creation of ‗concepts‘ that critically challenges institutional 
structures in complex macro-societal interactions. Wittgenstein, in contrast, privileges 
action-oriented micro-individual inquiry – it foregrounds in the interpretation of large-
scale e-health implementation (i.e. as in Greenhalgh, et. al., 2011).  
Deleuzian poststructuralist narrative subscribes to ontology that the world is labile, 
unpredictable and dynamic and it is constructed by a researcher becoming part of this 
world, and its interpretation written in the researcher‘s unique, reflexive and creative 
style. In contrast, Wittgenstein ontology subscribes to a world that is fixed, contextual, 
stable and predictable where interpretation is narrowly a symbolic representation of 
human actions and often without a critical examination. The former inquires from 
macro- societal perspective, while the latter is at the micro-individual.  
Deleuzian rhizome as a data presentation strategy, presents a researcher with an 
opportunity to engage with STS tenets of complexity, multiplicity and connections. STS 
makes accessible to a researcher, the creative revealing and interpretation of the 
underlying causes of a historical or structural problem or challenge (Sismondo, 2010, 
pp. 190, 197-8). Deleuzian poststructuralism and middle-range STS constructivism 
opens up to scrutiny, the taken-for-granted or hidden nature (invincible agencies) of 
technologies and practices. Thus, opening up the black boxes of complex process of 
globalisation; rather than narrowly studying stable and routine behaviours in an 
organisational context (Roberts, 2102, p. 40-47).  
Poststructuralist narrative shares with STS constructivism the need to unpack 
complexity and to interpret hidden meanings in organisational actions and behaviours, 
events and interactions, which take place at multiple levels of interactions during the 
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development and utilisation of technologies (Geels, 2007 and Wyatt & Balmer, 2007). 
In combination with poststructuralist narrative, inform how a researcher or an 
ethnographer collects data in the field and how the data are interpreted and presented to 
an audience, i.e. policymakers or epistemic communities. The construction of 
knowledge aligns with NIS institutionalism. An innovation system becomes a complex 
sociotechnical network, when institutional structural interaction is diffuse and 
horizontal. Not of a linear, vertical interaction in the conduct of ITTs – where 
hierarchical relationship amongst nation-states result in agential asymmetry typical of 
technoglobalism.  
Discourse analysis method to study national e-health implementation is at the level of 
organisations. Ours is at a higher level of technoeconomic changes of globalisation 
(Robert, 2012, pp. 40-44).  In the age of rapid and converging technoglobalism, where 
multiple interacting and contending institutions mediate the exercise of national agency, 
such narrative inquiry will not suffice. 
2.10.1 Justification & Limitation 
The justification is premised on the reflexivity of the researcher. Reflexivity is through 
a combinatorial use of Deleuzian poststructuralist narrative and STS constructivism. 
They share in common that the relations between cause and effect are not linear, but 
complex, political, contentious/contested and heterogeneous, and difficult to attribute to 
a single factor (Jasanoff, 1996). To determine the nature of causes, conditions and 
effects of the institutional structures by going beyond just identifying concrete 
sociotechnical interactions; and, also inquire about the largely hidden contingent, 
contradicting, multiple, and heterogeneous causes and effects, embodied in 
cosmopolitan socio-historical formations .   
Determining causality from messy and multiple qualitative data is a difficult task, 
because, ‗causes are heterogeneous and are hard to pin-down‘ (Jasanoff, 1996, p. 413). 
For example, if we argue that geopolitics constrains African countries‘ e-health 
technology acquisition, then we also need to accept that there are other heterogeneous 
conditions. National reticence as well as global and continental geopolitics can shape 
exercise of National Agency or domestic innovation activities.  
Reflexivity is based on Deleuzian rhizomatic narrative figures of ‗becoming‘ and ‗fold‘ 
– engaging in a nomadic inquiry. Moving across multiple labile, unpredictable and 
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dynamic spaces, both in the process of collecting data and writing through paying 
‗reflexive attention to diversity, contradiction, and complexity‘ (Gale, 2010, p. 304). 
Through nomadic becoming, the author became immersed in different and diverse 
geographies, epistemic communities and structural spaces of e-health technology policy, 
development and utilisation. In the process, a reflexive ethnographer assumes multiple 
identities, and in this regard; the author becomes a policy and technology advocate, a 
learner and researcher. For instance, the author‘s immersion in policy geographies and 
epistemic communities in Africa and Europe brought about, a ‗narrative turn‘ (Sikes & 
Gale, 2006). The learning from these policy and intellectual spaces in turn influences 
the contents and context of the thesis.  
Reflexivity is about immersion in a field of study. By having conversations with or 
interviewing different actors, and interacting with multiple documents that embody the 
contrasting and conflicting geographies, ideologies and cultures of the conduct of 
IeTTs. Reflexivity is also about challenging the status quo of established policy and 
epistemic orders by creating a new way of thinking of, or viewing an object or a subject 
(Jasanoff, 1996, Gale, 2010). For example, challenging the agential asymmetry of 
technology divide of globalisation and dualism of techno-globalism, between 
technology frontiers and laggards.   
Immersion and learning from, and participations in, policy and academic spaces and 
debates: formulation of national and continental eHealth policies in Africa; Africa‘s and 
international development; Global Health; and Science, Technology & Innovation 
(Appendix A and Publications), have all contributed to the reflexivity in the thesis. For 
example, participation and learning from the European Union-Africa cooperation 
process. The process, which culminated in the formulation of a Euro-Africa ICT 
Manifesto and the commencement of an EU-Africa ICT Forum, was influential in 
opening the author‘s intellect to the role of technology in international development. 
The author‘s advocacy for the inclusion of eHealth in this process was highlighted by a 
keynote presentation titled: Refocusing Europe-Africa Strategy: Strategic Importance of 
eHealth at the first edition of this forum held at the European Union Secretariat in 
Brussels in 2008. A similar participation was to the United Nations-World Health 
Organization ministerial and high-level process in 2009.  In addition since 2009, the 
author has through the Commonwealth Secretariat being providing technical assistance 
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to its developing member states in Africa and Asia on national e-health policy 
formulation. 
The narrative from these policy and intellectual spaces is the nature of national agency 
in international cooperation and development and in global partnerships.  In the process, 
our learned worldview has insightfully enlightened our knowledge of the pervasive 
influence of the complex interplay of institutions of politics, interests, trade, commerce, 
diplomacy and aid. We have come to question, how well-intentioned global partnerships 
or international development plans, are oftentimes counter-productive to national 
socioeconomic advancement aspirations of recipient developing countries. Our focus is 
on variation in the dynamics, depth and scale of African countries‘ national e-health 
technology acquisition trajectories in the context of complex interlinked globalised 
interactions.  
Becoming and fold brings creativity to the writing. It is performed by ‗telling‘ the 
policy and epistemic audiences in the writing – ‗each telling and retelling sets up will 
serve to reconfigure preconceptions, established interpretations, and practices‘ (Gale & 
Wyatt, 2007, p. 794). In this thesis, knowing is to counter-balance and enrich a 
predetermined world-view (Sismondo, 2010, pp. 58, 64). The predetermined world-
view is that in an increasingly globalizing world, that IeTTs are not free from 
contentions, politics and power and interests. They are rather driven by a complex 
political economy that is historically, socially and structurally constructed (Sismondo, 
2010, pp. 195-201, Fritsch, 2011).  
A technology embodies tacit or implicit knowledge that is not readily accessible or 
shared in a transfer process (Sismondo, 2010, p. 202). Such nature, typical of 
technoglobalism, conditions the consumers (recipients) to be dependent on the 
producers (developers or donors); for example, for newer technologies, or for technical 
knowledge to carry out repairs, and even for finances to implement projects.  
Reflexivity informs the writing of the thesis in a creative way of connecting 
multiplicities in disparate and messy qualitative data. That is ‗fold‘ – the revealing of 
thoughts and feelings that encourage different ones to unfold in narrative themes. Each 
institutional entity (i.e. involved actors and organisations) in the globalised conduct of 
IeTTs in Africa generate texts in their narrative accounts, which are in turn reflexively 
and creatively folded in the themes.  
82 
 
2.10.2 Data collection  
The data for narrative are collected from privileged access to diverse sources, in 
different and various geographies and policy spaces and at various times, over a four-
year period. The data employed are from multiple sources and mostly refer to 
telemedicine implementations at subnational, national and continental levels in Africa. 
There are also, to a lesser extent, data on electronic health records implementations at 
national level. Data sources are, for example, informants, interviews (structured and 
unstructured), participant observations, literature, transcribed field notes, ethnographic 
accounts, personal reflections and documentary evidence (reports of different forms and 
types). In all, 18 structured and unstructured interviews were conducted, 40 participant 
observations in policy meetings and technical conferences and 76 policy, programme 
and project documents were reviewed and analysed. 
2.10.3 Data analysis and interpretation 
The data analysis is through becoming and fold. It is about – reflexivity, while writing 
by making connections with, and working with, multiplicities of texts from different 
data sources. The goal is to capture the complexity, politics, history, contestations 
(conflicts), power and interests in the conduct of IeTTs in Africa. The intricacy and 
complexity of the conduct of international e-health technology transfer (IeTTs) and the 
messy nature of the data we have collected, means that the structure of the narrative 
follows Deleuzian rhizome. According to Sikes & Gales, 2006, a rhizomatic approach 
to narrative is a complex, non-hierarchical and non-linear, structural configuration 
which is defined by movement, multiplicity and states of becoming.  
The Deleuzian structural form permits the organisation of messy textual data fragments 
through ‗folding in‘ and ‗folding out‘ in the narrative writing, especially when 
interviews and conversations took place in real-life settings. Likewise, STS 
constructivism constructs knowledge from messy data as a process of improvisation and 
contingency (Sismondo, 2010, p. 133). It enables the unravelling of the complexity of a 
subject, by exploring and exploiting the richness and the interconnectedness of multiple 
qualitative data. The interpretation of data is fluid and mobile, suitable for capturing the 
emergence of multiple and diverse material technologies, actions and events. The 
narrative is not in the form of a structured emplotment – ‗providing a specific sequence 
and structure‘; but, to ‗explain the twists and turns, the layers and dimensions‘ (Sikes & 
Gale, 2006), that messy qualitative texts present.   
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The interpretation goes from the way Deleuze represent the world by inventing his own 
words and writing style. A narrative inquiry uncovers, challenges and questions hidden 
and established ideologies and institutional structures of complex sociotechnical 
interactions. Such as we are identifying and critically analysing the nature and impacts 
of structural constraints on domestic e-health innovation capacity acquisition in the 
contexts of global development and technoglobalism. 
Interpretations in the narrative chapters are presented in ‗narrative themes‘ – to organise 
the sense-making of, and give meaning to, the constraints or conditions and the 
presentation of key points into sections and sub-sections. Themes are more general than 
plots, because they ‗....relate to concepts and theories‘ (Sikes & Gale, 2006). They do 
not present data in a specific order or structure, but equips a reflexive researcher to 
organise and make meanings of messy qualitative data in the narrative.  
In the sections and sub-sections of the narrative chapters, the use of concepts and 
theories underpin a creativity that goes into the writing of the narrative themes. It is 
about ‘logic of sense and not a logic of reason‘, argues Sikes & Gale, 2006. The 
interpretation in the narratives, following Deleuzian notion, sense-making – the process 
of folding and unfolding of the texts in the narrative, is a continuous process of creative 
evolution (Gale & Wyatt, 2007 and Gale, 2010). It is a creative process of inventing 
new concepts that have not been previously developed by relaying lived experience.  In 
the process being reflexive, challenging that the structural territories of global, 
continental, national and subnational are not fixed, but rather are mobile and fluid, flux. 
By intensively connecting and multiplying rich and diverse messy texts, alternative 
accounts are thus, elaborated; for instance, by challenging that the 
cosmopolitan/consumerist conduct of IeTTs in Africa, requires a national industrial 
model for technology accumulation.   
2.10.4 Organisation of narratives  
Narrative is employed for organising data in Chapters 3-6, as set out in the research 
objectives in Chapter 1. Each chapter is a narrative that identifies and demonstrates how 
a structural mechanism manifests as structural constraints in the conduct of IeTTs. A 
symmetrical presentation helps in aligning heterogeneous views interests and causes of 
(Sismondo, 2010, pp. 132-133) technological controversies. Nevertheless, the narratives 
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in all the chapters are inter-linked, as each focuses on constraints to national e-health 
technology acquisition in Africa.  
The STS concept of symmetry is employed so that evenness is given to each macro-
structural mechanism in the conduct, in each narrative chapter. We employ symmetry in 
sense of concrete socio-technical interactions of actors, organisations and technologies 
in the conduct of IeTTs, and, also with an aim to reveal hidden influences of history, 
politics and power that mediate in such interactions (Robert, 2012, pp. 37-39).   
The focus of the narrative in each chapter is on the transfers of material e-health 
technologies such as devices and equipment, but each with a focus on a different 
condition. Each narrative chapter is stand-alone in this regard, also in that the sources, 
scope and scale of data employed for the narrative are presented at the beginning of 
each chapter. At the end of each chapter, a summary of the themes, and the key points 
from the narrative, are presented in a table.   
In Chapter 7, a discussion of how the constraints or conditions are inter-linked or inter-
woven is presented. The discussion explores how they co-act to constrain the 
acquisition of national e-health technology capacities in Africa. The STS concept of 
cumulative advantage is employed to discuss how the exercise of national agency can 
be exercised by African governments in the conduct of IeTTs. This concept helps to 
explain differences in productivity among parties in situations where capacities or 
competences are unevenly distributed (Sismondo, 2010, pp. 38-39). The discussion 
forms the basis for making our main contribution to knowledge – a collaboration model 
for fostering the acquisition of e-health technology competence in African countries.  
The concept of symmetry is employed in developing the model. Symmetry in an 
institutional sense is that interaction in an innovation system is ‗shared habits of 
patterned actions and behaviours‘ (Nelson & Nelson, 2002, p. 267). We are stating that 
each global, continental, national and subnational structure, in a socio-technical 
interaction, has a role to play as a collective in supporting the exercise of national 
agency. By drawing inspiration from Geels, 2007, our goal is to create an alignment 
amongst the multiple and contending institutional interests of globalised interactions of 
the conduct of IeTTs in Africa, and to make instrumental policy contributions.  
Collective action is needed when new or innovative combination of technologies is 
brought into use, and that requires the assimilation of new knowledge or the 
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development of new institutions of innovation (Nelson & Nelson, 2002, p. 269), by a 
leaning developing country. Symmetry, however, is not in the sense of actor network 
theory of a stable, predictable network, but of uncertain and labile interactions of 
technoeconomic globalisation (Robert, 2012, pp. 39-40).  
As technology learning in the age of globalisation, occurs amongst cooperating an ever 
competing nations in vertical relationships of IeTTs, an alignment with the complex 
horizontal interactions of multiple and diverse interests of institutional actors and 
organisations, can make active learning to happen and to be transformative.   
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3 Technological path-dependency 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the first of the four narrative chapters and addresses objective 1.It 
demonstrates and argues that a history of technological path-dependency exists in the 
cosmopolitan conduct of IeTTs in Africa. The narrative foregrounds those in the 
succeeding three chapters. It traces a perennial recipient‘s (AB) national e-health 
technology acquisition, has been institutionally constrained by a historical combination 
of global and domestic technological, social, economic and political changes and 
conditions.  
African countries are encouraged to become developmental states by acquiring domestic 
innovation and industrial capacities from participating in international trade and 
diplomacy (Forje, 2006; Juma & Bell Jr, 2006; Lall & Pietrobelli, 2005; Ymele, 2011). 
However, it is often taken for granted, that the reticence of a recipient National 
government can create a situation where the process of technology acquisition becomes 
static. Such stasis is noted in the historical and contemporaneous conduct of IeTTs in 
African countries, exemplified by AB.  
AB‘s exercise of National Agency has been historically conditioned by global 
geopolitical and technoeconomic events that took place in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, 
and leading to the present time. These historical events are still having a conditioning 
effect on this country‘s current immature state of domestic e-health innovation capacity. 
Telling, as this country is still struggling to implement its national e-health initiative.  
Given that a technological path-dependency is noted in the continuum of past-present 
conduct, we thus argue that the dynamism of exercising National Agency as 
entrepreneurial states (Mazzucato, 2011) or developmental states (Forje, 2006), is a 
policy choice for addressing such structural stasis.  
The data employed in this chapter are qualitative in nature collected over four years of 
research and field work. The data sources include different structured and unstructured 
interviews conducted with e-health policymakers and programme managers and key 
stakeholders at different national meetings and workshops. The interviews with some 
the actors are continued for a long period through e-mails for getting updates and 
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clarifications on the e-health projects they were involved in. Documental analyses of 
policy documents, evaluation reports and meeting reports, obtained by privileged 
accesses granted by these actors, are carried out. Other sources of data are transcription 
of notes taken from policy meetings.  
The references for the data sources are presented in Appendix B. In total, four 
interviews (two structured and two unstructured) were conducted, there were 
participations in two policy meetings, one meeting report was reviewed, twenty four 
project documents analysed, three policy documents reviewed, and the literature 
explored.  
The structure of the narratives is divided into eight sections.  
1. The first section gives an overview of national e-health implementation in AB.  
2. The second presents five cases of IeTTs and highlights their globalised 
conception, and how their diffusions in AB are shaped by global geopolitical 
and technoeconomic events. 
3. The third presents the institutional identities of the global actors and 
organisations in the conduct of the IeTTs in focus.  
4. The fourth presents other institutional identities of the global actors and 
organisations in the conduct of the IeTTs in focus.  
5. The fifth presents AB‘s technological contributions to the global innovation 
system in the process of being a recipient of IeTTs.  
6. The sixth lists three structural factors at the national level implicated in AB‘s 
setbacks in its domestic e-health innovation capacity acquisitions.  
7. The seventh emphasises that a strategic omission to exercise its National Agency 
has made AB still a dependent recipient of IeTT.  
At the end of each section or sub-section, a key point is included to highlight the finding 
from the narrative.  
3.2 National e-health implementation: AB’s storyline 
The choice of AB is informed by the insights we have gained into a Commonwealth 
Secretariat‘s process [CM, Appendix A] that contributed to the design of AB‘s current 
efforts to implement a national e-health initiative. These insights came during a two 
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weeks‘ research visit to AB in 2011. The visit provided an invaluable opportunity to 
observe at first-hand the state and progress of its national e-health implementation. 
During the visit, several interactions took place with senior officials from its Ministry of 
Health (MoH) and with national and international stakeholders in two workshops on 
national e-health policy formulation. It became apparent that little progress had been 
made in the national implementation, since the last of the transfers in this study was 
conducted a decade ago. For instance, two different national e-health policy documents 
formulated in 2004 [1] and 2006 [2], were still not yet implemented in 2011, when the 
process for the formulation of a new one commenced. More striking was that a 
reference was made in the 2006 policy document to malfunctioning telemedicine 
equipment that had been acquired from one of the previous IeTTs, conducted a decade 
earlier.  
The globalised nature of these past transfers was reflected in this new process of 
developing AB‘s national e-health initiative. A striking observation made at one of the 
workshops [3] was how the dominant influence of international actors was apparent in 
the policy setting process. Review of a strategic document [4], the blueprint, defines the 
specifications of technologies to be acquired for the country‘s national implementation.  
The extent of financial contributions made by multiple international governmental and 
non-governmental development organisations to the process is shown by a review of a 
national e-health vision document [5]. Such altruistic and diplomatic contributions are 
also apparent in the formulation of the previous national e-health policy documents [1 & 
2]. It is also apparent in making technology choices.  
We learned during an interview with a senior MoH official [6], that the specification of 
technologies for AB‘s national e-health implementation was based on a blueprint, 
conceived by a consortium of European based academic and multinational 
telecommunication organisations. Certainly, nothing has changed since the conduct of 
the previous IeTTs, those, as we are going to demonstrate in this narrative in this 
chapter, whose technologies were tested and improved in this country.  
There is inherent complexity that works to constrain or condition national technology 
acquisition from such transfers in the wake of technoglobalism, as we have previously 
identified in Chapter 2. The apparent influence of multiple international actors and 
organisations in AB‘s national e-health implementation suggests that a historical 
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linkage exists with previous conduct of unreliable IeTTs. As the interview with the 
senior official from the MoH [6] revealed, such unprofitable reliance on altruistic and 
diplomatic transfers for implementing AB‘s national e-health initiative is no longer 
acceptable. This apparent realisation of the unreliability of previous conduct is not 
surprising, as three evaluation reports [7, 8 & 9] recorded. AB‘s first recorded attempt at 
a national implementation in 2000 never materialised; because a partnership that was 
formed with a very reputable IGO broke down soon thereafter. In addition, these three 
reports catalogue how a series of acquired malfunctioning and defective 
telecommunication, computing and medical devices, in the absence of requisite 
domestic innovation capacity, had frustrated any hope of a successful national adoption.  
The next section thus traces a path-dependency between the globalised nature of the 
previous IeTTs and the current immature state of AB‘s domestic e-health innovation 
capacity.  
3.3 The previous IeTTs 
These previous North-South (N-S) IeTTs were five Satcom-e-health initiatives 
presented in Table 5.1. The first project is PS, a Satcom-telemedicine initiative in two 
African countries in the 1980s. The second is HEN, implemented for health data 
collection and management (health informatics) in several African countries, including 
AB in the 1990s. The third is WOD also implemented in several African countries and 
in AB in the 2000s, also for health informatics purposes. The fourth and fifth are EAS 
and TEL were both implemented in the 2000s. .The era when these IeTTs were 
conducted was before the current remarkable explosive diffusion of mobile phones in 
Africa. It was when e-health initiatives in Africa employed Satcom for communication 
and connectivity (Crump, 2006; Geissbuhler, et al., 2003; House, et al., 1987; Pelton, 
1987). The era when the three initiatives were conceived, was also the time when state 
and non-state actors from the global West started implementing Satcom-e-health 
initiatives, for example, expressed intentions of global development in (Dario et al., 
2005; Zuzek & Bhasin, 1996). Project GATES conceived by the International Space 
University is a notable example of such (International Space University, 1994).  
Table 3.1 presents the International e-health technology transfers 
Initiatives  Descriptions Implementations in Africa 
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PS PS was conceived, financed and 
implemented by INTELSAT for 
internationalising telemedicine 
services from global West to Africa in 
1984. 
The transfer and testing of 
teleconferencing and the 
transmission of physiological and 
imaging technologies.   
HEN HEN was conceived, financed and 
implemented by a consortium of 
global West not- for -profit 
organizations in 1989.  
The development and launching 
of two micro-satellites and the 
massive transfers of end-user 
devices for health data collection. 
WOD WOD was conceived, financed and 
implemented by a global West 
Foundation owned by a private 
Satellite company in 1990. 
The development and launching 
of a big satellite and the massive 
transfers of end-user devices for 
health information dissemination. 
TEL TEL was conceived, financed and 
implemented by a consortium of a 
global West public, private and 
academic, and  international 
governmental organisations in 2000. 
The development and testing of a 
new telemedicine device for 
remote teleconsultation.  
 
EAS EAS was conceived, financed and 
implemented by a consortium of 
global West public and private 
organisations in 2003.  
The transfer and testing of a new 
telemedicine device for aiding 
remote clinical diagnosis. 
 
The diverse international origins of these IeTTs over the last four decades are presented 
in Table 3.2. The table captures the representations of political, healthcare, 
telecommunication, financial, industrial and global development interests represented in 
the conduct of these transfers. The diversity reflects the multiplicity of international 
organisations such as IGOs, international NGOs, multinationals, academia and 
individuals involved in the transfers. Take for instance, the case of TEL. There were 
three academic institutions and one renowned research institute from three different 
European countries that worked together to invent and improve the technologies. There 
was also a device manufacturer from a different European country. Lastly, there were 
three IGOs that worked together to finance and design the transfer process. The inherent 
complexity, in the process of fostering national e-health technology acquisition, is a 
reflection of such multiple inputs and interests of different international actors, as it was 
with TEL in AB. Such multiple global/organisational interests, if uncoordinated by a 
recipient‘s national government, can act to constrain such acquisition.  
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Table 3.2 presents the diverse actors involved in the transfer of TEL 
Organizations Roles 
An internationally renowned research institute 
from an European country  
Device & Software Techno-Invention 
An international governmental organisation  International Development 
An international governmental organisation Telecommunication  
An European international governmental 
organisation 
Financial Contribution and 
International Development  
A telemedicine device manufacturing company 
from an European country 
Industrial Manufacturing 
A university from an European country  Software Techno-Science 
A university from an European country Radiology Technical Expertise 
A university from an European country Healthcare Expertise  
 
The narratives identify and examine how global technoeconomic and geopolitical events 
of the previous era on AB‘s exercise of National Agency. The narratives go further to 
identify and examine how these global events that acted as institutional mechanisms 
constrained AB‘s agency to foster technology acquisition.  
3.3.1 Global geopolitical events 
According to (Christol, 1974; Colino, 1968), the decades just before the first conduct of 
these IeTTs (i.e. the conception of Project Share (PS) in the 1980s) were when 
information and communication technologies  became an altruistic instrumental tool for 
international development. The employment of Satcom as an instrument of diplomacy 
coincided with Cold War inspired ideological and technological rivalries between the 
West and the old East (Soviet Union). That period was marked by intense global 
technoeconomic and geopolitical competition, driven by capitalism in the West and 
communism in the East (Colino, 1968; Lambright, 1994; Levy, 1975; Peter, 2006).   
Altruistic and diplomatic international technology transfers in the shape of institutional 
arrangements of bilateralism and multilateralism along N-S and South-South (S-S) were 
also emerging in these periods (Colino, 1968; Cowhey, 1990; Levy, 1975). Several 
African countries were recipients of such diplomatic and altruistic technology transfers 
during these decades, for example from AIDSAT and INTELSAT (Christol, 1974; 
Colino, 1968; Holmes, 1995; Howell, 1988). At this time, but to no avail, African 
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governments  formulated different policy instruments and conceived several initiatives 
to acquire Satcom infrastructures for their countries (Aloo, 1988; Demerliac & Metzger, 
1984; Habib-Sy, 1992; Häusler & Simonis, 1985; Holmes, 1995; Howell, 1988; Pfister, 
1999).   
A key point is that geopolitical crises at the global level can act to constrain or condition 
African countries‘ national e-health technology acquisitions.  
3.3.2 Global technoeconomic events 
The global ‗techno-economic‘ (Perez, 2010) events that defined the era when the IeTTs 
were conducted in Africa shaped the process of their national acquisition quests. The era 
was also a period of global rapid technological changes. The era was defined by the 
miniaturization of satellites and their receiving devices (Goldsby & Boyd, 2001; 
Nogueira, 1998). According to (Pelton, 1987), satellite technologies started evolving 
from fixed and big enterprise-centric receiving  devices to portable and small consumer-
centric ones. For example, very small aperture terminal (VSAT) emerged during this 
time, and reportedly, was invented with the African markets in mind (Yesufu, 1990). 
Behind this lay the emergence of mobile telephony (Holmes, 1995; Nogueira, 1998). 
The rapid technological changes were typified by INMARSAT, whose pioneering 
invention of portable devices for remote and mobile communication (Howell, 1988), led 
to their experimental utilisation for an international telemedicine service
12
 between 
Swaziland in Africa and the UK.  
Concomitant with these rapid changes were global economic events which constrained 
the diffusion of the IeTTs in Africa. For instance, in the case of WOD, a global 
economic crisis – the dotcom bubble burst of the 1990s, which resulted in a global 
‗credit crunch‘ as documented by (Goldsby & Boyd, 2001) - was a constraint to the 
successful acquisition of the technologies in those countries. Similarly, the oil price 
crisis of the 1980s was also implicated in African countries setback to acquire a pan-
Africa Satcom infrastructure during this era, as documented in a report (Habib-Sy, 
1992). The impact of these global technoeconomic events was truly disruptive to 
                                               
12 Roy Howell (2008) cited a pilot carried out by INMARSAT in Swaziland, a southern African country, 
to demonstrate its technological prowess. The highlight of this was an instance where the UK based 
doctors were able to remotely diagnose and prescribe treatment for a child suffering from a rare, life-
threatening ailment in the absence of a local and resident specialist.  
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Satcom technology acquisition in Africa, laments Habib-Sy. International investors 
were reluctant to commit their finances to African countries that had become indebted 
after being unfairly exposed to the global economic crises (Christol, 1974; Howell, 
1988).  In the case of a certain mineral resource-rich African country, her quest to 
acquire a national Satcom infrastructure suffered a fatal blow, as her hitherto secured 
access to foreign capital suddenly vaporised.  
Key point: global economic crashes and crises can act to constrain or condition African 
countries‘ national e-health technology acquisition.  
3.4 Global corporatism 
The employment of altruism and diplomacy in the previous IeTTs, as vehicles for 
facilitating the provision of financial and technical assistance by well meaning IGOs or 
international NGOs, did not enable AB to acquire domestic e-health innovation 
capacity. Analysis of the evaluation reports on the implementation of TEL in AB has 
revealed the reasons why these well intentioned acts were not successful, - specifically, 
politics and weak leadership.  
Political contestations that arose between one IGO that financed the IeTT, and another 
that facilitated the transfer process to AB were evident. It is documented in [10 &11] 
that power struggles between these two resulted because there was no agreement 
reached on a protocol to coordinate their partnership. This weak coordination led to a 
reported difficulty to secure long-term finances for the e-health technology transfers, as 
one of the IGOs that had previously committed, defaulted. A different IGO that had also 
previously committed to install a telecommunication infrastructure also defaulted.  
Weak leadership on the part of the IGOs was also evident. The lack of clear leadership 
led to poor accountability and coordination of activities during implementation. As can 
be deduced from this report [11], it was evident that the IGOs could not effectively 
govern and align the divergent interests of the multiple partners involved in the IeTT.  
The lack of a clear line of authority in the allocation and execution of tasks was also 
evident.  
The impacts of political contestations and weak leadership on national acquisition were 
negative. As documented in [10, 11, 12 & 13], it can be deduced that the IGOs omitted 
to enlist the cooperation of relevant national governmental agencies in the design and 
implementation of the IeTT. Even when the MoH was involved, it seemed a symbolic 
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involvement only, as it was bypassed during the transfer of the technologies to the 
hospitals where they were implemented. The import of this institutional neglect was 
apparent in the exasperated reaction of an AB government official, as documented in 
[11]. The official, from one of the agencies that were bypassed, expressed concern that 
the process was not aligned with the extant national plans for e-health implementation.  
Key point: corporate actions by global actors that manifest as political contestations 
amongst them, and weak leadership in the coordination of their actions, can either 
constrain or enable African countries‘ national e-health technology acquisitions.  
3.5 Global industrialism 
The global industrial partnerships that were forged by WOD and HEN to foster a 
development of low-capital devices for the African markets, (including in AB) never 
materialise. This was as a consequence of the high cost of the devices which was 
prohibitive for African consumers. Well-intentioned global industrialism in the case of 
WOD did not have impact in Africa at the time when its economy was grossly 
underperforming in 1990s. The industrial partnership was forged with a consortium of 
four major Japanese consumer electronic giants for the production of such devices, 
which were not affordable for potential consumers in Africa
13
, because of the set high 
market price, according to (Goldsby & Boyd, 2001).  
A partnership forged with a group of manufacturers from Asia
14
 also struggled to 
deliver the $US10 device they had hoped for. The market prices which the devices were 
sold for were prohibitive for most African users, as documented in these reports [14 & 
15]. A parallel can be drawn with a similar more recent event, the ‗One Laptop per 
Child‘ device‘s story. In this case, ideological differences between the altruism of a 
philanthropic organization (the device inventor) and the mercantilism and industrialism 
of its global corporate partner, frustrated this frugal innovation. As a consequence, the 
former couldn‘t  deliver on the widely publicised affordable market entry price of 
                                               
13 These Japanese consumer electronic giants Sanyo, Panasonic, Hitachi and JVC produced four different 
versions of the WOD devices each costing an average of $ US$300 in 1999. This amount was slightly 
more than the average annual individual income in AB in the same year.  
14 As deduced from [15], the minimum market entry price of $US300 for the devices produced by the 
Japanese was later reduced to $US150 when they were produced by an India, Indonesia and South Korea 
industrial complex. Nevertheless, this was not enough to reverse the uncertainty that trailed its evolution.  
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$US100 (Kraemer, Dedrick, & Sharma, 2009). Therefore, the promise of a laptop for 
each school child in developing countries never materialise.  
This clash of economic ideologies also affected the transfer of WOD to Africa. 
According to (Goldsby & Boyd, 2001), in the search for finances from the global capital 
market for inventing and producing of a satellite technology solely dedicated for 
Africa‘s market, a similar ideological clash between two dissimilar potential investors 
arose. This ideological clash pitted the neoliberalism of the global West‘s companies 
against the state capitalism of a competing Middle-Eastern National government. As a 
consequence, there was a reported delay in the transfer of WOD to Africa.  
The lack of a common standard between technologies produced by international 
companies was recorded as a constraint to a planned pan-African expansion of EAS. As 
documented in [7], a plan to link the telemedicine infrastructure in AB with that in 
another African country was scuttled, because the devices and software procured from 
two different international vendors were found to be incompatible. The challenge of 
incompatibility, as also documented in [8], was recorded as a frequent constraint 
encountered in implementing a national e-health initiative in AB.  
The superficial integration of Africa into the global industrial network was also a 
constraint. For instance, it is documented in these evaluative reports [10, 12, 13, 16, 17 
& 18] that there were delays to the repairs and maintenance of telemedicine devices that 
were being utilised in AB because the manufacturers were located in a European 
country. Even the simple fabrication of a spare part for a faulty device required the 
unreliable dependence on a complex global industrial network of manufacturers that 
were based in global West countries, as documented in these reports.  
Well-intentioned global mercantilism in the case of HEN also struggled to gain traction 
in Africa at the time when its economy was grossly underperforming in the 1980s. 
Hence, the promise of producing low-capital devices for the African markets was 
broken, as we learned in an interview with the project manager [19]. This was despite a 
commercial partnership that was forged with a consortium made up of a global West 
start-up company, national space agency and a large Satcom manufacturing company, 
as documented in [20]. It is important to point out that the start-up company is now a 
commercial manufacturer of devices for oceanography (Irish, et al., 1999), which can 
trace their invention to domestic technosciences carried out in Africa.   
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In spite of the report [21 & 22] that a technology remittance agreement was signed with 
the start-up company, no low-capital devices were ever transferred back to the African 
countries  that contributed to this global innovation, as we learned from the project 
manager [19].  
A claim can be made to suggest that these domestic techno-sciences have contributed to 
global innovations and enterprises. As an example, the utilisation of microsatellites that 
HEN pioneered is now widely employed for earth monitoring and observations 
(Nogueira, 1998).  This move from altruism to mercantilism is directly observable in the 
case of TEL. An improved portable telemedicine device, which came out as a product of 
domestic technosciences in AB, is now being offered as a commercial product by a 
European start-up company for military and civilian purposes in the Americas. This is 
as we learned from an interview with a key informant that is closely involved in the 
process [23].  
Key point: well meaning global industrial partnerships can constrain or enable African 
countries‘ of national e-health technology acquisitions capacity in, because of expensive 
transferred technologies. 
3.6 Globalised  technosciences  
It is observed that AB struggled to acquire domestic innovation capacity, despite reports 
to substantiate that it contributed to the improvements made to the transferred hardware 
and software in the process of addressing technology inappropriateness in these project 
documents [21, 22 & 24] and [14 & 15]. A review of the aforementioned documents on 
the local technosciences that took place with HEN and WOD, suggests that user-
generated and technical data considerably contributed to the development of a more 
appropriate and miniaturised Satcom devices, later made commercially available in 
global markets. It was apparent that AB did not acquire any capacity or accumulate 
technologies from the previous IeTTs, as we observed during a research visit in 2011 
[2]. 
For instance, a series of technosciences jointly carried out with WOD in various 
experiments in African countries are documented in two reports [14 & 15] produced by 
the Department for International Development (DFID). These domestic technosciences 
had in no small way contributed to the pioneering role WOD played in the 
miniaturisation of receiving devices. Similar joint experiments with HEN are 
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documented in [21, 22 & 24]. The documents detail a decade-long series of 
technosciences conducted in several African countries that contributed to the design, 
manufacturing of, and subsequent improvements made to, portable and mobile Satcom 
devices. For example, a newer generation of efficient antennas was developed after 
repeated prototyping, notably in AB (documented in [24]).   
These technological improvements were not limited to receiving devices only but also 
the satellites themselves. The invention and improvement of the HEN technology made 
possible the global transition from geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) to low earth orbit 
(LEO) satellites. To substantiate, as documented in [22], at the World Administrative 
Radio Conference in 1992, organized by the International Telecommunication Union, 
fervent advocacy by HEN‘s inventors reportedly contributed immensely to a decision to 
appreciate LEO‘s technology validity and appropriateness as a low-capital alternative 
for telecommunication in developing countries. This turned out to be an immense 
contribution to the global innovation system, according to Prof. Sir Martin Sweeting of 
the renowned, UK-based, Surrey Satellite Technology Limited (SSTL) (Sweeting, 
2000), who linked the HEN‘s invention with the emergence of LEO satellites.  
The contributions to global innovations were not limited to satellite technologies. It can 
be argued that contributions were also made to telemedicine devices. The review of 
TEL technical project reports [12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 & 31], 
reveals that a series of incremental domestic techno-sciences conducted over 2 years in 
AB immensely contributed to a markedly improved, usable and efficient device. The 
reports chronicle how a process of software and hardware prototyping resulted in the 
miniaturisation, improved mobility, ruggedization and greenness of the improved device 
that was finally produced after this period, as a contribution to global innovation.   
Key point: co- developments with global actors cannot necessarily make national e-
health technology acquisition happen.  
3.7 National capacities 
A strategic omission to accumulate technologies and assimilate technical knowledge 
from past conduct of IeTTs can partly be attributed to AB‘s reticence in exercising its 
National Agency. For example, its National government could have prior instituted 
certain national innovation capacities. There are two conditions behind this omission we 
have identified. The first is that certain counter-productive actions of global actors and 
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organisations identified in the preceding sections can be held liable. The second is 
limited benefit for example, from HEN and WOD had much to do with the contravening 
global technoeconomic and geopolitical events of the time of their conduct. In spite of 
the influences of these two conditions on national acquisition, we however, argue that 
the poor states of AB‘s national financial, economic and innovation capacities were 
more telling.   
3.7.1 National financial constraint 
Financial constraints impeded any wide-scale national diffusion of the transferred 
technologies in AB, in spite of all the domestic techno-scientific contributions to the 
global innovation system, as documented in the evaluation report [9]. For instance, the 
evaluation reports of the decade-long transfers of HEN [20 & 21] in AB and elsewhere 
in Africa, document national financial constraint as a major challenge to successful 
acquisition. This finding is also substantiated from these interviews [19] and [32] with 
the programme managers that were implementing the IeTTs in Africa at that time in the 
1990s. In the case of HEN in AB, it is documented in this report [20, pp. 9-10] that 
financial constraints limited the procurement of more and newer devices required for 
successful national expansion. As documented in these reports [20 & 22], the 
prohibitive costs of procuring an end-user device rose by a multiple of four from an 
initial cost of $7,500 in 1993 to $30, 000 in 2000. 
The same challenge was also encountered with the transfer of EAS in AB later in the 
2000s. As reported in the evaluation report [7], lack of domestic financial resources 
made impossible the regular maintenance of telemedicine equipments and also 
prevented the procurement of new devices from the global market after obsolescence 
set-in. The report stated how an incapability to mobilise $US 9 million, the amount 
needed to procure a set of new equipment for its only tertiary specialist hospital, proved 
to be deleterious. A resort to a purchase of unreliable and malfunctioning second-hand 
equipments as an alternative was documented in this report [8], did not help. 
Financial constraints also prevented the maintenance and repair of the existing 
equipment and the hiring of technical human resources. As documented in these reports 
[20 & 22], high financial costs constrained any attempts at domestic technological 
customization.  
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Ultimately, there was a shortage of technical expertise to carry out repairs and to adapt 
the technology for local utilisations. Similar circumstances also befell WOD. An 
evaluation sponsored by the Department for International Development (DFID) by the 
UK in AB in 2003, documented in [14 &15], identified the prohibitive and high unit 
cost of devices
15
  as a major constraint to any hope of a national adoption. Nevertheless, 
the fact that this country struggled to acquire national technology capacities from these 
IeTTs had less to do with national financial constraint, and more with the small size of 
its economy and its immature domestic innovation capacity.  
Key point: lack of national financial capability can limit domestic adaptations of 
transferred technologies and can cause technology obsolescence, which in turn can 
constrain recipients national e-health technology  acquisition.  
3.7.2 Small National economy 
The small size of AB‘s economy is identified as a constraint to the successful national 
acquisition of technologies from the IeTTs. Having a small national economic size 
meant that the markets were also small in size and were less integrated into the global 
economic system, as was observed with the transfers of WOD and HEN.    
The small market size of AB‘s national economy meant that an economy of scale was 
not possible. In the case of WOD, the price of the devices remained prohibitively high 
because the volume of the devices that were sold in Africa was too low to create any 
economies of scale, as documented in these reports [14 & 15]. Poor integration into the 
global economy meant, for example, dissociation from the centres of production in 
Asia, leading to scarcity of the devices in the domestic market. A factor that created an 
artificial inflation was also implicated in making the devices unaffordable. The situation 
was so dire that in the whole of Africa, the total number of sales veered widely from the 
initial market projection, according to these reports [14 &15]. Instead of a projected 
market of 250 million African potential buyers (a figure that represented 45% of 
African population in the 90s), the econometric analysis carried out by (Goldsby & 
Boyd, 2001) found out that only 6.4% of this projection was feasible.  
                                               
15 The report concluded that as if the minimum unit cost of $US150 price for a device was not prohibitive 
enough, the additional burden of an estimated $US1, 250 for computer accessories needed for Internet 
access and constant battery replacements, together made it unaffordable. 
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The superficial integration of AB into the global industrial and economic system was 
also a documented constraint in the case of EAS and TEL. These reports [7, 8, 13] 
document how the procurements of telemedicine equipment and their spare parts was 
hindered due to the loose connection of AB with complex, distant and overstretched 
global supply and value chains. The distance between AB and the global value chain 
also caused delay in the import of spare parts needed for the repair of telemedicine 
devices. For instance, in the case of EAS, it is documented in [7], that it took a whole 
two years to be able to procure a telemedicine device from the global market, because of 
AB‘s superficial integration into global economy.   
Key point: small National economic size and superficial integration into global 
economy can constrain national e-health technology acquisition.  
3.7.3 Immature National innovation capacity  
The immaturity African countries‘  domestic innovation capacities also contributed to 
the uncertainty of acquiring technologies from the IeTTs. A lack of capability to carry 
out routine repairs when there were breakdowns and the failure to adapt the 
technologies to local conditions, for example, was shown in the case of HEN. As 
documented in [21, 22 & 24], there were occasions of frequent breakdown of 
equipment, in the absence of domestic technical capabilities to repair or fabricate spare 
parts. For these reasons, the continuous utilisation of the technologies was constrained, 
as obsolescence set in, in the absence of domestic innovation capacity to engineer any 
improvements that were required. Similarly, the inability to locally manufacture WOD 
devices in African countries including AB was identified as a constraint to making them 
affordable for the African markets (Goldsby & Boyd, 2001).  
Similar problems with obsolescence and technology-environment misfit were prominent 
constraints in the cases of TEL and EAS, and resort to international manufacturing and 
expertise for repairs and procurements was reported. The deficient state of domestic 
innovation capacity in AB was identified, in the case of EAS, as a hindrance to the   
incremental adaptation of the transferred telemedicine devices to local needs and 
contingencies, as documented in these reports [7]. The same was also recorded for TEL, 
as documented in [18]. Some of the transferred telemedicine devices were never 
utilised, because the expertise to adapt the devices to local user-demands was lacking.  
This problem of deficient domestic innovation capacity was extremely constraining for 
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any e-health technology the acquisition in AB. For instance, it was documented in the 
evaluation report [9] that in a rare instance when a spare part was locally procured for a 
telemedicine device, the absence of the required domestic engineering expertise resulted 
in the device having to be eventually sent back to the manufacturer in a global West for 
the required repairs.  
It can be claimed that the immature state of domestic innovation capacity accounted for 
the lack of assimilation of the intellectual property rights (IPRs) co-generated with 
international partners in AB. In the specific case of TEL, the series of domestic 
technosciences that took place in AB, as documented in [10, 11, 12, 13, 16 & 17], was 
acknowledged by the inventors as immensely useful for the re-development of a more 
efficient and improved device, as documented in [31]. Nevertheless, it is apparent that 
these IPRs were not assimilated, as the capacity to adapt the technologies to local 
contingencies and needs was not evident years afterward, as documented in the report 
[9] produced in 2010.  
Key point: lack of domestic innovation capacity linked a failure to assimilate technical 
competence, can make local technology adaptations difficult to achieve, which in turn 
can constrain  national e-health technology acquisition .   
3.8 Uncertain National agency 
The narratives in the preceding sections have demonstrated that an African country, AB 
as a passive recipient of IeTTs in the last three decades, hasn‘t acquired domestic 
innovation capacity. The country is still without the requisite domestic e-health 
innovation capacities to engineer its own national e-health systems. If it were possible 
to assign whose role it is between the national and the global in addressing these 
constraints, the bulk of the responsibility lies with the former. The lack of the exercise 
of national agency had been the norm in the past, as is documented in the meeting report 
[33], produced following a national stakeholder meeting in 2011 and endorsed by the 
country‘s Minister of Health. For instance, in the national e-health vision document [5] 
and this meeting report [33], it is documented that national leadership had been 
unwisely absent in the conduct of strategic relationships with global partners in previous 
and ongoing IeTTs. 
AB‘s ill-fated national e-health technology acquisition can be attributed to a historical 
linkage between those previous IeTTs and how they have come to constrain the present 
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state of its e-health implementation. Despite their history of unreliability, it was 
observed during two field trips undertaken in 2009 [34] and 2011[2], that AB was still 
as heavily dependent now on transferred e-health technologies  as it was in the past. 
During these field trips, it became apparent that the country had not acquired the 
domestic innovation capacity that it needs to translate its policy of building a national e-
health infrastructure into concrete actions.  
On a field trip in 2009 to the main national hospital, where most of the transferred e-
health technologies were implemented and utilised, none of the transferred technologies 
from the previous IeTTs were still functioning, as was learnt in an interview with a 
hospital official. Moreover, the unpleasant sight of a mountain of obsolete equipment 
and devices dumped at the hospitals‘ biomedical unit demonstrates both the uncertainty 
of those previous technology transfers and is a testament to their unreliability.  
At the stakeholder meetings [1 & 2] that we participated in, a recurrent issue that 
dominated the policy debates was the difficulty AB is facing to coordinate and align the 
various IeTTs in the country with its national e-health strategy. The current deficient 
state of AB‘s domestic innovation capacity is in sharp contrast to the aspiration 
expressed to implement a national e-health initiative in the immediate future [5]. There 
is a list of constraints identified in the strategy paper as hindrances to turn this aspiration 
to a reality. Most of these are sociotechnical in nature. That is a technology acquisition 
imperative is to be incorporated in the currently being formulated national e-health 
policy, as informed by key stakeholders at the meeting in 2011 [2]. 
The incapability of AB to assimilate technologies and competences, and its historical 
uncertainty to adapt transferred technologies to local needs and contingencies, can be 
taken as the main cause of the current state of deficient domestic e-health technology 
capacity. The import of this deficiency is now recognised at policy-level in AB. To sum 
up, it is important to emphasise that the importance of national technology acquisition 
for an African country such as AB, for example in the telecommunication industry, was 
long recognised policy at the continental and global levels. See, for instance, a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the African Union with the United 
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Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in 1981
16
.  However, this 
policy was never translated into anything that resembled industrialisation in Africa 
(Aloo, 1988; Habib-Sy, 1992; Holmes, 1995; Pfister, 1999).  
Key point: limited exercise of National Agency in the conduct of IeTTs is the main 
factor that constrains national e-health technology the acquisition.  
3.9 Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated with the case of AB that a historical linkage exists 
between previous IeTTs and the current absence of a mature national e-health 
technology capacity in recipient African countries. This is a reflection of our 
articulation that there is an inherent complexity in the conduct of IeTTs in Africa. This 
complexity reflects the diversity of the international and national actors and 
organisations that are involved in the process. The narrative has traced and examined 
how global geopolitical and technoeconomic events can constrain or condition domestic 
technology acquisitions capacities from previous conducts. We have also identified that 
the high cost of transferred technologies and political contestations among global actors 
can also be conditional. In addition, how national financial constraint, absent national 
innovation capacity and small national economic size can constrain a successful 
acquisition, were identified. 
Table 3.3 summarises factors which are identified to account for uncertainty acquisition 
of national e-health technology capacity acquisitions in African countries.  
Table 3.3 summarises the institutional constraints 
Narrative themes Institutional constraints 
Global geopolitical events Geopolitical crises at the global level can 
constrain or condition a recipient‘s   
national e-health technology acquisition.  
Global technoeconomic events Global economic crashes and crises can 
constrain or condition a recipient‘s 
national e-health technology acquisition. 
                                               
16 Article Volume 1590, II-1047 between the UNIDO and the Pan-African Telecommunication Union 
(currently know as African Telecommunication Union) expresses the wish of the latter to foster domestic 
Satcom industry in Africa with the support of the former.  
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Global corporatism  Corporate actions by global actors that 
manifest as political contestations amongst 
them, and weak leadership in the 
coordination of their actions, can either 
constrain or enable a recipient‘s national e-
health technology acquisition.  
Global industrialism  Well meaning global industrial 
partnerships can either constrain or enable 
a recipient‘s national e-health technology 
acquisition in, because of expensive 
transferred technologies. 
Domestic technosciences Co- developments with global actors 
cannot necessarily make a recipient‘s 
national e-health technology acquisition 
happen.  
National financial constraint Lack of national financial capacity can 
limit domestic technology adaptations and 
can cause technology obsolescence, which 
in turn can constrain national e-health 
technology acquisition.  
Small National economy  Small National economic size and 
superficial integration into the global 
economy can constrain national e-health 
technology acquisition.  
Immature national innovation capacity Lack of domestic innovation capacity 
linked to an uncertain assimilation of 
technical competence can make difficult 
local technology adaptations, which in turn 
can constrain e-health technology 
acquisition.   
Uncertain exercise of National Agency  Uncertain exercise of National agency in 
the conduct of IeTTs as a main factor that 
constrains national e-health technology 
acquisition. 
 
We have identified and demonstrated a complex history of institutional constraints on 
national e-health technology acquisition. The main finding of this chapter is that the 
exercise of National Agency can ensure a recipient‘s acquisition of domestic e-health 
innovation capacity from IeTTs.  
Further exploration of the nature of such complexity and its influence on domestic 
accumulation and assimilation, is presented in the succeeding three narrative chapters. 
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At this junction, we provide a brief account of how the narrative in this chapter link to 
and complement the ones in the subsequent three chapters. These subsequent narratives 
further build on this chapter, and identify and examine the institutional nature of the 
structural constraints to the exercise of National Agency in the complex interactions that 
characterise the process of IeTTs in African countries. Subsequent narratives identify 
how national, continental and global institutional actions contribute to a recipient‘s 
immature state of domestic e-health innovation capacities.   
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4 Global geopolitics 
4.1 Introduction 
The second of the four narrative chapters that addresses Objective 2. This identifies and 
demonstrates how institutional actions and identities, manifest as global geopolitics, in 
the cosmopolitan conduct of both North-South (N-S) and South-South (S-S) IeTTs. 
Furthermore, how national e-health technology acquisition is constrained and the 
inappropriateness and affordability of transferred e-health technologies are 
demonstrated.  
Global geopolitics manifests as international commercial and ideological differences 
amongst involved diverse and competing actors and organisations. The contentions are 
underpinned by the emerging global technoeconomic events and changes, as those 
identified in the case of AB in Chapter 3. As rising global economic giants emerge from 
the East they are competing with the established global West countries for supremacy 
and influence in international markets and trade (Cheru & Obi, 2010). The position of 
many African countries as technology laggards (Forje, 2006; Lall & Pietrobelli, 2005; 
Ymele, 2011), despite being recipients of numerous N-S transfers from the global West, 
has caused some academics to see the transfers as  promoting technology dependency 
(James, 2002; Ya'u, 2005) (See chapter 3 for detailed examples). The same judgement 
cannot yet be made of the emerging S-S transfers from the global East. However, 
(Cheru & Obi, 2010, pp. 22-23) contends that the consequence of technology 
dependency cannot be overlooked.  Interdependency among nations is, however, 
essential for co-development of technologies in international cooperation (Freeman, 
2002; Lall & Pietrobelli, 2005). Notwithstanding, the utility of ITTs that such 
cooperation brings, has limited impact on recipient developing countries‘  technology 
accumulation and assimilation.  
In the context of global development there is a notable technological path-dependency 
between the past and the present. Despite best intentions, since the first cosmopolitan 
conduct of Satcom ITTs on the back of the launch of the 1
st
 United Nations Decade of 
Development in the 1960s (Colino, 1968), and to the present conduct of IeTTs in the 
current MDGs practise, most recipient African countries several decades later on, are 
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still global Satcom technology laggards. A substantiation is that African countries are 
still recipients of Satcom-based IeTTs, for example the pan-African e-health initiatives.   
The first global development plan did not translate into a successful transfer of Satcom 
technologies to recipient African countries (Aloo, 1988; Habib-Sy, 1992; Pfister, 1999). 
Just as it is emerging that cosmopolitan m-health transfers that predominates in the 
MDG practise, are struggling to scale-up in recipient countries (Tomlinson, et al., 
2013). Un-developmentally, a historical linkage of uncertainty set in motion by the 
earlier ill-fated Satcom ITTs, are observed in contemporaneous ones directed at 
achieving the MDGs such as pan-African e-health initiatives (Asamoah-Odei, et al., 
2007; Geissbuhler, et al., 2007; Telecommunications Consultants India Limited, 2007).  
Like Domino cards, such technological path-dependency in the way we demonstrated 
with AB (Chapter 3), has been replicated in successive and contemporaneous conduct of 
IeTTs and ICT4D initiatives in Africa. This is an observation that is not lost to (Ya'u, 
2005). Would for instance, these initiatives often presented in the mode of international 
cooperation, survive the stasis of historical linkage?    
In their book, (Cheru & Obi, 2010, pp. 14-39) further identifies an emerging trend of 
technology transfers through various bilateral and multilateral international cooperation 
arrangements, as diplomatic instruments to strategically gain future commercial 
footholds in African markets. The tussle between two global East economic giants, as 
documented by (Cheru & Obi, 2010, p. 47) in acquiring Africa‘s biggest mobile 
operator in 2009, is an example of the perceived intentions of strategic mercantilism and 
industrialism.  
The implication of these observations will be demonstrated in the ensuing narrative. It 
can be seen that little difference exists between N-S and S-S IeTTs, in term of their 
consequences for of national e-health technology acquisition in Africa. As Cheru & Obi 
go on to highlight, the rise of the global East state operated enterprises (SEOs) brings 
them into direct competition with each other and with the global West multinationals in 
Africa (Cheru & Obi, 2010, pp. 31, 47 & 73-75).A similar observation can be made 
about the recently conducted IeTTs (Satcom telemedicine initiatives) in several African 
countries.  
The data employed in this chapter are qualitative in nature collected over four years of 
research and field work. The data sources include different structured and unstructured 
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interviews conducted with African and international policymakers and key informants at 
different meetings, workshops and conferences. The interviews with these actors 
continue for a long period through e-mails and from discussions at different fora, for 
getting updates and clarifications on e-health projects they were involved in. 
Documental analyses of policy documents, evaluation reports and meeting reports, 
obtained by privileged accesses granted by these actors, are carried out.  
Other sources of data are from transcription of notes taken in policy meetings. In total, 
nine interviews (nine structured and one unstructured) were conducted, there were 
participations in six policy meetings, four meeting reports were reviewed, twenty 
project documents analysed, one national e-health policy document reviewed, and the 
literature surveyed. The references for the data sources are presented in Appendix B. 
The main source of data is from participations in the policy debates that contributed to 
the shaping and implementation of three pan-African e-health initiatives (Appendix C) 
and from data from national e-health initiatives in Africa.  
The chapter is divided into four main sections.  
1. The first section demonstrates, from the conduct of IeTTs, geopolitical 
competitions manifested in the forms of mercantilism, industrialism and 
diplomacy.  
2. The second section presents how geopolitical contentions can result in a clash of 
commercial ideology between the global East and West.  
3. The third section demonstrates that geopolitical contentions can result in African 
countries acquiring expensive and inappropriate transferred technologies from 
global markets.  
4. The fourth examines the conduct of neoliberalism that is common to both global 
West and East in the conduct of IeTTs.  
At the end of each section or sub-section, a key point is included to highlight the finding 
of the narratives.  
4.2 Geopolitical competition 
In the recent conduct of large-scale pan-African e-health transfers (Appendix C) in 
Africa, similar geopolitical competitions are observed; as we have observed in the 
various negotiations that took place at these meetings, amongst the multiple global, 
continental and national actors and organisations involved in the conduct of IeTTs in 
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Africa. We observed this while participating in a multi-stakeholder policy meeting on 
these e-health technology transfers held at an office of a pan-African organisation in 
2009 [35]. The dominant presence of the global identities in the conduct is underpinned 
by a perception of their self-interests.  
The geopolitical interests of the global actors were observed in the conducts. 
Geopolitical contentions between an S-S IeTT from the global East and an N-S one 
from a consortium of the global West were observed at a multi-stakeholder meeting 
[35]. Although both were presented to Africa‘s continental and National governments 
with an altruistic face, we had the opportunity to observe at firsthand how the 
institutional interests of international actors can constrain national e-health technology 
acquisition was presented at the meeting. The meeting was convened to incorporate 
Africa‘s inputs into the transfers‘ co-implementation plan. It included representatives 
from Africa‘s continental and regional bodies and from the partnering international 
organisations. At the meeting, the strategic importance of the integration of the two 
contending globalised transfers for the benefits of effective national acquisition was 
demanded by the African representatives.  
“[......], I am not against the [donor sponsored] Telemedicine project but it is the [the 
pan-African organisation] which has to see how best it can coordinate the two different 
initiatives which in some cases they have the same objectives.......”  
This expression from a high ranking official from a pan-African telecommunication 
organisation at the stakeholder meeting organised by a key pan-African governmental 
organisation [35], sums up the recipients‘ desire to integrate the competing and 
contending  IeTTs.  
However, the expressed strategic interest of the African governments to integrate the 
three different e-health technology transfers was met by strong opposition from those 
competing global actors. At this immediate aforementioned meeting, it was openly 
expressed by the proponents of the N-S IeTT that such integration wouldn‘t be in their 
own strategic interest. The same position was also taken by the proponents of the S-S 
transfer, according to an official of the key pan-African governmental organisation at 
the same meeting. The expression of strong opposition to integrate plausibly had 
something to do with their real intents for conducting the transfers in the first place. The 
conduct of the transfer was supposed to reside within an altruistic multilateral 
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international cooperation arrangement. However, from what we deduced from these 
concept reports [36 & 37], there is reason to suspect that their real intent was for 
conducting mercantilist bilateral relationships with African countries. 
Nevertheless, the employment of the craft of diplomacy by the proponents for 
legitimising the conduct of the transfers was not appreciated by Africa‘s policy makers. 
They also feared the potential of geopolitical contentions arising as a consequence of 
multiple uncoordinated e-health technology transfers. Take for instance, this expression 
from the same high-ranking official who was present at the multi-stakeholder meeting 
[35]. 
“[Africa] will even in future be offered several other initiatives but the most important 
thing will be to synchronize. Now we have from [the East and West donors] next it 
could be the US and China‖ 
Such occurrence of geopolitical contentions constrained the integration of the two N-S 
and S-S IeTTs. The intensity of the expressed reluctance to integrate the two contending 
globalised transfers was also documented in these meeting reports [38, 39 & 40]. 
Despite the diplomatic pressure applied by Africa‘s main continental governmental 
body to foster the integration of the contending transfers, organisational rivalry 
persisted, as the proponents of the two competing and contending  transfers were 
ultimately reluctant to integrate, as we learned in the post-meeting report [40]. 
According to an official of Africa‘s main governmental body interviewed during a 
research trip a year after the meeting [41], no hope of integration ever materialised.  
The interests of mercantilism and industrialism were observed as the underlying 
currents driving these geopolitical contentions. In the case of the N-S transfer, the quest 
to safeguard the commercial interests of its constituents was expressed at the meeting 
[35]. Demonstrably, the desire to maintain a separate organizational identity from the S-
S IeTT, as expressed in this meeting report [42], was also matched by the latter‘s 
perceived desire to pursue its mercantilist interests with African countries, as we learned 
in an interview with a national implementation manager of the said transfer [43].  
The displays of these institutional behaviours were observed in the conduct of the two 
contending globalised transfers. In that conduct, the interests of mercantilism and 
industrialism are intricately interwoven, with the untoward consequence of causing 
national technology dependency. In the case of the N-S transfer, a review of the 
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programme documents [36, 44, 45, 46 & 47], revealed that a well established global 
West Satcom-e-health industrial research complex was already in existence before the 
IeTT was conceived. The suspicion that a future mercantilist interest was in the air is 
evidenced in the scale and scope of the biomedical, computing and telecommunication 
technologies being proposed for transfers. For instance, the blueprint to build a large-
scale pan-African Satcom infrastructure, presented in this document [47] was not even 
on the agenda for scrutiny at the meeting [35].   
A suspicion of intent of industrialism was discovered from the review of the 
implementation plan conceived by a global consultancy firm [36]. It can be inferred 
from the plan that the preferred recipient countries already had in operation national e-
health initiatives that could act as suitable test-beds for adapting the transferred 
technologies to Africa‘s markets. Moreover, the intention to produce technologies for 
African markets was not denied by their representative at the multi-stakeholder meeting 
[35]. We therefore suggest that the conduct of the transfer was strategically employed as 
a clever means of securing a commercial foothold for their products and services in 
African markets.  
The manifestation of these institutional forms is even more strikingly observable in the 
S-S transfer. The observation of mercantilism and industrialism is substantiated with 
this micro-narrative of telemedicine software that was transferred to an African country. 
The software that was developed for donor country‘s domestic utilisation [37] was 
already protected by an intellectual property right, which as documented in this 
evaluation report [48], made the ignorant recipient immediately need to start paying for 
upgrades. Previously not communicated to the recipient country was that a license fee 
was required to carry out any domestic technology upgrading, required to make it fit for 
local utilisation. The strategic goal was to make African countries mercantile lock-in 
with the originating country. There is a reason to suspect that the transfer was conducted 
in order to strategically achieve this end. Take, for instance, these comments from an 
interview with an African expert who was involved in the international negotiation that 
preceded the technology transfers at a stakeholder meeting in 2009 [72] and those from 
an interview with the manager of national implementation of an S-S IeTT [43].  
“[….] the [the donor country’s] government wants to offer that service to the African 
Continent we will pay for the [the foreign] doctors to give the service   I’m saying why 
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are you building capacity in [in the foreign country] to give a service to Africa, but not 
building capacity here? It’s really buying market share” [from 72]. 
“[.......,] the real purpose of the network [infrastructure] was to create in road to govt 
[recipient government] for ICT from the [donor country] and [to] leverage the spread 
of [companies] business using govt support” [43]. 
“I have met with them and they actually offered to buy me out [...,] they look[ed] at the 
[...], and said we can fund this entire project and your govt (sic) will pay back in 20-
30yrs [......]” [43].  
What these comments show is that the advancement of mercantilism and industrialism 
is the real goal of the technology transfer. The goal as these comments show is to 
employ the conduct of the IeTT as a strategic means of giving competitive advantage to 
its business and industry in African markets. To substantiate this claim, a review of an 
evaluation report of a national implementation in an African country [48] revealed that 
‗medical tourism‘, is the common practice. This is a business practice where rich 
patients examined utilising telemedicine by medical experts from another country, can 
travel to that country for any prescribed medical or surgical treatments. The implication 
of this practice of medical tourism does not augur well for economic and healthcare 
workforce (human capital) development in the recipient country. Economically, money 
paid abroad for treatments might otherwise be spent locally for the same purpose in the 
low-income recipient country.  
In addition, ‗deskilling‘ of its local healthcare workers might arise, because of not being 
exposed to the management of complex medical and surgical cases, that learning 
through an international telemedicine consultation infrastructure could have offered. 
Global self-interests can worsen the already poor state of domestic health systems and 
can frustrate any attempts to integrate multiple and competing e-health initiatives.   
Key point: global geopolitics in the conduct of contending and competing S-S and N-S 
IeTTs in Africa can in the long run constrain or condition national e-health technology 
acquisition.   
4.3 East-West contention 
The employment of global diplomacy is observed in the conduct of both the N-S and S-
S IeTTs in Africa. This institutional form, a manifestation of the mechanism of global 
geopolitics, is strategically employed to advance the interests of mercantilism and 
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industrialism, and can constrain or condition national technology acquisition . The term 
East-West contention is adopted to capture how diplomacy can be employed for 
advancing commercial gains during technology transfers. In the conduct of the S-S and 
N-S IeTTs in Africa, this contention manifests as two competing ideological forms of 
global East and West mercantilism and industrialism.   
This comment from an interview with a high-ranking official of a pan-African 
governmental telecommunication organisation [76] sums up the intensity of global 
commercial competition for Africa‘s Satcom market.  
“Intelsat will be launching a satellite [name given to the satellite]. Asian Broadcasting 
Services (ABS) will also be launching a satellite with coverage of [southern African 
countries], O3B networks, New Skies are also planning to launch a satellite to cover 
Africa” [76]. 
This demonstrates that global Satcom companies from global East and West are already 
competing with each other to capture the emerging e-health service market in Africa. 
Take for example, the procurement of bandwidths from a global West Satcom 
multinational for e-health service delivery by an S-S IeTT from a global East giant, 
reported in these reports [50, 51 & 52] that documented the implementations.  
An employment of diplomacy is observed in both N-S and S-S IeTTs in order to gain 
undue advantage in their commercial competitions for Africa‘s market share. Take for 
instance, the conduct of the e-health technology transfers from two emerging global 
East countries and from a global West consortium. In the case of the former, it was 
discovered that the transfers were facilitated by their respective ministries of Foreign 
Affairs, as we discovered from reviewing the initiative documents [37, 55, 58 & 59]. In 
the latter; the support of a global West organisation was instrumental in enlisting 
Africa‘s continental governmental bodies‘ endorsement, as we learned from the 
presence of a high-ranking official of the organisation at a multi-stakeholder meeting 
[35]. Through the instruments of institutional arrangements such as bilateralism and 
multilateralism, diplomacy is employed by these global actors to strategically gain 
commercial advantage. The contestation between them mirrors two different but 
competing geopolitical ideologies. 
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Key point: commercial competitions between these contending N-S and S-S IeTTs 
reflect two different but competing geopolitical ideologies between the global East and 
West.  
4.3.1 Eastern ideology 
Eastern ideology is taken to capture the identities of mercantilism and industrialism in 
the conduct of two S-S IeTTs in Africa. In the case of one of the two global East 
economic giants, a review of two documents [51 & 53], which set out the conditions of 
international cooperation, discovered the employment of such arrangements for 
advancing Eastern mercantilism in the conduct of this particular transfer. First, 
diplomacy ensured that a multilateral memorandum of understanding (MOU) was 
extracted from a pan-African governmental body [53], endorsing its technology transfer. 
Different bilateral commercial agreements were later signed with African countries. 
Discussions with Ministry of Health officials from English speaking West Africa 
countries, at this national e-health policy formulation workshop [57], revealed that they 
were being pressured into signing commercial bilateral procurement agreements with 
their SEOs.   
A review of these meeting reports [54 & 55], revealed that an IT Company, owned by 
this global East country‘s National government, was responsible for designing and 
implementing the transferred e-health technologies. The company was to implement a 
blueprint for a pan-African telecommunication infrastructure for Africa [56], which put 
it in direct mercantilist competition with a similar plan from the global West consortium 
[47].  
A similar employment of diplomacy was also observed in the conduct of the other 
global East economic giant. In the case of the other S-S IeTT, a review of these reports 
[58 & 59] that documented  the conduct of the technology transfer capture the 
diplomatic process that preceded the signing of a bilateral international cooperation 
agreement between this African country and the global Eastern country. Diplomacy was 
employed to advance the mercantilist goal of a SEO e-health technology multinational 
from the latter.  
The diplomatic act involved a series of meetings between their ambassadors sponsored 
and financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of this donor country. It also entailed 
the participation of government officials from the country‘s ministries of technology, 
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finance, industry and international development during the negotiation. In this process, 
diplomacy mutated to mercantilism. A commercial company, jointly owned by this 
country‘s SEO, has been incorporated in an African country, and has commenced 
trading in e-health equipments and services in Africa (interview with a key informant 
[49]).   
Key point: eastern mercantile-industrial ideology can constrain or condition how 
African countries‘ national e-health technology acquisitions.  
4.3.2 Western ideology 
Western ideology is taken to capture the identities of mercantilism and industrialism in 
the conduct of an N-S IeTT in Africa by a global West industrial consortium. The 
perception of employing diplomacy for advancing mercantilism in this case was more 
subtle, as observed at an international cooperation forum in 2009. At this forum, high-
profile African government officials had closed-door meetings with their counterparts. 
Such subtlety can also be inferred from the conduct of a technology transfer. The said 
consortium had earlier, before the conduct of the technology transfer in focus, procured 
Satcom equipment and devices and bandwidths from a global West multinational for an 
African country‘s national telemedicine initiative (interview with the project manager 
[60]). Such an act reveals a subtle employment of diplomacy to smooth the path for one 
that was to come.  
Thus, the choice of a country with a mature e-health initiative to be the recipient, gives 
the impression that it was a ploy to pre-test the appropriateness of the consortium‘s 
technologies for African markets. Take, for instance, the procurement of Satcom 
equipment and devices and technical expertise from two global West multinationals by 
the consortium, in ongoing large-scale e-health implementations in two African 
countries. 
Such use of a conduct of an IeTT, as an indirect means for carrying out technological 
prototyping, appears to be a trademark of this global West consortium in advancing its 
mercantilism and industrialism. An interview with a project manager [61] of a similar 
action by the consortium in another developing region of the world reinforces this 
perception. Apparently, the mercantilist activities of the industrial consortium partners 
went beyond the original scope of the multilateral international cooperation agreement, 
as they were forcing on the recipient a certain Satcom technology standard. Such 
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behaviour was also identified by (Habib-Sy, 1992; Häusler & Simonis, 1985), as an 
institutional constraint, that worked against past African countries‘ quest of acquiring 
Satcom technologies from the global markets .   
In the past, similar ill-fated quests, were partly a consequence of numerous geopolitical 
ideological contentions between the global East and West during the Cold War, claims 
(Christol, 1974; Cowhey, 1990; Holmes, 1995; Howell, 1988). Technology was a 
diplomatic tool for enrolling members into diametrically opposed geopolitical circles of 
influence.  
Key point: western-eastern mercantile-industrial ideological contention can constrain or 
condition African countries‘ national e-health technology acquisitions.  
4.4 Inappropriateness and affordability 
The manifestations of such East-West contentions observed in the conduct of IeTTs, can 
constrain or condition African countries‘ technology acquisition from ideologically 
divided global markets. Hence, the concerns of technology inappropriateness and 
affordability in the context of technoglobalism, calls for further analysis.   
A manifestation of geopolitical contentions was demonstrated in the case of a bilateral 
commercial S-S transfer of Satcom technologies from one of the global East economic 
giants‘ SEO to an African country KL, for the purpose of building its national e-health 
infrastructure. As was learnt from informal interviews at these meetings [57 & 62], the 
geopolitical events that preceded the procurement had the dynamics of an East-West 
complex. Apparently, previous commercial negotiations conducted with some global 
West Satcom multinationals by this African country, were unsuccessful. Consequently, 
the difficulty in negotiating for favourable terms was cited as a reason for resorting to 
an alternative choice – a supposedly more favourable S-S transfer.  
Generally speaking, it can be argued that neither N-S nor S-S IeTTs have been 
favourable for national e-health technology acquisition in Africa. In the case of the S-S 
transfer in KL, the satellite that was commercially procured soon thereafter became 
dysfunctional and had to be de-orbited as discovered in an interview with a Director of 
the Agency [63] that was operating the satellite
17
. The public uproar that greeted this 
                                               
17 The satellite failure was due to a solar panel defect that led to its malfunctioning and after a failed 
frantic rescue attempt, it was decommissioned.  
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setback was reported by the national newspapers in the country, and revealed that there 
were previously undisclosed intense competitions between the global East and West in 
the bidding process. Apparently, KL deemed procurement from the former as more 
affordable than the offers received from the latter.  
As previously mentioned, the choice of an S-S technology transfer did not go down well 
with the public. There was a feeling that procurement from the global West could have 
offered a superior product to the one that was eventually procured from the competing 
other, which was perceived as inferior. Such dynamics of East-West contention in the 
conduct of IeTTs in Africa, call into question the appropriateness of transferred e-health 
technologies.  
Hence, the narrative foregrounds the concern of affordability of e-health technologies in 
the midst of global geopolitical contention. This structural constraint setbacks African 
countries‘ national e-health implementations and subsequent long-term domestic 
innovation assimilation and accumulation.   
Many African countries face the challenge of procuring affordable e-health technologies 
from the global markets. Take for instance, the case of another African country ZP, 
whose efforts to build a national e-health infrastructure [64] in the last decade from both 
N-S and S-S IeTTs have so far been unsuccessful. An interview with an official from 
the country‘s ministry of health in 2010 [65 & 66] informed us that limited progress had 
been achieved in this regard. The delay in implementation was attributed to the 
incapability of ZP to successfully negotiate global markets, during the conduct of both 
transfers.    
ZP, just as we noted with AB in Chapter 3, was constrained in negotiating the 
complexity of global markets, because of domestic financial limitations. For the 
country, previous participation in similar technology transfers turned out to be 
unaffordable, due to the prohibitive costs of procuring e-health devices and equipments 
from global markets. In spite of having articulated detailed technology specifications 
and procurement procedures in this policy document [64], an attempt to participate in a 
commercial S-S IeTT with a global East country never materialised. ZP was incapable 
of affording a mere estimated $US 500, 000 quoted for the procurement. Hence, what 
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was planned as an incremental national e-health implementation suffered a massive 
setback; as was discovered in two separate interviews with an official from its Ministry 
of Health [65 & 66].   
The spectre of financial constraint also manifested itself in being a recipient of an N-S 
IeTT (project documents [67 & 68]). It took two years of painstaking fundraising and 
entrepreneurial efforts of a philanthropic global West faith-based organisation, to 
mobilise $US 300, 000 for procuring two expensive modern digital microscopes from 
global markets, needed for building an urban-rural telepathology infrastructure in ZP. In 
the process, they had to delicately negotiate complex global markets, before affordable 
appropriate devices were eventually sourced. 
The challenge of e-health technology affordability is a commonly encountered 
constraint in Africa, as this interview [69] with the founder of a pan-Africa telemedicine 
infrastructure informed. A planned expansion of the said N-S transfer to other African 
countries suffered a fatal setback, because of this structural constraint.  
In a different circumstance, a planned large-scale pan-African e-health implementation 
by a global West altruistic-mercantilist consortium, suffered a similar setback. The 
mobilisation of an earmarked multi-million US dollar capital investment to procure 
Satcom, biomedical and computing devices from the global markets, never materialised.  
Again, another unfulfilled cosmopolitan promise due to geopolitical political 
contentions. The state (which included African, global West and East countries and 
non-state actors (NGOs and IGOs)) that constituted the consortium, could not arrive at a 
multilateral decision (interview with the organisation‘s senior official at that time [70]).  
African countries struggle to successfully negotiate global geopolitics when procuring 
e-health technologies from global markets. The constraint of affordability as 
encountered by ZP in complex and competitive global markets, setback its national e-
health implementation. An interview with a senior official from this country‘s Ministry 
of Health, during a National e-health policy formulation workshop [71], confirmed 
such; and  ironically, that any hope of reviving it is heaped on receiving an IeTT from a 
global East.  
Key point: neither N-S nor S-S IeTTs have made e-health technologies reliable and 
affordable for national e-health implementations in Africa.  
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4.5 Neoliberalism 
We demonstrated that neither western nor eastern commercial ideology seems to have 
resulted in an unproblematic technology transfer in the aforementioned recipient 
countries. It might be that both ideologies commonly embody the identities of 
mercantilism and industrialism. These appear to bind them together in a shared practice 
of ‗neoliberalism‘ (Fritsch 2009, pp. 35-36).  
This shared ideology in the context of technoglobalism can be interpreted in a way 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) regime, binds cooperating countries together. Such 
understanding was obtained from a session on a global East country‘s development plan 
for Africa at the Chatham House African Agency programme in 2009 [73]. A very 
senior official of the country‘s Development Agency plainly stated that the country 
cannot altruistically transfer technologies to Africa, because most were co-developed 
with mostly global West countries. Both the global East and West are locked together in 
technology neoliberalism. A shared neoliberalism informs the practice of their 
multinationals and state operated enterprises (SEOs) mercantilism and industrialism in 
the conduct of IeTTs.   
What is apparent is that transferred-health technologies will not come cheap for most 
African countries. Even when they domestically co-developed technologies, most might 
be not be able to afford them.  
Reverse innovation (Immelt, Govindarajan, & Trimble, 2009) by multinationals and 
SEOs, might result in a situation where domestically co-developed e-health devices in 
African countries, become expensive and unaffordable commodities on global  markets. 
For example, a certain e-health device invented by a global West multinational in a 
middle income African country [74], is now being offered at prohibitive prices in global 
markets. A similar act of reverse innovation is also identified with another device 
invented on the back of the innovations that took place in two low-income African 
countries [AB and ZP], but being manufactured by a global medical device 
manufacturer (Parati et al., 2010). Of course, an accusing finger should also be pointed 
at the immature state of these recipient countries‘ domestic innovation capacities, which 
might have scuttled knowledge assimilation and technology accumulation.  
Key point: both eastern and western commercial ideologies commonly embody 
technology neoliberalism.  
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4.6 Conclusion 
The narrative identifies and examines the constraining and conditioning impacts of 
global geopolitics on national e-health technology acquisition in Africa. Global 
diplomacy, mercantilism and industrialism, which manifested in both conduct of North-
South and South-South IeTTs, can impact on the exercise of National Agency. These 
global institutional identities underscore the true nature of the conduct; hence, 
foregrounding the concern of technology affordability as an institutional constraint to 
domestic acquisition.  
Table 4.1 summarises the institutional manifestations of global geopolitics.  
Table 4.1 summarises the institutional constraints 
 Narrative themes Institutional constraints 
Geopolitical competitions Global geopolitics in the conduct of 
contending and competing S-S and N-S 
IeTTs can in the long run constrain or 
condition of national e-health technology 
acquisition.   
East-West contentions Commercial competitions between these 
contending N-S and S-S IeTTs reflect the 
underlying geopolitical contestations 
between the global East and West.  
Eastern ideology Eastern mercantile-industrial ideology can 
condition recipients‘ national e-health 
technology acquisitions.  
Western ideology Western-eastern mercantile-industrial 
ideological contention can constrain or 
condition recipients‘ national e-health 
technology acquisitions.  
Inappropriateness and affordability Neither N-S nor S-S IeTTs made e-health 
technologies reliable and affordable for 
national e-health implementations.  
Neoliberalism Both eastern and western commercial 
ideologies commonly embody technology 
neoliberalism. 
 
A key finding is that East-West contentions capture the underlying geopolitical divide 
in the conduct of IeTTs in Africa. We reckon that if unregulated it can constrain 
affordable technology acquisitions from the global markets; as the costs of procuring e-
health technologies are prohibitive.  
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5 Continental fragmentation  
5.1 Introduction 
The narrative in this chapter addresses Objective 3. It identifies and demonstrates how 
institutional actions and identities manifest as continental fragmentation in the 
cosmopolitan conduct of IeTTs. Global influences in this manifestation and its 
constraints on national e-health technology acquisitions are highlighted.  
As Freeman (Freeman, 2002) affirms, in the conducts of international technology 
transfers, a successful diffusion  of national acquisition happens when the strategic 
intermediary role of continental governmental bodies is enabling for national 
technology acquisition. That is, the continent plays an essential intermediary role 
between the global and the national in the conduct of international technology transfers. 
Such an intermediary role, according to (Muchie, 2004), can enable an assimilation and 
accumulation of domestic innovation capacity, when continental governmental 
organisations are acting in unison, and are strategically advancing an innovation agenda.  
An optimal functioning of the continental political and financial organisations is 
essential, and they have to be aligned with their national counterparts for a successful 
transfer to occur. In the conduct of S-S and N-S IeTTs in Africa, the narrative in this 
chapter identifies that the intermediary function is weak. Instead of enabling domestic e-
health innovation capacity accumulation, we observe that the inefficiency of the 
continental governmental bodies in Africa is constraining the exercise of National 
Agency.   
There are three institutional forms identified as structural constraints in acquiring 
domestic e-health innovation capacities in African countries. The first is the divisive 
influence of regionalism. The second is the influence of fragmented governance. The 
third is poor strategic leadership. These three define the mechanism of continental 
fragmentation. They constrain the exercise of National Agency, as continental 
institutions malfunction in the performance of their intermediation role during the 
conduct of IeTTs.  
The first section examines the nature of continental fragmentation as geopolitical 
divisions in Africa. The other two examine the organisational capacities of the 
continental governmental organisations as they mediate in the conduct.    
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The data employed in this chapter are qualitative in nature collected over four years of 
research and field work. Data sources include different structured and unstructured 
interviews conducted with African and international policymakers and key informants at 
different meetings, workshops and conferences. Interviews with some the actors were 
followed up for years through e-mails and from discussions at different meetings and 
conferences, giving updates and clarifications on e-health projects they were involved 
in. Documental analyses of policy documents, evaluation reports and meeting reports, 
obtained by privileged accesses granted by these actors, are carried out. Other sources 
of data are transcription of notes taken in policy meetings. In total, five interviews (three 
structured and two unstructured) were conducted, there were participations in five 
policy meetings, seven meeting reports were reviewed, eleven project documents 
analysed, six policy documents reviewed and the literature reviewed.  
The references for the data sources are presented in Appendix B. The main source of 
data is from participation in the policy debates that contributed to the implementation of 
three pan-African e-health initiatives (Appendix C) and from data from national e-
health initiatives in Africa.  
The chapter is divided into three main sections. 
1. The first section presents and demonstrates how IeTTs conducted on a regional 
basis can fragment continental governance and make recipient countries take 
self-interested unilateral decisions.  
2. The second section describes the underlying nature of fragmented governance as 
defined by complex interactions, interference and inefficiency, that limit 
coordination of IeTTs.  
3. The third presents and demonstrates that poor strategic leadership results in poor 
coordination of, and limited influence in, the conduct.  
At the end of each section or sub-section, a key point is included to highlight key 
findings.  
5.2 Regionalism 
Regionalism, the fragmentation of Africa into geopolitical regions by dominant 
international actors and organisations in the conduct of both N-S and S-S IeTTs, can 
constrain national technology acquisition.  Regionalism, the convenient segmentation of 
geographically proximate African countries into groups, is evident in national 
implementations of pan-African initiatives (Appendix C). The fragmentations are 
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caused by the disruptive global dominance in the conduct of IeTTs in Africa. Insights 
into past conduct of Satcom technology transfers in Africa demonstrate that such 
regionalism might result in a weakening and disintegration of any continental 
multilateralism that has been put in place to enable it. Moreover, it had also resulted in 
African countries taking unilateral actions in opposition to such continental 
multilateralism.  
Regionalism that is identified in the conduct, favoured one geographical sub-continent 
over the other. For example, countries from East Africa were explicitly picked for 
national implementations in two of the conduct, as reviewing these reports revealed [45, 
46 & 75]. A reason that can be offered for this observed predilection was found when 
participating in various policy debates that took place at the Chatham House Global 
Health Security and Governance and African Agency programmes [73]. Countries in 
this African region, for example AB in Chapter 5, are noted for being long-standing 
dependent recipients of more financial aids from international development partners 
relative to other parts of the continent. However, one of the transfers was explicitly 
intended to be implemented in all the five geo-economic regions of the continent: 
namely West, East, North, South and Central, as stated in these documents [37 & 56].  
So, in this example, national implementations were to be conducted on an equally 
distributed regional basis.  
There is a correlation between regional variation and the distribution of national 
implementations of the technology transfers. A review of a multi-stakeholder meeting 
report on an S-S IeTT conduct [55] revealed a skewed distribution of national 
implementations in the eastern, western, southern and central part of the continent, 
when compared with those in its northern part.  
The exclusion of the northern region can be explained by its relative regional economic 
strength and its geographical proximity to Europe. Perhaps the region‘s existing 
ownership of a regional Satcom system (as discovered from an interview with an 
executive of a pan-African telecommunication body [76]) made it unsuitable for the 
technology transfers‘ hidden agenda of commercial operations. This region and certain 
middle-income countries from the southern African region were also excluded as a 
recipient of another N-S IeTT, as discovered from a review of its technical 
implementation document [46].  
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The consequence of regionalism, however, was that unilateralism supplanted 
multilateralism in the conduct. The attendant outcome of such supplanting was that 
multilateralism became fragmented, and the intermediary role expected from the 
continental governmental organisations was not evident. The beneficiary became the 
donor, who tactically started enlisting countries into separate bilateral arrangements. As 
a result, the recipient countries themselves started to take unilateral decisions to break 
away from the collective organisation at the regional level.  
5.2.1 Fragmented multilateralism 
The fragmentation of continental multilateralism as a consequence of regionalism 
imposed by overbearing global dominance seems characteristic of IeTTs conduct. 
Dynamics of such characteristic became apparent in a multilateral process, in which, 
Africa‘s Continental and National governments, together with several IGOs, global 
West countries and multinationals, tried in vain to deliver a successful N-S Satcom 
technology transfer
18
. Insights from the policy debates on this ill-fated acquisition 
process help us to understand how such an act of national unilateralism could become 
an institutional constraint to technology acquisition.  
Global dominance – overbearing industrialist, mercantilist and diplomatic interests of 
international entities in the transfer process
19
, as stipulated in this policy meeting report 
[77] and these policy documents [78 & 79], ended up fragmenting a set pan-African 
Satcom  technology multilateralism. How regionalism resulted in geopolitical 
contestations between Africa‘s English-speaking and French-speaking regions in the 
process of technology selection, is revealed in [77]. Each of the two neo-colonial 
separate linguistic regions represented a different technology choice. Moreover, each 
choice was backed and financed by competing global mercantilist, industrial and 
diplomatic interests, and were jostling with each other for Africa‘s policymakers‘ 
attentions.  
                                               
18 The idea of a Pan-African Satcom network was conceived in the 1970s as essential for socio-economic 
development of Africa. This plan was the first socio-economic and industrial development blueprint led 
by Africa‘s continental governmental bodies that was aimed at reversing the trend of Africa‘s lack of 
global competitiveness.  
19 The transfer was dominated by IGOs such as ITU, UNESCO and UNDP and with the financial 
supports of the Governments of Italy and Germany. The process of the transfer was also dominated by a 
‗Trans-Atlantic alliance‘ of private consultancy organizations from Canada, Norway, Sweden, France and 
the UK. 
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The ultimate consequence of these dominant interests was that certain African countries 
started competing with each other. For instance, an English speaking country that 
offered to host the operational headquarters of a proposed pan-African Satcom 
infrastructure, came up against the self-interest of a certain global West Country, who 
preferred it to be instead sited in a competing French-speaking one (policy meeting 
reports [77 & 80]).  
Fragmented multilateralism thus eventually brought about a manifestation of national 
unilateralism. In the process, the promise of a pan-African Satcom infrastructure 
implementation as a spur for fostering a continent-wide digital economy, evaporated.  
This conclusion might be prescient for the contemporaneous cosmopolitan 
implementation of these pan-African e-health initiatives (Appendix C).  Just as Africa 
lost an opportunity in the past to successfully acquire technologies and build a planned 
pan-African e-health infrastructure, it is not overstretching it to state that a similar a fate 
might befall these initiatives.    
Key point: regional linguistic differences can make the achievement of continental 
multilateralism difficult to attain, which in turn can constrain national technology 
acquisition.  
5.2.2 Unilateralism 
Unilateralism stemming from regionalism underlines the mechanism of continental 
fragmentation. This (where each individual country enters into a bilateral agreement 
with the international governmental partner, as found in a review of this implementation 
document [51]) differs from multilateralism (where implementations in each country are 
directed or led by a continental governmental body). In the conduct of an S-S IeTT, 
unilateral national implementation completely replaced the collectiveness of continental 
multilateralism, the documented original basis for conducting the transfer [53], as this 
evaluation report [48] has shown. 
Unilateralism has its own consequence for a late coming recipient‘s national technology 
acquisition, as it was discovered from a stakeholder meeting [57]. Early domestic 
implementation in a regional hub West African country translated into delayed transfers 
in neighbouring countries. The early recipient had an e-health infrastructure fully 
operational before the latecomers, which were still waiting for the transfers, almost a 
year thereafter. Of course, having a pre-established regional hub for regional 
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coordination and organisation is essential. However, an unintended consequence is that 
an early recipient could gain an undue strategic advantage over the latecomers in 
potential future international cooperation and trade. In this conduct, the hub country 
became engaged in a bilateral virtual telemedicine services trade with the donor, in spite 
of the latecomers. Such resultant act of bilateralism, a consequence fragmented 
continental multilateralism, explains how unilateralism stem from regionalism.  
Such unilateralism may inadvertently create a regional technology dependent 
relationship between an early recipient and latecomers. For example, the former 
privileged and pre-established innovation capacity could later make the latter dependent 
for their implementations. Conversely, being concurrent recipients might have given 
them equal shots at technology acquisition from the donor. Though, a pre-established 
regional leader re-transferring adapted technologies to others could in regional 
development sense, seen as success. 
A unilateral act of abstinence is also a cause of regional fragmentation. For instance, 
southern and eastern African countries in comparison with others were behind the curve 
in national implementations of the said S-S IeTT, as we learnt from these policy setting 
workshops [2 & 71]. A middle-income southern African country also unilaterally 
decided against becoming a recipient of a bilateral contending S-S transfer (multi-
stakeholder policy meeting on pan-African e-health initiatives [40] and an interview at a 
multi-stakeholder meeting in 2009 [72]). Such competitive nature of IeTTs‘ conduct 
belies the influence of global dominance in the emergence of these acts of unilateralism.   
Key point: regionalism can lead to national unilateralism supplanting continental 
multilateralism in the conduct of the IeTTs. 
5.2.3 Domestic action 
Fragmented continental multilateralism can nudge financially capable countries towards 
taking a domestic action to foster a national technology acquisition. For example, an 
initially unsuccessful unilateral action taken by a mineral resource-rich African country 
to acquire its own national Satcom technology, after the said ill-fated pan-African effort 
(Habib-Sy, 1992). This domestic policy choice, albeit protracted, thereafter resulted in a 
successful Satcom technology acquisition about two decades later on.  
This country initial exercise of National Agency – its willingness to finance an N-S 
technology transfer, came up against the self-interest of a certain global West Country 
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(policy meeting reports [77 & 80]). Recently, however, the country has reaped the fruit 
of its unilateral policy choice. A modern Satcom technology was acquired through an S-
S transfer. This will provide an infrastructure upon which its unilaterally conceived 
national e-health initiative will be implemented. This is testament of its foresighted 
domestic action as this initiative is implemented separately from a globally conceived 
and continentally endorsed S-S IeTT (interview with the national implementation 
manager [43]). 
A positive view of globally mediated fragmented continental multilateralism can be 
taken given the success of such act of unilateralism.  
Key point: fragmented continental multilateralism can inadvertently spur a financially 
endowed recipient‗s unilateral technology acquisition.  
5.3 Poor strategic leadership 
Poor strategic continental leadership is an institutional constraint to the exercise of 
National Agency in the conduct of IeTTs in Africa. Continental governmental bodies 
must perform their strategic intermediary role between the global and the national; even, 
in the face of global diplomacy and mercantilism (see Chapter 4).  
Weak strategic leadership can constrain domestic e-health innovation capacity 
accumulation in two ways. The first is inefficient coordination on the part of the 
continental governmental bodies in dealing with inherent complexity involved in 
negotiating with multiple and self-interested international donors or partners. The 
second is the limited influence of these bodies in the design and conduct of IeTTs.  
5.3.1 Inefficient coordination 
An inefficient coordination of the diplomatic negotiations with multiple and diverse 
international donors at the continental level is identifies as an institutional constraint to 
national e-health technology acquisition. This can partly be attributed to dominant 
cosmopolitanism and the complexity that comes with it.  
 The complex nature of negotiating and navigating diverse diplomatic, mercantilist, 
altruistic and industrial interests are on their own enough to make the effects of 
inefficient coordination, more glaring. This complexity is a reflection of the multiple 
global, continental and national actors involved in the conduct of IeTTs.   
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With such multiple organisational interests at play in negotiations, one can imagine that 
any attempt at coordinating would be difficult, especially if the organisational capability 
to do so is deficient. Inefficient coordination constrained continental oversight in 
national implementations (an interview with an official of the main continental political 
body [84]). This has a negative consequence for exercising National Agency.  
We identified in the case of one of the IeTTs, that national inputs critical for fostering 
successful acquisition were excluded from negotiations with international donors. The 
technology transfer was conducted in an atmosphere of an ‗information void‘. This is an 
example of how weak strategic leadership in negotiations can prevent equitable 
partnerships for recipients.   
It is not that a need for coordination was not recognised at the continental level. 
However, the inherent complex interactions coupled with self-interested push made it 
very difficult to achieve such. We noticed strong strategic lobbying from the 
international partners to advance their self-interest in their dealings with the continental 
governmental bodies (directly observed in a multi-stakeholder meeting [35]). These 
meeting reports [32, 39, 82 & 83] reveal how a transfer donor incessantly lobbied a 
continental governmental body in order to make its own proposal the official choice in 
lieu of competing others.  
Inefficient coordination result in limited influence on donors. Despite the expressed 
intention of a main continental governmental body to forge partnerships amongst 
multiple donors at this multi-stakeholder meeting [35], such never materialised. A 
review of two stakeholders‘ meeting reports [40 & 55] revealed that the different 
sponsors instead opted to keep their implementations separate from each other.  
A reason that can explain difficulty in coordinating complex interactions and 
negotiations is found in these meeting reports [38 & 39] on the proceedings of 
negotiations between a main continental body and one of the sponsors of an IeTTs. The 
reports reveal dissatisfaction with lack of transparency and accountability in the conduct 
of the IeTTs, expressed by this body.   
The ultimate consequence was fragmented pan-African multilateralism – a situation 
where a collection of continental governmental bodies enlist and invite national inputs 
and cooperation in negotiations. Rather, unilateralism when separate countries enter into 
individual bilateral agreements with donors was an unfortunate outcome. 
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Key point: inefficient continental coordination of multiple and complex globalised 
interactions can constrain recipients‘ national technology acquisition.  
5.3.2 Limited influence 
Weak strategic leadership, in general, has also much to do with the exclusion and 
limited influence of continental governmental bodies in the design of IeTTs. None of 
the continental governmental and technocratic bodies was involved in the design of an 
N-S transfer until two years after its cosmopolitan conception (interview with an official 
of a continental political organisation [41] and review of stakeholders‘ meeting reports 
[32, 39, 82 & 83]).   
Limited influence can be assessed by the extent of financial contributions made to 
IeTTs‘ conception and implementation by continental bodies. More often than not, 
donors are usually the sole financiers. For example, these pan-African e-health 
initiatives were solely conceived and financed by them (programme documents [75 & 
85]). This stark reality is supported by a comment obtained from an interview with a 
high-ranking official of a continental telecommunication organisation [76]. 
“After all it is not the [pan-African organisation] which is providing funds [...........] but 
the donor institutions [.....]”  
Neither the continental governmental bodies nor national governments contributed 
financially to the initiatives‘ design and implementations. Perhaps they were not asked 
to in the first place by the donors, or that they were not willing capable to do so. The 
latter is the more likely reason. Take, for instance, the reluctance of the continent‘s 
premier development bank to co-finance one of the pan-African initiatives, (interview 
with a senior official of a continental governmental body [86]). A given official 
explanation was that the bank‘s organisational policy was to only entertain and finance 
project requests from individual countries and not one conceived by a donor. 
Notwithstanding, such act of reluctance comes as another demonstration of weak 
strategic leadership.   
A similar act of reluctance was detrimental to a successful pan-African Satcom 
technology acquisition in the past. Continental multilateral leadership struggled to enlist 
financial commitments from member states, as noted in these policy documents [80 & 
87]. Notably, only three countries out of the total, (at that time African countries were 
45 in number), came up with what was in fact less than 2% of the required finance for 
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the intended N-S technology transfer. The action taken by the continental leadership 
thereafter to mobilise domestic public finance, is telling. Recourse to private 
investments was eventually made to mobilise the financial capital required for the said 
acquisition (noted in this policy document [88]). Notwithstanding, the said acquisition 
suffered from a history of near-misses no thanks to regional neo-colonial contestations 
and contravening global technoeconomic and geopolitical events (refer to Chapter 4).  
The history was also underscored by disruptive influences of global diplomatic, 
mercantilist and industrial contestations and competitions. Most pertinently, such 
history was also defined by a display of weak continental strategic leadership. Though, 
the technology has now being acquired, fully functional and operated by a technocratic 
continental organisation. The past setback can be found replicating itself in the present 
conduct of IeTTs. A historical path-dependency of the past conduct‘s dynamics is 
existentially observable, as we found out from reviewing these policy documents [78 & 
79].   
As it the eventual acquisition was privately financed and operated, the pan-Africa 
Satcom technology infrastructure, public governance of its utilisation by continental 
governmental organisations, is weak. Hereby is making multilateral e-Service provision 
nearly impossible to achieve. A consequence is a forced recourse to international 
procurements of bandwidths from a western multinational by countries that were 
recipients of transferred e-health technologies. Ironically, this multinational  absurd 
display of mercantilism was implicated by (Habib-Sy, 1992) in the history of near-
misses. This conundrum could have been avoided, had the pan-African Satcom body 
involved early on in global-continental negotiations.   
The absence of this telecommunication infrastructure management body in the 
negotiations that preceded the conduct of IeTTs is identified as another display of weak 
strategic continental leadership. The perplexed reaction of a senior official of the 
Satcom organisation to this absence (interviews: [35] and [76]), was both informative 
and conclusive. An offence was taken to the reality that a body created for a purposive 
should be begging to supply bandwidths to initiatives presented as ‗developmental 
projects‘ by altruistic ‗international development partners‘. This was hard to fathom.  
After all, in the case of the pan-African e-health initiatives, continental governmental 
bodies‘ participation in and inputs into IeTTs‘ their conduct and implementation, was 
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not more than a ‗window dressing‘. Their influence on national implementations in 
recipients is more a matter of ‗style‘, less of ‗substance‘.  The aloofness of certain 
wealthy African countries towards the privately financed pan-African Satcom body 
sums it up. It substantiates that continental governmental bodies‘ influence on recipient 
countries is really even weak. 
Take for instance a middle-income Southern African country that declined to partake in 
any continental multilateral technology management. In defiance, it is going ahead with 
unilateral acquisition from the same implicated multinational. Though being financed 
by its domestic private sector is development. As the same country also opted out of a 
multilateral S-S IeTT, speaks to the reality that such act of unilateralism is inevitable.   
Key point: not co-financing IeTTs is a reflection of weak continental strategic 
leadership capability. 
5.4 Fragmented governance 
A fragmentation of continental governance mechanism is identified in the conduct of 
the IeTTs in Africa. This is an ineffective functioning of continental governmental 
organisations‘ administrative and policy making mechanisms, in their execution of 
intermediary or facilitating roles of ensuring that recipients are fairly and equally 
treated. Such fragmentation is a reflection of poor communication amongst the various 
departments within the main continental governmental body, and it is compounded by 
the deficient coordination of its relationships with other technocratic continental ones.  
In addition, fragmentation also reflected the main body‘s limited influence on 
international development partners‘ objectives. Take for instance the negligence of two 
IGOs, whose headquarters were involved in the conduct of an N-S IeTT, neglected to 
brief their African regional offices of an implementation being conducted in their 
administrative domains (discovered from reviewing this stakeholder technical meeting 
report [81]). Their missing intermediary roles could have assured an engaged 
participation of the continental bodies and the negotiated aggregation of potential 
recipients into workable multilateral arrangements.  
Given the density and multiplicity of involved stakeholders in the conduct of IeTTs, 
such institutional neglect can come as unavoidable. Such complex plurality contributes 
to continental governance fragmentation, and can condition how a recipient‘s exercise 
of National Agency. To sum up, fragmented administrative and policy-making 
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mechanisms of continental governmental organisations can condition technology 
acquisition. 
There are two factors we have identified that are behind the fragmentation of 
governance at the continental level.  
5.4.1 Organisational inefficiency 
The first is the inefficient coordination of administrative functions of continental 
governmental bodies in the conduct of the IeTTs. We noticed a fragmentation amongst 
those departmental units with various functions in finance, infrastructure development, 
healthcare, science and technology and socio-economic advancement. There were not in 
synergy, in the absence of an effective coordinating mechanism and leadership.  
We identified two consequences of inefficient coordination.  
The first is that the interfering nature of global diplomacy in the conduct of the IeTTs 
can partly cause fragmented continental governance. Such was closely observed at a 
multi-stakeholder meeting [35], involving representatives from two IGOs and those 
from Africa‘s continental governmental bodies. An IGO who was a sponsor of an N-S 
IeTT, that wanted to partner with another one with a similar transfer of same 
technological characteristics, had this request coldly rejected. Self-interested 
advancement of global diplomacy and mercantilism we noted in preceding sections, are 
also examples of constraining institutional competition. In all, we noticed that 
uncoordinated continental bodies were always at hand to forge global partnerships that 
they limited influence in.  
Interference wouldn‘t have been possible, had the various continental governmental 
bodies were strategically and duly coordinated. This could have their governing of 
IeTTs‘ conduct less perfunctory rather than just issuing out political endorsements.  
The second is by and large, a main consequence of fragmented governance. That 
continental multilateralism will struggle to materialise as African inputs into the 
governance of transfers, are often missing. There is a historical precedent to consider in 
interpreting the potential impact of this consequence on the exercise of a recipient‘s 
National Agency. As described by (Habib-Sy, 1992), a similar situation of fragmented 
continental  governance was associated with a catalogue of setbacks in acquiring a pan-
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African Satcom technology. Consequently, this made countries to start contemplating 
unilateral acquisitions, when pan-African multilateralism became fragmented.  
Key point: organisational inefficiency can partly cause fragmented continental 
governance.  
5.4.2 Fragmented policy-making 
The second is that fragmented governance has to do with the complexity inherent in 
interacting with multiple and contesting National governments and international state 
and non-state actors involved in the conduct of the IeTTs. This manifests as intra and 
inter organisational contestations.  Inter-organisationally, continental governmental 
bodies have different and competing institutional priorities, as found at this multi-
stakeholder meeting [35]. For example, a continental development bank, that was 
supposed to co-finance the implementation of one of the transfers, already had in place 
a plan to bankroll a separately developed regional e-health initiative.   
Intra-organisationally within a continental governmental body, competition amongst 
administratively distinct departments can also constrain an exercise of a recipient‘s 
National Agency.   
During two research visits to this main body in 2009 and 2010, it was discovered that 
there were three different administrative departments with overlapping responsibilities 
for governing e-health policy-making. From interviews with officials from these three 
departments, it was further discovered that communication and coordination among 
them was very limited. One of the departments with a techno-centric leaning was 
dominant in the attendant policy deliberations (stakeholders‘ technical meeting reports 
[32, 39, 82 & 83]). This implies that essential inputs from the other two departments 
were not taken into consideration. For instance, the second science and innovation-
oriented department, whose active inputs could have advanced national technology 
acquisition, was not present at all at these important meetings. Similar kind of frosty 
relationships are observed with the third technically relevant health-centric department.  
A fragmentation of e-health policy governance is apparent. As, for such a body, 
partnering with international donors requires effectively navigating complex 
interactions, more difficult to attain, if, intra-organisational coordination and 
cooperation cannot be fostered.  
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Key point: fragmentation of continental policy-making governance can impede national 
e-health technology acquisition.  
5.5 Conclusion 
Continental fragmented governance has been identified as a structural constraint to 
national e-health technology acquisition from IeTTs in Africa. We identified and 
examined its working against continental governmental bodies‘ intermediary roles 
between the national and global in conducted transfers. Three institutional forms of this 
constraint are identified.  
The first is regionalism. The fragmentation of the continent by the international partners 
based on Existing geo-economic or geopolitical segmentations are exploited by donors 
for advancing their self-interests in national implementation, contributed to continental 
fragmented governance.  
The other two forms, weak continental strategic leadership and fragmented governance, 
are internal in origin. Deficient organizational capacities of continental governmental 
bodies to both coordinate and influence the design and implementation of IeTTs, is an 
institutional challenge.  
Complexity inherent in coordinating various competing and contending national, 
continental and global actors, and organisational inefficiency of continental 
governmental bodies, fragment intended multilateralism. Thus, national unilateralism is   
coordinated governance of the transfers impossible.   
Table 5.1 summarises institutional constraints 
Narrative themes  Institutional constraints  
Regionalism Regionalism can lead to national 
unilateralism supplanting continental 
multilateralism in the conduct of the 
IeTTs. 
Fragmented multilateralism Regional linguistic differences can make 
the achievement of continental 
multilateralism difficult to attain, which in 
turn can constrain national technology 
acquisition.  
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Unilateralism Regionalism can lead to national 
unilateralism supplanting continental 
multilateralism in the conduct of the 
IeTTs. 
Domestic action Fragmented continental multilateralism 
can inadvertently spur a financially 
endowed recipient‗s unilateral technology 
acquisition.  
Organisational inefficiency  Organisational inefficiency can partly 
cause fragmented continental governance.  
Inefficient coordination Inefficient continental coordination of 
multiple and complex globalised 
interactions can constrain recipients‘ 
national technology acquisition.  
Fragmented policy-making Fragmentation of continental policy-
making governance can impede national e-
health technology acquisition.  
Limited influence Not co-financing IeTTs is a reflection of 
weak continental strategic leadership 
capability. 
 
The ultimate consequence of the structural constraint is that national e-health 
technology acquisition can be impeded. In response, recipients take unilateral actions 
away from fragmented multilateralism.   
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6 National reticence 
6.1 Introduction 
National reticence explains and demonstrates African countries‘ weak and lagging 
domestic e-health technology accumulation and assimilation. This is identified as even 
more telling for their national technology acquisition; notwithstanding, the other 
contributing and influencing conditions we identified in preceding chapters.  
This chapter addresses Objective number 4 by examining institutional variation and 
dynamics of National Agency in the conduct of IeTTs. We associate the causality of this 
condition with three domestic factors. The first is primarily a weak exercise of National 
Agency. The second is the organisational passivity of recipient African National 
governments. The third is poor dynamics of domestic e-health technology adaptations 
and accumulations. We explore these three factors by examining variation of current 
state of domestic e-health innovation capacities in African countries. 
We argue that immature extant domestic innovation capacity in these recipients, account 
for their poor history of national e-health implementations. By identifying that their 
domestic incremental accumulation and assimilation of e-health innovations from 
subnational experimentations are missing and weak. It moves beyond blaming others, 
by stressing a strategic imperative for exercising National Agency in face of dominant 
and incessant cosmopolitan conduct.  
Several African countries, for example AB (Chapter 3), have expressed in their national 
e-health policy documents, their domestic e-health implementation ambitions. However, 
up to now, none has in a global comparative term been successful. A catalogue of 
setbacks and uncertainties has been the norm across the continent. This is because most 
African countries, despite being longstanding recipients of diverse IeTTs, have 
historically struggled to build up their domestic innovation capacities.  (This is 
notwithstanding the fact that a recipient country such as AB has made considerable 
technoscientific contributions to global innovation system). Subnational e-health 
experimentations have hardly ever scaled up to a critical mass required for fostering 
domestic technology and competence accumulations.  
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According to the NIS literature (presented in Chapter 2), African countries are 
categorically global technology laggards due to their immature extant domestic 
innovation capacities as they historically struggled to assimilate and accumulate from 
international technology transfers (Forje, 2006, Lall & Pietrobelli, 2005). In contrast, 
global technology frontiers‘ possession of extant domestic innovation and industrial 
capacities are underpinning an incremental national e-health technology accumulation 
and implementation (Chapter 2).  
On this account, we identify two domestic institutional actions as to why an exercise of 
National Agency is deemed strategic for African countries.  The first is the proactive 
role of National government in fostering and forging domestic innovation capacity from 
international technology transfers. Given that with the frontiers, both an acquired and 
indigenously fostered domestic innovation capacities, are driving their incremental 
technology accumulation and knowledge assimilation from various subnational 
experimentations. With them, the establishment of cognitive, normative and regulative 
institutions (Geels, 2004) by their National governments underpins their domestic 
acquisitions and implementations. National agency is driven by normative proactive and 
collaborative behaviours of their domestic public and private sectors. They are 
formulating innovation policies, stimulating industrial development, promoting 
socioeconomic growth and providing financial resources provision.  
The second action is that a frontier‘s possession of domestic innovation capacity drives 
its incremental accumulation and implementation. As already articulated in Chapter 2, 
such occur through long-term technology learning from subnational experimentations 
and voluminous utilisations at sectoral hospitals and clinics. Incrementalism is 
characterised by domestic technology adaptations from usually undertaken 
technoscientific and engineering activities in the process of addressing challenges of 
technology inappropriateness or obsolescence.  
This explains the dynamics of domestic e-health innovation capacity acquisition. 
Technical competences acquired from such subnational actions and activities are in turn 
assimilated into their extant functional and productive national innovation systems. 
Assimilated knowledge then become a foundation for accumulating existing and 
emerging technologies. Upon which subsequent the fostering of further and novel 
domestic innovations and creation of domestic industries, follow. The acquired 
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domestic innovation capacity, then, incrementally supplies appropriate technologies for 
engineering national e-health the implementations.  
Subsequent narrative examines that the variation this dynamics in of African countries 
and why its absence or immaturity account for their immature national e-health 
technology capacity states.  
The data are qualitative in nature collected over four years of research and field work. 
The data sources include different structured and unstructured interviews conducted 
with key informants, national e-health programme managers, entrepreneurs and policy 
makers at different meetings, workshops and conferences. The interviews with some of 
the actors continue for a long period through e-mails and from discussions at different 
meetings and conferences, for getting updates and clarifications on e-health projects 
they were involved in. Documental analyses of policy documents, evaluation reports 
and meeting reports, obtained by privileged accesses granted by these actors, are carried 
out. Other sources of data are transcription of notes taken in policy meetings. In total, 
five interviews (four structured and one unstructured) were conducted, there were 
participations in seven policy meetings, seventeen project documents were analysed, 
two national e-health policy documents  reviewed and observations made from six 
conferences. The references for the data sources are presented in Appendix B. 
The chapter is divided into three main sections.  
1. The first section presents and explores the normative behaviours of African 
countries‘ public sector that can constrain the exercise of National Agency in 
national e-health technology acquisition. 
2. The second section demonstrates and explores how a lack of the proactive role 
of national governments constrains knowledge assimilation and technology 
accumulation, and fostering of domestic e-health innovation and industry. It 
explores how variations in the exercise of National Agency is explained by 
differences in their national economic sizes and national innovation capacities 
3. The third section demonstrates and explores how immature domestic e-health 
innovation capacity, is associated with an uncertain incremental subnational 
utilisations and accumulations. It shows that low volume technology utilisation 
and absent domestic e-health industry as institutional barriers to domestic 
acquisition.  
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At the end of each section or sub-section, a key point is included to highlight the finding 
from the narratives.  
6.2 Lack of National Agency 
A lack of exercising National Agency in the conduct of IeTTs is identified with African 
countries. This refers to proactive behaviours that the public sector of recipient African 
countries can exhibit for ensuring national e-health technology acquisition. The 
uncooperative organisational behaviour of the public sector of an African country: KL, 
exhibited during the conduct of an S-S transfer, is employed to demonstrate how such 
display of National reticence can stifle domestic acquisition. For instance, as it was 
noted in mismanagement of its national e-health telecommunication technology 
acquisition.  
There are two factors we associate with such lack of the exercise of National Agency in 
this recipient, as observed during participations in these national e-health policy making 
stakeholders‘ meetings [35 & 65]. These are implicated as responsible for the defunct 
state of its national e-health implementation. Their interpretations give an insight into 
how the working of this country‘s immature and unstable institutions, to the point that a 
technology acquisition from an S-S transfer was truncated.  
6.2.1 Inter-agency rivalry 
Inter-agency rivalry is the first of the two identified institutional barriers. It is a 
reflection of the irreconcilability of KL‘s National governmental agencies‘ divergent 
organisational interests. In the process of building its national e-health 
telecommunication infrastructure, a strategic omission to reconcile conflicting and 
fragmented organisational functions of the five different agencies involved led to a 
mismanagement of the transfer. For instance, the agencies that are responsible for 
healthcare policy and provision were at odds with those responsible for 
telecommunication (policy formulation, service provision and infrastructure 
development research).  
Such manifestation of irreconcilability had its consequence. Instead of fostering 
management collective stewardship, in the form of instituting an inter-agency 
cooperation mechanism for the delineation and governance of responsibilities, the 
manifestation of inter-organisational rivalry proved to be catastrophic for a deepened 
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and scalar national acquisition. In this case, the irreconcilability of the divergent and 
conflicting bureaucracies of the different governmental agencies rendered the fostering 
of inter-agency cooperation and governance difficult. 
Key point: domestic inter-agency rivalry can constrain a recipient‘s national e-health 
technology acquisition.  
6.2.2 Organisational technocentrism 
The second is  parochial techno-centric interpretation of e-health deepened inter-
organisational rivalry among KL‘s different National governmental agencies. As a 
consequence of irreconcilability amongst the agencies, two conflicting groups emerged 
along technology development and health service provision lines. A dominant techno-
centric group, constituted of the three telecommunication service provision, research 
and policy making national agencies, made irrelevant the inputs of the sole health 
service provision agency that was involved. In the absence of any governance 
mechanism and with the health service provision agency‘s lukewarm attitude to e-
health, the organisational techno-centrism of the dominant group, contributed to the 
catastrophic termination of its national e-health infrastructure implementation.     
Organisational techno-centrism of this kind can constrain national e-health technology 
acquisition from IeTTs in African countries. When a national inter-agency governance 
mechanism is not instituted as a policy foresight, such institutional behaviour can 
manifest.  
We have demonstrated that inter-agency rivalry and related organisational techno-
centrism in a recipient can stifle technology acquisition. This kind of disingenuous 
organisational behaviour is atypical of global technology frontiers. As stressed in 
Chapter 3, with these leaders, the pro-activity of their national governments is evident in 
the ways they steer, foster and forge their domestic e-health technology capacities. Their 
possessions are dependent on the institutions of constructive collaboration and 
cooperation among their National governmental agencies. Similar pro-activity are found 
wanting in most African countries. It is hard to see that without such, they can 
successfully foster acquisitions from IeTTs.  
Key point: organisational technocentrism can constrain a recipient‘s national e-health 
technology the acquisition. .  
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6.3 Passive National governments  
The passivity of African National governments is a manifest of a lack of pro-activity in 
deliberately fostering national e-health technology acquisition. Global frontiers 
formulate and institute appropriate policies, and they also provide enabling 
environmental conditions for enabling domestic innovation to thrive (Chapter 2). 
However, in African countries (AB, KL and PE), such exercise of National Agency is 
found as limited, or absent on the whole. Nonetheless, this is not always the case with 
these countries. There are instances identified to demonstrate that African national 
governments are indeed capable of exercising such National Agency.  
An acquisition of a hi-tech Satcom technology by KL through an institution of bilateral 
south-south cooperation with an emerging global East economic giant is an example. 
Another is the proactive behaviour exhibited by PE‘s National government in the 
process of being a recipient of an S-S IeTT (national implementation evaluation report 
[48] and an interview with the country‘s advisor on national telemedicine 
implementation [89]).  
PE‘s National telecom regulatory agency and its Ministry of Health financed the 
implementation of the transferred e-health technologies in its hospitals and clinics, in 
the face of a documented uncertainty. An institution of bilateral S-S cooperation with a 
different emerging global East economic giant, prior to the conduct of the said transfer, 
is identified as instrumental for it becoming an early privileged recipient above what 
seemed to be other more suitable candidates in Africa. Nonetheless its National 
government pro-activity made it become a recipient of valuable telecommunication and 
computing technologies.  
These two examples of exercising National Agency are however few and far in between 
in Africa. There are other contrary examples that buck this trend. These make us to 
unequivocally state that passivity on the part of African National governments stifles 
national e-health technology acquisition. For example, the Satcom technology acquired 
by KL soon became dysfunctional, a few months after it was put into orbit. As a 
consequence, its national telemedicine infrastructure that technology supplied 
bandwidth for also became defunct. Admirably in PE, domestically invented low-capital 
telemedicine software later became an appropriate replacement for the documented 
unreliable transferred one. 
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A manifestation of National reticence also extends to limited advocacy with relevant 
global bodies responsible formulating for international e-health related governance such 
as the World Health Organisation (WHO), International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) and International Standard Organisation (ISO). This claim is backed by direct 
participation in technical engagements with these organisations during the course of this 
research study. A shocking discovery, that African countries were excluded from an 
European body led global e-health telecommunication standard-setting process, was 
made at a conference organised by the International Society for Telemedicine and E-
health in 2007 (Appendix A).  
Another discovery made from a conference organised by the Institution of Engineering 
and Technology in 2008 on biomedical technology innovation and regulation in 
developing countries. Following polemic debates that trailed some technical 
presentations on two African countries, that revealed they were not structurally and 
strategically positioned to advocate for their ‗national-interests‘ in a global system. It 
was highlighted at the conference that there a need for creating a special governance 
mechanism for regulating the development of less-capital-intensive and appropriate 
(frugal) biomedical technologies (i.e. diagnostic medical devices). Such, much-needed 
for making remote diagnosis, were not of interest to these global bodies. An account of 
how difficult it was to get the ISO to accredit and certify a low-capital medical device, 
developed after a long daunting frugal engineering process, was presented as a 
demonstration.   
There is much to be lamented about an unfavourable atmosphere of globalisation and its 
powerful agents.  In all the examples we cited of AB, PE and KL as recipients, their 
exercise of National Agency was stifled by certain global corporatist and industrialist 
actions (Chapters 3 & 4). With PE, for instance, the withdrawal of financial and 
technical supports by an international donor for subnational experimentations, created 
an uncertain atmosphere for an expected national technology acquisition. Given that a 
longer term support by an international partner, can ensure that ample time was given 
for technology accumulation to take place, this uncertainty stifled scalability.   
All in all, judging from knowledge we acquired from participating in policy debates at 
the Chatham House Global Health Security and Governance conferences and meetings 
[73], the extent to which the exercise of National Agency can have any meaningful 
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impact on global actions is limited. We reckon that changing or influencing global 
actors‘ behaviours, is not deemed worth pursuing as an appropriate strategy. An 
exercise of National Agency is advocated as paramount in the wake of technoglobalism, 
if domestic innovation assimilation and accumulation are to be successful, as we argued 
in Chapter 3. To successfully acquire technologies, an alignment of and the proper 
functioning of a recipient‘s public sector is essential and instrumental.  Such is only 
fostered through the pro-activity of a country‘s National government.  
Proactivity is more likely if a recipient‘s national innovation system is mature and 
capable enough for accumulating transferred e- technologies and assimilating 
competences. Provision of national finances, a possession of a thriving domestic private 
sector and the presence of certain national conditions are examples of such maturity. We 
identify an absence and deficiency of national e-health policies and structural 
weaknesses in these domestic conditions, as areas in which proactive actions of 
National governments can also make a difference in Africa.  
Key point: how African governments can proactively engage with and influence global 
governance, can determine if e-health technologies are successfully acquired.  
6.3.1 Deficient National e-health policy 
African countries have until recently struggled to formulate and institute a National e-
health policy. The few that have done so do not have an innovation strategy included in 
their policies. No considerable is made for fostering domestic innovation accumulation 
and assimilation.  
In the World Health Organisation Global Observatory for eHealth 2007 report, global 
ranking of countries demonstrates that a country‘s e-health adoption progress with 
correlates with an institution of a national e-health policy. Not surprisingly, the 
countries we identified as global e-health technology leaders (Chapter 2) rank higher 
than any African country in this regard.  
 
Most African countries were reported as laggards – have not instituted a national e-
health policy. Out of the surveyed 39 African countries, fewer than 40% of these 
claimed to have in place a policy. Such a poor performance relative to global 
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benchmark is a demonstration of their display of National reticence. This is hardly a 
surprise.  
Following field trips to some African countries, it was noted that most have not even 
formulated a national policy. Worse still, those that had were yet to implement it, for 
instance, by translating it into institution of e-health programmes. Generally, it was 
noted that almost all the countries, such as KL, PE and AB, had no policies, and none 
seemed to be considering including a strategy of forging domestic innovation capacity.  
African national governments‘ reticence of not including an innovation strategy in their 
e-health policies by,  is a pointer to why they have been historically constrained in their  
technology  acquisitions.  A similar history is noted in African countries‘ continued 
dependence on altruistic and mercantilist international biomedical technology transfers. 
Their reticence in failing to formulate and institute a national health technology policy, 
of an e-health kind, was identified as a barrier by a senior official of the World Health 
Organisation (conference organised by the Institution of Engineering and Technology 
(IET) [90]). Having such policy in place that takes into consideration domestic needs 
and capabilities, he asserted, and could have prevented them from being recipients of 
sub-standard and inappropriate medical devices and equipment.  
The consequences of not instituting an innovation strategy, highlighted by the cases of 
three recipient African countries of varying economic statuses presented at this 
conference, were technology obsolescence and dependency. As the advocated 
instrumentality of a national policy is to prevent or minimise such challenges, an 
acquisition of engineering skills and competences for making local repairs and 
maintenance, couldn‘t have been more relevant.  
In a middle-income African country, BC, lack of an innovation strategy might have 
hindered a nascent implementation of its national e-health initiative. This conclusion is 
arrived at after learning from a World Health Organisation‘s expert on biomedical 
technology in Africa at the aforementioned IET conference. In this country, almost 50% 
of the transferred biomedical technologies were identified as obsolete, inappropriate and 
impractical for utilisation, he stated. This situation was reported to be even worse in 
other low-income African countries with relatively weaker domestic innovation 
capacities.  
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Key point: not including an innovation strategy in their national e-health policies is a 
manifestation of African national governments‘ reticence.    
6.3.2 Weak National capacities 
African countries are at a disadvantage in their national e-health technology acquisition 
quest from IeTTs due to weakness in certain essential national capacities. Small 
economic size and low financial capacity are national capabilities, we identified as 
institutional constraints to competitively acquire technologies. AB considered in 
Chapter 3, brought to bear less exercise of its National Agency in the conduct of IeTTs; 
and as such identified as too structurally weakened to successfully acquire domestic e-
health innovation capacity. The influences of these national conditions on national 
governments‘ pro-activity are thus examined.  
A pointer as to how weakness in these national capacities contributes to and correlates 
with the display of National reticence is provided by the Global Observatory for eHealth 
2007 report from the World Health Organisation (WHO). The report ranks and monitors 
countries worldwide on their national e-health adoption progress. It demonstrates that 
progress correlates with national income levels based on World Bank measures. Not 
surprisingly, high income countries ranked such as West European and North American 
countries are identified as global e-health frontiers. Conversely, most African countries 
ranked as low-income countries, are global technology laggards.  
This suggests that a low-income country is institutionally weakened as a result of its 
small sized economy and low national financial capacity. Hence, in global terms will be 
less innovative. Moreover, these weaknesses also suggest that the capability of an 
African country to initiate and sustain a national e-health implementation is constrained, 
by virtue of the structural limitations of adapting and absorbing transferred 
technologies. For instance, in the way we demonstrated with AB (Chapter 3). Its passive 
dependence on being a mere recipient and not concurrently an innovator are hindering 
national e-health technology acquisition.  
It is noted that countries with small economic sizes struggle to accumulate technologies. 
In contrast, though, high, middle-income and mineral resource-rich countries might fare 
better, by the virtue of their relatively stronger national financial capacities (Brundenius 
& Mawoko, 2010). Acquisition by the formers is hindered by such weak national 
conditions. Notwithstanding, their impacts on the exercise of National Agency vary. 
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Middle-income and mineral resource-rich African countries can be more strategically 
placed to acquire domestic e-health innovation capacities. Having a bigger economic 
size, conventionally, confers an advantage on these countries, not least because of their 
stronger financial capacities.    
This strength is noted in BC, a middle-income African country, and KL, a mineral 
resource-rich one, in the conduct of two different S-S IeTTs. BC‘s national economic 
strength, as we discovered from a review of these evaluation reports [58 & 59], 
positioned it well, in ensuring that competences were assimilated and technologies 
accumulated. There are indications that the country has benefited from past and present 
technology transfers. An interview with an official of the country‘s premier health 
research institute at an e-health stakeholders‘ meeting in 2009 [72], informed us that a 
telemedicine equipment was jointly developed in the conduct of this IeTT, is now being 
utilised in its healthcare system.  
KL‘s financial strength provided by its natural mineral resources endowment ensured a 
temporally successful Satcom technology acquisition. The technology was essential for 
providing the telecommunication infrastructure for its national telemedicine initiative 
(interview with an official, during a conference on e-health policy [62]). Its government 
exercise of National Agency was demonstrated by its determination, against all 
opposition, to partner with a global south giant made this feat possible.  
Key point: small-sized economy and low financial strength can constrain a recipient‘s 
national e-health technology acquisition.  
6.4 Poor adaptations and accumulations  
Poor technology adaptations and accumulations from IeTTs are identified as accounting 
for African countries‘ immature state of national technology capacities. As 
demonstrated with AB in Chapter 3, these countries have historically struggled to 
knowledge assimilation; because over time, of their reticence to incrementally 
accumulate capacities from small-scale subnational experimentations. This is inevitable, 
because of African countries‘ poor exercise of National Agency, passivity of National 
governments and immature state extant NISs (Sections 6.2 and 6.3).  
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Given that such institutionalism is essential for technology adaptations and 
accumulations, then, it is not surprising that most struggle with their national e-health 
implementations.    
We instructively observed from, and vividly elucidated by, the national presentations 
made, and from policy debates, at the ‗Science with Africa‘ [91] and the African 
Network for Drugs and Diagnostic Innovation [92] conferences, both hosted by the 
United Nations Economic Council for Africa (UNECA) in 2010. That most African 
countries lack the mature regulative and normative institutions relative to global 
standards, required for fostering domestic e-health innovations. What was striking was 
that African National governments have been reticent in historically underperforming in 
building these institutions. Their possession of immature extant domestic innovation 
capacities, prior to the conduct of IeTTs, is making technology acquisitions a 
challenging task.  
Given that as we noted with the frontiers,(Chapter 2), having in place a mature extant 
domestic innovation capacity is conventionally linked to an evolutionary national e-
health technology implementation. Then, the uncertainty of implementations in African 
countries is hardly surprising. As a mature NIS, creates receptive conditions for 
domestically absorbing and assimilating technical competences and also for adapting 
and accumulating technologies. What underpins global frontier‘s national e-health 
implementations is an industrial base, which invents and produces incremental and 
radical domestic innovations. This puts into context African countries‘ perennial 
struggle with technology obsolescence and dependency. Most do not possess the 
requisite domestic innovation capacity and competence. Though, we identified National 
reticence as the main influence behind this state of structural immaturity, global 
dominance also has a role to play in it.   
A review of these five evaluative reports [48, 93, 94, 95 & 96] on the conduct of N-S 
and S-S IeTTs in three African countries, including PE, shows the interlinking nature of 
these structural constraints. Technology obsolescence and dependency result from the 
recipients‘ passive reliance on transferred technical expertise finances, for effecting 
arising subnational technology updates and upgrades. When transferred technologies 
become aged and outdated, frequent malfunctioning occurs, because of incompatibility 
with the ever-changing and physically austere African environments. National reticence 
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manifests due to African governments‘ omission to institute a governance mechanism to 
both encourage the transfer and the assimilation of technical skills and knowledge. They 
have neglected to foster domestic entrepreneurships, i.e. encouraging local businesses 
and firms to either develop or upgrade acquired software and hardware as a strategic 
response to, for example encountered technology inappropriateness, such as 
documented in these evaluation reports [93 & 96].  
The immature state of extant domestic innovation capacity to carry out local adaptations 
to transferred e-health technologies was identified in the case of KL. Mobile vehicular 
telemedicine units, procured for its national e-health initiative, malfunctioned and were 
abandoned because they could not be locally repaired (interview of a foreign consultant 
working on the implementation [72]). This domestic institutional deficiency is noted in 
most African countries. It explains uncertainty surrounding accumulations and 
assimilations from subnational experimentations in the conduct of IeTTs. As such we 
reckon that sustainable national technology acquisitions are remotely unlikely, if 
transferred technologies are not durably utilised and adapted for long-term experimental 
and experiential learning to occur and deepen. 
Key point: recipients‘ immature extant domestic innovation capacity leads to poor 
technology adaptations and accumulations.  
6.5 Low subnational utilisations 
We explain the dynamics of a recipient‘s poor state of domestic adaptation and 
accumulation of transferred e-health technologies by their low subnational technology 
utilisation and weak domestic industrial capacity. We note that low voluminous 
subnational technology utilisation in African countries creates a situation where 
incremental accumulations stagnate, thus frustrating long-term technology acquisition.  
Two recipient African countries, one a middle-income country, BC, the other low-
income, CE, demonstrate how the two factors hinder assimilation and accumulation.  
Table 6.1 summarises domestic e-health technology developments in two recipient African 
countries 
Country Domestic E-health technology 
developments 
BC BC as a middle-income country, had 
formulated a national telemedicine policy 
almost two decades ago, and very recently 
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became the recipient of a bilateral S-S 
IeTT. The transfer involved the joint 
design and manufacturing of a low-capital 
telemedicine device appropriate for rural 
and primary healthcare service delivery. 
The device is for remote and rural digital 
healthcare delivery in this country.  
CE CE, in contrast, is a low-income country, 
with no national e-health policy in place, 
but has articulated a national vision for e-
health. CE also was a recipient of an N-S 
IeTT, which involved the unilateral 
domestic long-term development of a low-
capital electronic health compliant 
biomedical-computing device, over a 
period of ten years, by global actors.   
 
The two IeTTs conducted in these recipients, share a similar focus on developing frugal 
e-health technologies. However, the similarity stops here. With BC, the invention of an 
e-health device was conducted on an equal partnership basis with global actors, through 
a fostering of an international bilateral institutional arrangement. This is a typical 
exercise of its National Agency. Conversely, with CE, such exercise was not apparent. 
Device development was unilaterally carried out by global actors. A plausible 
association between national economic strength and variation of national e-health 
technology acquisitions is demonstrated by BC being a middle-income country and CE 
a low-income one.  
This section is divided into three sub-sections. The first describes how low subnational 
utilisations, stemming from poor adoption, contribute to the challenge of technology 
inappropriateness. The second describes how user-generated clinical and technical data 
and collected during co-developments of appropriate e-health devices with global 
actors, can create a vicious national cycle. The third describes how a feedback loop that 
joins together subnational, national and global innovation systems has to be in place for 
a domestic incremental accumulation and assimilation to occur.  
6.5.1 Technology inappropriateness 
The challenge of technology inappropriateness arises from poor adoption within 
recipients‘ national healthcare systems. This is found to be common to most African 
countries; for instance, as associated with low subnational utilisation in AB (Chapter 3), 
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A review of five evaluation reports of transferred e-health technologies adoption of in 
four African countries [48, 93, 94, 95 & 96], substantiates this association. 
Inappropriateness defined as a lack of fitness of transferred devices and equipments to 
recipients‘ environments, and to local users‘ preferences, was associated with a decrease 
in utilisation. A consequence of this challenge was that doctors, nurses, community 
health workers as users, working within their national healthcare systems at hospitals, 
clinics and health centres, poorly utilise them.  
A conduct of an S-S IeTT in PE, illustrate the nature of the technology 
inappropriateness, and a vicious cycle that arises as a result. It manifested as reported 
technical dysfunctions and telecom infrastructural deficiencies at its implementing 
hospitals. Typical documented causes were frequent malfunctioning of transferred 
telemedicine devices exemplified by incompatible videoconferencing cameras and 
computers and poorly designed and complex software. The risks that these 
technological constraints posed for continuous clinical working and engaged user-
experiences eventually led to their poor utilisation.  
The fewer user- generated data that resulted from these poor utilisations, eventually led 
to the abandonment of the e-health technologies, a negative outcome that is commonly 
reported in the conduct of IeTTs in most African countries. A persistent scenario is that 
poor utilisation constrains local technology adaptation. Primarily, fewer user-generated 
data limit forging domestic designs and solutions. Secondarily, local technology 
adaptations are impossible to undertake, because these are usually undertaken by 
cosmopolitans, who are heavily over-reliant on global industry and expertise. For 
example, in PE, there are documented instances when malfunctioned and defective 
devices were sent abroad by them for much needed repairs and maintenances. There are 
two partial causes as to why an incremental domestic e-health innovation accumulation 
and assimilation is uncertain in the recipients.  One is partly due to low utilisation and 
as a consequence fewer user-generated technical and clinical data. Two, partly, because 
of frequent overreliance on distant global value-chain. This sequence of actions thus 
creates a vicious cycle.  
Two types of vicious cycles are identified.  
The first cycle is the one that occurs at a recipient‘s health system in hospitals and 
clinics. Poor subnational technology utilisations resulted in fewer user-generated data 
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that are suitable and needed for forging domestic technology adaptations. As a 
consequence, no critical mass needed to foster an incremental national accumulation.  
The second is when a long history of low subnational utilisations snowballs into a larger 
national vicious cycle. The nature of this cycle is identified with the still passive 
globally dependent AB (Chapter 3). Thus, a unilateral employment by the global 
industry of the fewer generated data, for producing upgraded technologies for 
international markets (reverse innovation), creates a situation where technology 
inappropriateness challenges, are not being addressed domestically in the recipients. In 
the process, limited domestic accumulation of technologies and assimilation of 
competence have occurred. AB had no semblance of a domestic e-health innovation 
capacity, at the time of a research visit in 2011 [2], in spite of being a long-standing 
recipient of numerous IeTTs in the last three decades.  
Key point: low sub-national technology utilisation stifles incremental domestic 
innovation capacity accumulations.  
6.5.2 National vicious cycle  
The creation and persistence of a national vicious cycle is identified if no feedback loop 
is created to reintroduce appropriate e-health technologies for further utilisations. Why a 
series of small subnational vicious cycles snowballs into a larger national one, is 
attributed to a loose coupling between a global innovation system and a recipient‘s 
domestic equivalent.  This implies that a feedback loop is missing between global 
industrial centres and African countries‘ immature extant national innovation systems.  
We obtained two insights from a conference organised by the Institution of Engineering 
and Technology (IET) on biomedical technology innovations in developing countries in 
2008 [90]. This helps to explain the plausible causes of a national vicious cycle and to 
identify why no such feedback loop is in existence in most African countries. Several 
papers, presentations and discussions at the conference on frugal and appropriate 
medical devices innovations were insightful.  
The first insight is industrial in nature. Only limited technology adaptations actually 
take place domestically in recipient African countries. Most of the real innovation 
activities such as R&D and manufacturing that contribute to domestic assimilation and 
accumulation occurred outside the recipients‘ national technology system. These were 
being carried out at various global centres by global academia, engineers, designers, 
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companies and investors. This is despite the fact that the presented devices were reverse 
innovated on domestic user-generated clinical and technical data. As a consequence, 
this leads to a lesser domestic accumulation of e-health technologies.  
The second insight is institutional in nature. There is a little possibility of any reversed 
innovated device finding its way back to the local hospitals where they were initially 
conceived.  Experts at the aforementioned conference cited a cosmopolitan indifference 
to local and mass-production. It is difficult to see how domestic accumulations and 
assimilations can occur in this global dominant atmosphere.  
The two insights: industrial and institutional in nature, can account for the persistence of 
both types of vicious cycles. As these were not noted with the global e-health frontiers 
we examined in Chapter 2. These deficiencies are not found to constrain their domestic 
acquisitions in the conduct of IeTTs; for instance, as in the case of a technology transfer 
conducted between South Korea and the European Union. A tightly coupled feedback 
loop exists that acts as a ‗conveyor belt‘ between them, as both geographically separate 
regions share similar industrial and institutional configurations. Thus, a fostering of a 
mutual interchange of technologies and competences occurred. In contrast, such 
existence is difficult to find in most of the African countries we visited. There is no 
mechanism to act as a ‗conveyor belt‘ between global industrial centres and their 
immature extant national innovation systems. A vicious cycle makes a recipient 
passively dependent on cosmopolitanism for solving the frequently encountered 
challenge of technology inappropriateness. 
Key point: creation and persistence of a national vicious cycle can stifle an incremental 
domestic accumulation of technologies and assimilation of competences and 
knowledge.   
6.5.3 Absent feedback loop 
The instrumentality of a feedback loop linking together subnational, national and global 
innovation systems is to foster a domestic incremental accumulation and assimilation 
from IeTTs. The existence of a feedback loop might facilitate a continuous adoption and 
utilisation of reverse innovated appropriate devices into Africa‘s healthcare units. 
Further usage of the appropriate devices might create a mechanism for a continuous 
domestic innovation capacity acquisition from global innovation systems.  
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Conversely, when such a loop is not in existence, i.e. when re-introductions into 
Africa‘s immature national innovations systems stall or cease, a vicious cycle persists. 
A vicious cycle could become a virtuous one only if a tightly coupled feedback loop 
exists – so that national and global innovation systems are mutually exchanging 
technologies and knowledge. Two different conducts of IeTTs demonstrate variation of 
instrumentality of a feedback loop in two African countries: BC and CE. A comparison 
between the two indicates that a long history of participating in technology transfers 
might be a key to instituting a virtuous cycle that might address the challenge of low 
subnational utilisations. Both show a varying mutual interchange of technologies and 
competences between domestic and global innovation systems in the process of 
addressing technology inappropriateness. A review of these evaluation reports [58, 59 
97, 98, 99, 100 & 101] ascertains and differentiates the instrumentality of a feedback 
loop in the two separate technology co-development processes in the two countries. 
The loop in each process creates a mechanism in the life cycle of the development, 
during which subnational and global innovation systems are constantly engaged in a 
mutual exchange of knowledge. The prototypes of devices being developed were 
regularly improved upon by user-generated clinical and technical data and by global 
engineering and manufacturing. At the same time, each device was being concomitantly 
re-introduced back to the hospitals where the data were collected for usage. The re-
introduction commences a sequence of actions that repeats itself within the loop, during 
the life cycles. Each step of this sequence was marked by contestations and negotiations 
between subnational and global systems and by complex, localised technoscientific 
processes.  
A combination of an inquisitive problem-solving approach with frugal engineering 
practices and entrepreneurial spirits, eventually produced devices that were evaluated as 
appropriate and fit for the users and to their local environments. Take this lifecycle as a 
mini virtuous cycle at the subnational innovation system that addressed the challenges 
of inappropriate e-health devices. A concentration and convergence of mini virtuous 
cycles over a long time coalesce to form a larger national virtuous cycle. In CE, the 
feedback loop only existed in such a mini cycle – between a single and smaller 
subnational innovation system and a bigger multifaceted global one.  
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In BC, however, a bigger, national virtuous cycle was already in place due to its 
relatively matured domestic technology system tightly coupled to the global one, prior 
to the moment that this particular IeTT was conducted. A big cycle had emerged after a 
longer preceding history of accumulating mini virtuous cycles, by going though series 
of many subnational sequences actions. Since the formulation of a national telemedicine 
policy in late 1990s, BC has undertaken a series of domestic invention and production 
of e-health (biomedical) devices in collaboration with international partners mostly from 
Europe. According to discoveries made in these reports [102, 103, 104 & 105] that 
documented this series of domestic technoscientific actions, these came after a first an 
unsuccessful attempt at a national e-health implementation, was bedevilled by a 
catalogue of technology inappropriateness. Over time, and before this invention in focus 
started (close to a decade afterwards), BC had already accumulated adequate knowledge 
to domestically develop e-health devices from a series of mutual exchanges with global 
innovation system.  
This extant possession of a domestic e-health innovation capacity ensured that an e-
health device was already being domestically developed, before the commencement of 
the conduct of IeTT in focus. This indicates that its invention was a product of a 
sequence of domestic actions.  We discovered that an incremental longitudinal 
innovation pathway exists involving an accumulated of mobilising a series of low 
subnational user- generated clinical and technical data. This comes on the back of a 
sequence of domestic actions accumulating from a series of previous mini virtuous 
cycles, created a large virtuous cycle. A long established three-way interaction among 
subnational, national and global innovation systems had ensured that such a longitudinal 
pathway came out of a concentration of domestic-led technology experimentations. This 
ensured that low utilisation was no longer a challenge to bother with; because BC‘s 
domestic competence had incrementally accumulated, sufficient to invent an e-health 
device. This accumulation of competence and knowledge accounts for a structural 
variation between BC and CE.  
An accumulation of previous mini virtuous cycles was not evident in CE. From 
reviewing these implementation vision documents [106 & 107], it is hard to find a 
feedback loop between a long established three-level innovation interactions and the 
domestic development of the device in focus. Any evidence of any domestic invention 
is limited to this one-off case of a global dominated project, documented in these reports 
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[97, 98, 99, 100 & 101]. From a national presentation made at a Commonwealth 
Secretariat‘s workshop on national e-health policy formulation [71], no other reference 
was made to domestic development of e-health devices, except this particular one.  
The possession of an extant domestic e-health innovation capacity, acquired from a 
history of subnational accumulations in BC, ensured that in the process of inventing the 
e-health device in focus, a mutual exchange of knowledge with the global innovation 
system was evident during the conduct of the IeTT. This is not evident in CE‘s process. 
There, the whole process of the device‘s invention was dominated by global actors and 
industry and utilised very limited inputs from domestic ones. Without any identified 
history of an incremental technology acquisition from a concentration of subnational 
accumulations, it will be near impossible to find domestic actors and industry in CE that 
can make such inputs. A longitudinal and concentrated accumulation and assimilation 
underpinned by a history of technology utilisations, albeit low in volume, is necessary 
for such acquisition. 
Key point:  a domestic e-health innovation capacity acquisition can only be attained 
after a long history of participating in various IeTTs.  
6.6 Absent domestic industrial capacity  
The absence and immaturity of African countries‘ domestic industrial capacities is 
hindering national e-health technology the acquisition. Industry in the forms of local 
firms involved in e-health technology design and manufacturing, and local businesses 
engaged in entrepreneurship and commercialisation, are identified as immature, and in 
some cases absent in most recipients. Demonstrations of how the presence or absence of 
a domestic industrial capacity can drive and make certain technology accumulation and 
knowledge assimilation by comparing two African countries: BC and CE.  
The facilitating roles of domestic public and private sectors play in the building of a 
domestic e-health industry capacity are demonstrated with these contrasts. To show how 
BC has been more successful in its technology acquisition, and how CE has been less 
so. 
The ensuing narratives are divided into three sections.  
The first demonstrates that public sector investments into a domestic e-health industrial 
capacity can contribute to a desired accumulation and assimilation. The second 
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demonstrates that domestic entrepreneurship by local private sector can also contribute 
to acquisition. The third demonstrates a need for including a domestic innovation 
strategy in national e-health policy.  
6.6.1 Low public sector investments 
The facilitating roles that national public agencies can play in the acquisition of a 
domestic e-health industry are demonstrated by comparing BC and CE together. Public 
sector investments in the form of financing, leading and participating in research and 
development (R&D), are identified as facilitators.  
With BC, its public agencies, such as Ministries of Health, Science and Technology, 
Information and Communication Technologies, and its premier medical research and 
national science and industrial development institute, were actively involved in the said 
e-health innovation process (evaluation reports [58 & 59] and an interview with the 
manager-in-charge of the transfer process at this meeting in 2009 [72]).   
The national agencies provided finances towards the development of the said 
telemedicine device. In addition, BC‘s national standard setting and certification 
agencies were at hand to ensure that the co-invented device conforms to local 
environmental realities and needs. Its premier medical research institute has a good 
record of fostering domestic e-health technosciences with local and foreign universities 
and research centres and domestic private and public sectors. This is informed by the 
author‘s prior research collaboration on e-health software design in Africa20 with some 
of its senior staff. Moreover, a research visit to one of BC‘s premier universities to 
observe on-going work on the invention of a different telemedicine device indicates the 
emergence of a domestic e-health R&D capacity. With such a capacity for research 
development and management, the medical research institute was able to lead the co-
development in the conduct of the IeTT. Not only that, it also contributed technical 
expertise to the domestic R&D that took place with the international partner within the 
local hospitals, where the device was tested.  
In contrast, the co-development process that took place in CE was not subjected to the 
same kind of governmental governance and scrutiny, as reviewing these evaluation 
                                               
20  An example was invitation to a week-long Open MRS workshop in Cape Town, South Africa in 2007 
to deliberate on fostering innovations in e-health software for building large-scale electronic health record 
(EHR) infrastructures [108]. 
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reports [97, 98, 99, 100 & 101], suggests. There is no mention made of its National 
government making any financial contribution to the device‘s invention. Most of the 
R&D that led to the invention of the device was carried out by researchers from foreign 
universities and there is no indication that BC‘s local universities participated in or 
made any contribution to the process. Any hint of a contribution was not documented in 
the reports.  
An involvement of CE‘s Ministry of Health was only apparent when the device was 
available for subsequent technology adaptations.  The use of its local public and private 
clinics for product testing was a documented involvement, though. Rather, the 
dominance of global actors such as IGOs, iNGOs and IDOs, in terms of their financial 
and technical expertise contributions to the device‘s development, demonstrates the 
relative passivity of CE‘s national agencies. Such global dominance is also apparent in 
the protracted implementation of its national e-health initiative, as we discovered from 
these documentations [100, 106 & 107]. Investments into domestic R&D and 
governance from BC‘s public sector which facilitated the co-development, were found 
wanting in CE.  
We demonstrated with BC that participating in an IeTT on an equal basis by making co-
investments is an example of an exercise of National Agency. Any competence acquired 
in the process could make the difference in carrying out future technology adaptations. 
For example, learning from domestic invention and production of an e-health device, 
could make the carrying out of local repairs and maintenance possible. The financial 
and technological resources that BC‘s extant domestic e-health industry offers, might 
have made entering into a mutually beneficial bilateral international cooperation easier 
than what happened for a country such as CE. 
Key point:  possessing an extant domestic industrial capacity can contribute to a 
recipient‘s national e-health technology acquisition.  
6.6.2 Weak private sector entrepreneurships 
Weak private sector entrepreneurship is identified as a barrier to domestic e-health 
innovation capacity acquisition. The energy and inventiveness that a country‘s private 
sector brings to a country‘s e-health industry, has already been mentioned with regard to 
global e-health leaders in Chapter 2. BC‘s thriving private sector entrepreneurship is 
found to be influential in enabling it to assimilate e-health competences and technical 
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knowledge. Prior to the conduct of this immediate technology transfer, its private sector 
had already made noticeable contributions to its domestic e-health industrial capacity. 
This finding is backed by observations made and discussions during multiple research 
visits to this country in the last four years. 
During participations in different technical workshops, such as [72 & 108] and high-
level ministerial policy meetings [109], a far reaching knowledge of ongoing domestic 
inventions and commercialisations of e-health technologies such as hardware, software 
and telecom architecture were obtained. Also from informal discussions with start-ups, 
entrepreneurs and companies in these meetings and elsewhere in the country, it was 
learnt that the state of e-health innovation and entrepreneurship in the country was up 
and coming. For example, an interview with an m-health entrepreneur at an annual 
gathering of major players in Africa‘s telecom landscape [110] revealed a decade long 
history of a domestic innovation that underpinned the invention of an e-health device. 
He described how in the early 2000s, he started working on inventing a mobile 
medication adherence device, before the advent of Smartphones.  
The invented device, now being offered on the global market is also in use in BC‘s 
home market, was commercialised through the mobilisation of financial resources from 
local venture capitalists. Moreover, the device is being manufactured domestically by a 
local firm. The device company, is not only selling the devices globally, but is also 
rendering remote virtual e-health monitoring services to clients all over the world. This 
is a measure of what we learnt of other local firms‘ activities from the aforementioned 
meetings.  
It is this kind of private sector driven innovation and entrepreneurship that constitutes 
and drives BC‘s industrial capacity. Its domestic companies invent, commercialise and 
manufacture, even, prior to the said IeTT‘s conduct. We noted that its National 
government finance and institute R&D in local universities, and invest into human 
resources development in the process. Such was the strength of BC‘s domestic industry 
and market, that a multinational company that co-invented the e-health device in focus, 
has established a subsidiary private firm in the country to start offering products and 
services (information gained at an interview with a key informant at an e-health 
stakeholders‘ meeting in 2010 [72]).  
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It can generally be said that BC‘s private sector‘s contributions are more than the 
design, manufacturing and commercialisation of e-health services and products. We 
have also learnt of emerging local consultancy firms that are providing technical 
expertise for e-health innovations and entrepreneurships. In addition, we discovered that 
financial supports by local foundations, venture capitalists and businesses are available 
for fostering domestic innovations.  All these national endowments were in place and 
would in no small means have facilitated the technology acquisitions.   
In the case of CE, the influence of its domestic private sector was found missing. BC‘s 
extant industrial capacity is found to be far more established and matured than CE‘s, an 
advantage that might provide a more suitable condition for acquiring technologies from 
the IeTTs.  
Such endowments are not identified with CE. As far as can be inferred from a review of 
its national e-health vision documents [98, 99, 100 & 101], there is no mention made of 
any local private sector consultations or contributions to its national e-health 
implementation. The kind of entrepreneurial drive that we have identified with BC is 
not apparent. Rather, there is a reason to argue that CE‘s private sector is relatively 
weaker.  For example, one of the aforementioned reports documented a global capitalist 
competition battle, between an Asian company and a North American one, battling to 
supply technologies for a proposed national e-health implementation.  In a review of the 
evaluation reports [97, 98, 99, 100 & 101] that chronicled the development of an e-
health device during a conduct of an N-S IeTT, there was no mention of any 
contribution made by its domestic private sector. Though it was a domestic invention by 
a locally registered company, the finances and the technical expertise that underpinned 
it, came largely from the benevolence of global altruism and diplomacy.   
The poor state of CE‘s domestic e-health industry is also underscored by the fact that 
sourcing qualified and technically competent human resources from the domestic 
market is documented as a challenge during the said device‘s development.  
Key point: possessing an extant domestic e-health industrial capacity and private sector 
entrepreneurship is instrumental for a recipient‘s national e-health technology 
acquisition.  
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6.6.3 Lack of domestic innovation strategy 
The case for including an innovation strategy in a national e-health policy in African 
countries is identified as important, judged by comparing the likely adoption rate of the 
invented devices in BC and CE. Though, the different devices have not been widely 
deployed within their health systems; however, the reported uptake within BC‘s health 
system is far more than in CE‘s. There is reason to predict that in the near future, the 
telemedicine device will be far adopted in BC.  
An informal discussion with a staff member of the aforementioned national premier 
research institute in BC at the Royal Society of Medicine eHealth & Telemedicine 
annual conference in 2011, suggests such a possibility. Another reason is that BC has 
just formulated a new national e-health policy, released in 2012, which showed inputs 
from its domestic private sector (knowledge acquired from contributing to the process 
that led to the policy‘s formulation, and through participation in different stakeholder 
meetings in the country, for example at [72]). After a prior dependence on IeTTs that 
partly contributed to an earlier setback to build a national e-health infrastructure, the 
new policy prioritises e-health hardware and software adoption as a strategic focus. It 
also recognises the imperative of instituting domestic technology certification and 
standards.   
With CE, the possibility of a similar national scale-up is quite remote (judging from 
observations made at a national e-health policy workshop, organised by the 
Commonwealth Secretariat in 2011 [71]). At that time, it had no national e-health policy 
in the mould of BC‘s in place. A presentation made on its national e-health 
implementation did not give a good impression of progress. The high costs of e-health 
hardware were pointed out as a challenge, among other constraints that were mentioned.  
Evidence to corroborate a lack of affordability (documented in the national e-health 
vision document [106] and an evaluation report of a national pilot [107]), is similar to 
the one we identified with AB in Chapter 3. A reported lack of adequate national 
finance to support the procurement of equipment and devices (possibly from the 
company that invented the device in focus) and their installation, limited a planned 
national scale-up to just 2% of CE‘s health facilities. An interview with its Ministry of 
Health official at the aforementioned workshop [71], did not give encouraging pointers 
to the device‘s future prospect of a national scale-up.  
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CE‘s weak financial and industrial capacities mean that adoption rate will be relatively 
poorer than in BC. The latter‘s private sector can contribute financial and technological 
resources towards the implementation of a national e-health initiative. Having what is 
close to an innovation strategy included in its national e-health policy, points to an 
exercise of its National Agency.  
Key point: having an innovation strategy included in a national e-health policy can 
foster national technology acquisition.  
6.7 Conclusion 
The main conclusion drawn from this narrative is that National reticence is identified as 
a structural constraint to a recipient‘s national e-health technology acquisition. We 
strongly identified three institutional barriers as manifestations of National reticence. 
The first barrier is a lack of the exercise of national agency in the conduct of IeTTs. 
Uncooperative organisational behaviour within recipients‘ public sectors is identified as 
an institutional constraint. There are two factors we identified as the reasons behind this 
behaviour. These are at the sectoral level: inter-agency rivalry and organisational 
techno-centrism.  
The second barrier is that African National governments‘ passivity in the conduct of 
IeTTs is also matched by a lack of pro-activity in influencing global technology 
governance. Absent national e-health policies, weaknesses in national economies and 
low financial capacities are constraints to national e-health technology acquisition.  
The third barrier is that poor domestic technology adaptations and accumulations, which 
arise from low subnational utilisations and absent or immature domestic industrial 
capacity, account for poor national technology acquisition. Low subnational utilisations 
caused by technology inappropriateness, create a national vicious cycle, which 
constrains the accumulation of technologies and assimilation of knowledge.  
A need for a feedback loop that tightly coupled together subnational, national and 
global innovation systems is noted as instrumental in making a vicious cycle of 
innovation failures to a virtuous one.   
Table 6.2 summarises institutional constraints 
Narrative themes Institutional constraints 
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Inter-agency rivalry  Domestic inter-organisational rivalry can constrain a 
recipient‘s national e-health technology acquisition.  
Organisational techno-
centrism  
Organisational technocentrism can constrain a recipient‘s 
national e-health technology the acquisition.  
Passive national 
governments 
How African governments can proactively engage with and 
influence global governance, can determine if e-health 
technologies are successfully acquired.  
Deficient national policy  Not including an innovation strategy in their national e-
health policies is a manifestation of African national 
governments‘ reticence.   
Weak national capacities  Small-sized economy and low financial strength can 
constrain a recipient‘s national e-health technology 
acquisition.  
Poor domestic 
adaptations and 
accumulations 
Recipients‘ immature extant domestic innovation capacity 
leads to poor technology adaptations and accumulations.  
Technology 
inappropriateness 
Low sub-national technology utilisation stifles incremental 
domestic innovation capacity accumulations.  
National vicious cycle Creation and persistence of a national vicious cycle can 
stifle an incremental domestic accumulation of technologies 
and assimilation of competences and knowledge.   
Absent feedback loop A domestic e-health innovation capacity acquisition can 
only be attained after a long history of participating in 
various IeTTs.  
Low public sector 
investments 
Possessing an extant domestic industrial capacity can 
contribute to a recipient‘s national e-health technology 
acquisition.  
Weak private sector 
entrepreneurships 
Possessing an extant domestic e-health industrial capacity 
and fostering private sector entrepreneurship is instrumental 
for a recipient‘s national e-health technology acquisition.  
Lack of domestic 
innovation strategy 
Having an innovation strategy included in a national e-
health policy can foster national technology acquisition. 
 
The absence of domestic e-health industrial capacities in African countries, associated 
with low public sector investments, weak private sector entrepreneurships and lack of 
an innovation strategy in their national e-health policies, is also noted.  
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The main conclusion that we draw from these findings is that a recipient‘s immature 
national innovation systems cannot on a large-scale accumulate and assimilate from 
IeTTs.  
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7 Discussion and Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
We have examined and demonstrated the economics and sociology of e-health 
innovation. The conduct of international e-health technology transfers (IeTTs) is 
necessary for national e-health technology acquisition in African countries. In this 
thesis, we have identified and demonstrated that certain institutional factors can either 
constrain or condition domestic acquisition. The identified constraints can nevertheless 
be employed to understand how such acquisition can be fostered in African countries. 
To achieve this will require an understanding of how the different institutional forms 
and identities of the involved multiple actors and organisations at global, continental 
and national levels can be harnessed and managed for success.  
We have employed a pragmatic and pluralistic combination of moderate and middle-
range Science and Technology Studies (STS), and NIS institutionalism theories and 
Deleuzian poststructuralist narrative method to study e-health at the interface of health 
informatics and global development. To identify and demonstrate that the institutional 
structures of global technoeconomic interactions, can constrain or condition the national 
e-health technology acquisition. We inquire how e-health technologies diffuse trans-
nationally in the context of globalisation at a macro-societal/institutional level as 
opposed to the micro-individual one preferred in conservative health informatics 
studies. The combination is employed to organise and order messy, complex large 
qualitative data collected from different and diverse sources over the last four years. The 
thesis is unique, as we have yet to identify any other study on the conduct of IeTT or in 
health informatics that has this unique combination.   
Existing studies in the policy contexts of health techno-globalism and international 
development on the transfers of e-health, ICT and biomedical technologies, are lacking 
in depth, scope and scale that we have achieved with theoretical and methodical 
pragmatism and pluralism. Typically and conservatively, previous work from health 
informatics on national e-health implementations and ICT4D (Chapters 1 & 2) on the 
conduct of e-health technology transfers have commonly taken an information society, 
action-oriented, micro-level and managerial approach. The conducts of Global Health 
165 
 
and STI (Chapter 2) have typically and conservatively neglected agential asymmetry, 
politics and power in the conduct of biomedical technology transfers.  
As opposed to the traditional information-based approach to study national and trans-
national implementation of e-health technologies, we found that a Schumpeterian 
industrial model of technology development and utilisation is relevant. We contend that 
in the current cosmopolitan conduct of IeTTs and in its associated Global Health and 
ICT4D policy, technology development and utilisation, is Schumacher and consumerist 
in orientation. Instead of a cosmopolitan agency in the Global, a national one is 
presented as an alternative is recommended for consideration in global and national 
policy.  
7.2 Narrative themes 
The narrative themes we have identified in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 are summarised in a 
cyclical, actor network theory (ANT) - like interaction in Figure 7.1. We identified four 
structural mechanisms that manifest as institutional structures in globalised complex 
and contested interactions among constitutive actors and organisations (Figure 7.1). As 
opposed to cyclical interaction typical of analysis of organisational, micro-individual 
analysis in health informatics, i.e. (Sunyoung Cho, et al., 2008; Davidson & Chiasson, 
2005; T Greenhalgh & Stones, 2010), a concept of Symmetry from middle-range STS 
constructivism articulated in (Chapter 2) is employed.  
In a globalised development and utilisation of e-health technologies, Symmetry as 
opposed to ANT‘s equality of agency of humans and technologies in horizontal 
sociotechnical interactions (F.W. Geels, 2004; Roberts, 2012; Wyatt & Balmer, 2007), 
is observed. In ANT, Symmetry occurs in flat, horizontal and circumscribed 
interactions. For instance, in the way that Cerny, 2000 and Fritsch, 2011, pp. 37-38 took 
for granted national agential asymmetry in globalisation, in that they ascribed symmetry 
of agency to state and non-state actors. Whereas, ours represents that institutional 
interactions are not only symmetrical but also both vertically hierarchical and 
horizontally diffuse. This is unlike a core-periphery orientation of technology dependent 
relationships between producing technology leaders and receiving laggards, implied in 
ITTs literature (Christol, 1974; Colino, 1968; Contractor & Sagafi-Nejad, 1981; Habib-
Sy, 1992; Häusler & Simonis, 1985; James, 2002; Reddy & Zhao, 1990; Ya'u, 2005). 
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The sociology of the complex interactions in conduct of IeTTs occurs in a complex 
network of diverse geographies, technologies, institutional power and knowledge bases. 
These, historically evolve in a dynamic network of actors, institutions and technologies 
of temporal and geographical dimensions. Hence, the institutional structures 
constraining and conditioning domestic innovation learning, that manifested in complex 
vertical and horizontal interactions of subnational, national, continental and global 
levels.  
Thus, we gave evenness to the influences of the structural constraints or conditions on 
lack of domestic e-health acquisition from IeTTs in African countries. In addition to 
demonstrate that the institutional structures manifest in complex and contested 
interactions of technoglobalism.  
  
Figure 7.1 Narrative themes
The key narratives from the chapters are summarised as follows.  
1. Chapter 3 showed that there exists a technological path-dependency between an 
African country‘s ability in implementing its national e-health initiative and the 
preceding history of struggling to acquire domestic e-health technologies from 
IeTTs. It also identifies global technoeconomic and geopolitical events and 
institutional structures of global corporatism and industrialism in this history of 
uncertainty. However, a lack of the exercise of National Agency is identified and 
demonstrated to be behind the country‘s present poor and globalised (there are 
many international actors and organisations involved in the implementation) 
state of e-health implementation.  
2. Chapter 4 showed that global geopolitics is manifested in East-West contention, 
which can work to constrain the acquisition of national e-health technology 
capacity from IeTTs in Africa. The contention is characterised by corporatism, 
mercantilism, industrialism and technology neoliberalism, and may make 
challenging for the recipients the transfers of affordable and appropriate e-health 
technologies from global markets.  
3. Chapter 5 showed that fragmentation of governance mechanisms at the 
continental level in Africa can work to constrain the acquisition of national e-
health technology capacity from IeTTs in Africa. Regionalism and breakdown in 
continental multilateral arrangements can lead recipient countries to take 
unilateral decisions, which might make acquisition from e-health technology 
transfers uneven across the board.  
4. Chapter 6 showed that domestic actions taken by National governments can 
work either to constrain or to enable the acquisition of national e-health capacity 
from IeTTs. Actions taken by both domestic public and private sectors in 
recipient countries can either enable or constrain the accumulation of e-health 
technologies and the assimilation of technical knowledge and competence from 
e-health technology transfers.  
The concept of Symmetry is further elaborated upon later in this Chapter. First, we 
examine the interconnectedness of the effects of institutional structures at global, 
continental, national and subnational levels on the exercise of National Agency.  
169 
 
By applying theoretical pragmatism and pluralism to the research objectives, we have 
found that the transfers of e-health technologies in Africa in the context of globalisation 
occur in a dual/dichotomous (vertical and horizontal) complex and contested 
interactions. The first is hierarchical in nature – a vertical interaction exists among 
constitutive actors and organisations at global, continental, national and subnational 
levels.  
The second is that a horizontal relationship exists among institutional forms and 
identities of the involved diverse actors and organisations. The interactions at the 
horizontal are characterised by conflicting and multi-stakeholders‘ institutional interests 
of all that are involved at the different levels, which manifests in self-interested motives 
and agenda. Power, politics and contestations are identified in both the vertical and 
horizontal relationships in the interactions. Some of our findings support and also 
contend with those identified in the literature we presented in both Chapters 1 and 2 as 
regarding the general conduct of technology transfers.  
We highlight in Section 7.8 novel contributions made primarily to the health informatics 
domain such as the role of National governments, the essential nature of domestic 
innovation capacity, national economic prowess and global geopolitics in the 
development and utilisation of e-health technologies.  
7.3 Discussion 
We take the technology focus adopted in the thesis for discussion as was in the 
narratives in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 and identify a common thread that runs through the 
narratives, that the exercise of National Agency in the conduct of IeTTs in African 
countries is weak and absent in most countries we have studied. On this basis, we 
contend that the horizontal orientation of interaction implied by STS constructivism in 
the contexts of global development (Sismondo, 2010), and of techno-globalism (Fritsch, 
2011). The contention stems from a counter-argument put forward by these authors 
(Forje, 2006; Freeman, 2002; Juma, 2010; Juma & Bell Jr, 2006; Juma, et al., 2001; 
Klein & Kleinman, 2002; Lall & Pietrobelli, 2005; Lundvall, 2007; Mazzucato, 2011; 
Muchie, 2008; Pavitt, 1998) that a country is the basic unit of technology invention and 
production in the age of globalisation. With all caution, we cannot see how African 
countries, in a medium to long time scale, can acquire domestic e-health technology 
capacity from IeTTs without proactive actions of their National governments. We 
therefore put forward that the hypothesis of cumulative advantage presented in Section 
2.7 is applicable in constructing how African countries can acquire domestic e-health 
technology from international transfers.  In short, it is to counter that ‗data is not 
destiny‘ or that ‗nature need not equate to nurture‘. African countries can learn from 
what global technology leaders are doing.   
We build on the existing work on national e-health implementation in Africa presented 
in Sections 1.5 and 1.6 to argue that together with the possession of a mature national 
innovation system (NIS), a domestic innovation capacity is also required to drive an 
incremental implementation. To learn is to know what they are doing. These countries 
possess mature NIS and have over a long period acquired domestic technology 
competences in biomedical, telecommunication and computing industries. The 
technologies produced by these industries are then being utilised to incrementally build 
their national e-health infrastructures. In addition, African countries can learn from 
global leaders how their National governments‘ and public and private sectors‘ 
investment into the three identified domestic industries are associated with their 
incremental national e-health implementations.  
On this basis, we identify two areas to present and articulate the discussion.  
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1. The first is to assert that a large-scale implementation of a national e-health 
initiative is difficult without the possession of a domestic innovation capacity.  
2. The second is to propose and present a framework to advocate collaboration and 
cooperation amongst the diverse actors and organisations involved in the 
conduct of IeTTs in Africa.  
7.4 Cumulative advantage and national e-health technology capacity 
We contend that, rather than passivity, the proactive exercise of National Agency of 
African National governments is needed to navigate and negotiate complex interactions 
in the conduct of IeTTs. We stress particularism in the face of the universal notion 
implicit in techno-globalism, that all African countries possess the requisite innovation 
capacities for accumulating e-health technologies from IeTTs. In doing so, we employ 
literature that emphasises the role of technology in national and global survival and 
progress. The proactive actions of African countries might help in starting to acquire 
domestic e-health technology capacities for implementing their national e-health 
initiatives. The locus of agency in most of the technology transfers studied in the thesis 
is at global level. The technologies are designed and manufactured in the global East 
and West and only utilised at the subnational levels in recipient African countries. This 
description represents the contested and complex nature of IeTTs in African countries, 
such as in AB in Chapter 3, ZP in Chapter 4, CE and PE in Chapter 6 and to a lesser 
extent in KL in Chapter 4 and 6.  All these transfers are happening in the context of 
global geopolitical contentions between, and the corporatism and industrialism of, 
global East and West and in the absence of strong continental leadership (Chapters 3, 4 
& 5). 
The transferred technologies flow from the global to the subnational with minimal 
investment from their passive National governments (public sectors) and private sectors. 
Besides, the national innovation systems in these countries are immature and weak. 
Contrast this with a country such as BC in Chapter 6. With BC, we demonstrated that it 
possesses a relatively mature NIS – exemplified by the actions of its public and private 
sectors‘ financial provision, domestic R&D and manufacturing and entrepreneurship. In 
this case, the technologies flow from the global to the national and then to the 
subnational. This model of transfer was observed in the conduct of globally sponsored 
pan-Africa e-health initiatives, partly because of the fragmented governance at the 
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continental level (Chapter 4 & 5).  In contrast, in the dynamics in AB and CE, the 
transferred e-health technologies flow from the global level straight down to the 
subnational level, with minimal investments from their National governments. This is 
not too different from the dynamics of the transfer of green technologies conducted in 
Tanzania, a low-income and less global technology laggard African country 
investigated by (Caniëls & Romijn, 2009) .  
The nature and consequences of the technology transfers vary among countries. From 
analysing the narratives, we identified two models to make meaning of the conduct of 
IeTTs in Africa. The two models are reflecting the divergent principles espoused by 
Schumpeter and Schumacher, for example by (Kaplinsky, 2011) of how material 
technologies are developed for, and trans-nationally transferred to, developing 
countries. The two models differ, based on the ‗doing it all for me‘/ cosmopolitan 
approach, implicit in the conduct of IeTTs, and the national/ ‗let me learn and do it 
myself‘ approach of an industrial e-health model. The former is attributed to 
Schumacher and the latter is Schumpeterian in nature. The two approaches apply to how 
transferred e-health technologies can be accumulated in African countries. We employ 
them to demonstrate how the hypothesis of cumulative advantage applies to recipient 
African countries studied in the narratives.   
Table 7.1 Schumpeter versus Schumacher 
Country BC CE/AB 
Technology Transfer model Schumpeter Schumacher  
Transfer dynamics Global-National-Subnational Global-National 
National Economic Size Middle-income Low-income 
National e-health model Proto-industrial Consumerist 
Learning mode Active  Passive 
 
The two technology transfer models explain the divergent domestic flow of e-health 
technologies in the cases of BC and CE presented in Chapter 6 and AB in Chapter 3. 
As noted with BC, a history of accumulating technologies from a series of domestic and 
transferred small-scale e-health projects is bringing the exercise of National Agency to 
bear. In CE, this incrementalism was not identified. Its National government, public and 
private sectors were not as active as BC‘s.  
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The divergence between the two countries can be explained by how Schumacher 
advocated that small scale intermediate technologies must be transferred to low-income 
countries. We explain why CE and other low-income countries such as PE, AB and ZP 
were recipients of a Schumacher type of IeTT. With AB in Chapter 3, we traced a 
history of technological path-dependency on being a recipient of environmentally 
inappropriate and costly transferred e-health technologies. A similar type of 
technological constraint was identified with ZP in Chapter 3 and PE in Chapter 6. With 
AB, CE and ZP, their plans to implement a national e-health initiative have yet to 
materialise. The consumerist model of national e-health technology development 
associated with these countries is the opposite of what we articulated and demonstrated 
with BC. 
7.4.1 Schumpeter and African countries   
In a middle-income country, BC, a proto-industrial model of national e-health 
technology implementation, close to the Schumpeterian approach of the global e-health 
leaders, is demonstrated. A feedback loop between largely domestically conceived 
subnational e-health experimentations and its national techno-science infrastructure, is 
demonstrated in the conduct of the IeTTs BC was involved in. KL in Chapters 3 and 6 
is not a middle-income country but a mineral-resource rich country with a national 
financial capacity. It was therefore able to procure a satellite technology from a global 
East economic giant. However, an uncertainty of the technology coupled with its 
relatively immature NIS made its national e-health implementation to suffer a massive 
setback. Even so, the influences of global geopolitical contentions between the West 
and the East and their competing corporatist, mercantilist and industrial interests, might 
have partly contributed to the uncertainty. BC‘s national e-health technology 
competence is not yet in the league of the global e-health leaders. Nevertheless, its 
divergence from KL and the others can be explained by the former‘s national economic 
size and far more mature NIS.  
The acquisition of domestic e-health technology capacity in BC follows a 
Schumpeterian model. What distinguishes this model from Schumacher‘s (from a NIS 
perspective) is the different mode of learning that BC adopts and which others have not.  
Leaning on (Juma et. al., 2001, p. 632, Section 2.2 and Lundvall 2007), we present the 
industrial model as active learning from IeTTs, while the learning in the consumerist 
model, associated with CE and AB, is passive.  
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We take the industrial model of global e-health leaders as active learning. It reflects the 
proactive role of developing countries‘ National governments in establishing the 
regulative and normative institutions essential for fostering domestic techno-science and 
entrepreneurship in the public and private sectors. It also shows us that capable 
countries actively strive to acquire e-health technology capacity from IeTTs. This model 
explains the cumulative advantage that BC has over the others. Its active learning 
separates it from the passive learner, AB, despite both sharing a history of being 
recipients of transferred technologies. It is the difference between the ‗let me learn and 
do it‘ approach in BC and the ‗doing it all for me‘ approach in others such as AB and 
also PE and CE. The proto-industrial model in BC is ensuring that national e-health 
technology capacity is being acquired by a combination of both domestic techno-
sciences and accumulation from e-health technology transfers. This model ensures that, 
in the conduct of an IeTT, the exercise of National Agency will ensure that the flow of 
transferred e-health technologies does not occur only between the global and the 
subnational.    
Active learning is what underpins the Schumpeterian national e-health model. On the 
other hand, passive learning has more in common with how (Kaplinsky 2011, pp. 195-
196) described the Schumacher‘s model. That is, developing countries should be 
passive consumers of intermediate technologies designed and manufactured by global 
technology leaders, without leaving the recipients with technology choices. We contend 
that most African countries were presented with limited technology options in the 
conduct of IeTTs. They had limited influence and contributed no inputs to the design 
and manufacturing of transferred e-health technologies. The technologies were, in most 
instances, passively received, hence giving limited or no opportunity for active learning.   
Consumerist AB is an archetypical recipient of transferred e-health technologies of 
Schumacher‘s model. We demonstrated that with a historical linkage between past and 
present of conduct of IeTTs. The lack of technology choice that this mode implies for a 
recipient country, such as AB, does not augur well for active learning, and hence the 
acquisition of national e-health technology capacity in Africa. However, we have 
demonstrated with BC, as a result of a relatively more mature extant NIS, that an 
African country can actively learn from being a recipient of technology transfers. This 
forms the basis for challenging the cosmopolitan, Schumacher‘s model that currently 
informs the conduct of IeTTs in Africa.  
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We contend that the Schumpeterian industrial model has proved itself with the global e-
health leaders as a domestic platform to incrementally implement a national e-health 
infrastructure. African countries can learn from these leaders and follow BC‘s example. 
The role national techno-science plays in the development and utilisation of e-health 
technologies is prominently demonstrated in countries with such an industrial model. It 
is underpinned by their National governments‘ exercise of National Agency, rather than 
the passive dependence on receiving e-health technology transfers, that Schumacher, 
advocated.  
The consumerist model in Africa is outdated and is out of touch with academic 
reasoning on the new direction for Africa‘s socio-economic progress, as it cannot serve 
its developmental needs in the age of technology globalisation, contended (Forje, 2006; 
Muchie, 2004; Ymele, 2011). In addition, a new policy direction on Science, 
Technology and Innovation from Africa‘s continental governmental organisations is 
encouraging National governments to invest more into fostering and forging domestic 
innovations and industries (Brundenius & Mawoko, 2010). A Schumpeterian model for 
national innovation and industrial capacity acquisition is now a strategic option for 
developing countries to adopt (Arocena & Sutz, 2003; Baskaran, 2005; Juma, 2010; 
Juma & Bell Jr, 2006; Muchie, 2008). Not least because other African countries can 
emulate South Africa, with its emerging industrial, research and financial 
infrastructures, on how this can be done (Kraemer-Mbula & Muchie, 2009).    
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that Schumacher (Schumacher, 1972) on the production 
of small-scale technologies, is useful and suitable for explaining how the cumulative 
advantage hypothesis will work for the acquisition of national e-health technology 
capacity in Africa.  
7.4.2 Schumacher meets Schumpeter 
Schumacher‘s model can inform us how the challenges of technology inappropriateness, 
such as obsolescence and incompatibility to users and environment, can be addressed in 
the conduct of IeTTs. We employ this model to explain how national e-health 
technology acquisition can incrementally develop from the accumulation of small scale 
subnational experimentations. In this regard, we concur with Kaplinsky that 
Schumacher can meet Schumpeter in how domestic e-health capacity can be fostered in 
Africa. In particular, we subscribe to the view that the industrial model of technology 
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production advocated by Schumpeter, is suitably employed to incrementally innovate – 
for inventing and producing affordable and appropriate technologies in Schumacher‘s 
sense.  
Technical knowledge and competence assimilated in the process of accumulating 
transferred e-health technologies, is needed for domestic production or re-inventing of 
appropriate technologies in recipient African countries. In the narratives, we identified 
that the inappropriateness of transferred e-health technologies in the countries 
constrained domestic accumulations (Section 6.4 with ZP and KL and Section 7.5.1 
with CE). Variably, these countries did not possess the domestic innovation capacities 
needed to deal with technical setbacks and uncertainties when they arose. With AB, we 
argued that it should not depend on foreign expertise and industry to remedy the 
challenges of technology inappropriateness encountered at its hospitals. For example, 
the country was incapable of carrying out maintenance and technical repairs locally. 
This wouldn‘t have been the case, had AB‘s National government exercised National 
Agency to assimilate technical competence from previous conduct of IeTTs. The 
narrative on BC in Sections 7.4-7.6 informed us that such exercise by the proactive 
actions of its National government and public and private sectors can translate to 
accumulation of technologies and assimilation of competence.  
With BC, we demonstrated that, if a feedback loop exists between subnational 
experimentations and utilisations and a country‘s NIS, challenges of technology   
inappropriateness can be addressed domestically. Such desired domestic action (or 
exercise of National Agency) points to how Schumacher can meet Schumpeter in the 
acquisition of national e-health technology capacity in recipient African countries. The 
industrial model employed by BC contributed to an incremental development of 
affordable and appropriate technologies in Schumacher‘s sense. 
We advocate that an incremental accumulation of technologies and assimilation of 
technical competence from small scale projects can lead to the acquisition of national e-
health technology capacity. De Laet & Mol, 2000, pp., 238-242, for example, 
demonstrated with a domestic engineering and implementation of water pump devices 
and infrastructure in Zimbabwe. Learning from, and accumulation of, small subnational 
experimentations, can eventually and incrementally snowball to make domestic 
invention and production of appropriate e-health technologies possible. Hence, vicious 
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cycles of setbacks and uncertainties being caused by technology inappropriateness at the 
subnational levels can turn to virtuous cycles of domestic accumulations (Chapter 6).  
The Schumacher model is employed to explain how national e-health capacity can be 
domestically acquired from being a recipient of IeTTs. However, the model presents 
African countries with limited technological and institutional choices, as regarding their 
exercise of National Agency in fostering domestic e-health capacities. The ―doing it all 
for me‖ approach, exemplified by (Schumacher, 1972), informed the cosmopolitan 
nature of the conduct of IeTTs in African countries. We identified in the narratives that 
the development and utilisation of e-health technologies were taking place in recipient 
African countries (i.e. in AB and CE (Chapter 3 & 6)), and their invention and 
production were carried out by global actors, who conducted their design and 
manufacturing outside the continent. The approach gives agency to global actors and 
not national actors in the design and manufacturing of e-health technologies, even 
though, some transfer of competence can occur. Schumacher‘s model inclination is that 
the design and manufacturing of appropriate technologies should take place outside the 
recipient countries (Kaplinsky 2011, p. 198, Section 2.2). This model promotes passive 
learning and constrains National Agency. In contrast, the Schumpeterian model that 
underpins national e-health technology implementation in technology frontier countries, 
promotes active learning.  
7.5 Domestic e-health innovation 
We identify with (Baskaran, 2005; Bauer, et al., 2012; Forje, 2006; Freeman, 2002; 
Fritsch, 2011; Juma, et al., 2001; Achim Lang, et al., 2012; Lundvall, 2007; Mazzucato, 
2011; Mohan, et al., 2002; Muchie, 2008; Sharif, 2006; Ymele, 2011) that a country is 
the primary agent of technology development in the age of technology globalisation. 
The challenges encountered by AB, BC, ZP and KL with transferred inappropriate 
technologies, cannot be dissociated from their lack of the Schumpeterian domestic e-
health innovation capacity.  
BC was presented as possessing a proto-industrial model of national e-health 
technology development because the country is South Africa. It doesn‘t possess yet a 
domestic e-health innovation capacity that matches up to global e-health leaders in 
terms of industrial competences in computing, biomedical and telecommunication. 
Though, it might still be catching up with the UK and Scandinavian countries in 
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carrying out advanced domestic lifescience technosciences (Pavitt, 1998, pp. 801-803). 
However, it is the closest in Africa to these advanced countries, in terms of national 
economic size and domestic innovation capacity. Regarded as the most technologically 
advanced country in Africa (Kraemer-Mbula & Muchie, 2006, 2009), South Africa has 
just started thinking of putting in place a domestic e-health innovation plan (Van Dyk, 
et al., 2010). It doesn‘t yet host multinationals with competence in semiconductor 
innovation and manufacturing of consumer electronics such as Smartphones, as we 
noted with global e-health leaders. Though, it has an m-health innovation company 
Cell-Life, which came out of a triple helix partnership funded by its National 
government with technologies developed by its universities and research institutes. The 
emerging domestic e-health technology industry in South Africa (Chapter 6) lends itself 
to the ‗let me learn and do it myself‘ approach that the Schumpeterian model represents.  
We note that, in the age of technoglobalism, ‗fortune favours the brave‘. In this respect, 
African countries must emulate their Asian counterparts. Countries such as South 
Korea, Malaysia and India, hitherto identified as technology laggards, have recently and 
astonishingly become known as global economic giants. These and including UK, USA, 
Norway and Germany we identified in Chapter 2, have national research centres that 
carry out e-health R&D combinations and also host global technology multinationals. 
As entrepreneurial or developmental states, they have instituted domestic technoscience, 
and are encouraging and investing into their public and private sectors, by stimulating 
entrepreneurship and industrial capacity in the process of implementing their national e-
health initiatives.  
South Korea, a country that (Sachs, 2003, pp. 138-139), acknowledged as an overnight 
success in domestic technology invention and manufacturing, is adopting an industrial 
model to engineer an incremental implementation of its national e-health initiative. 
Reported progress being made in its national implementation isn‘t coming as a surprise, 
as state entrepreneurship and steerage are evidently demonstrated (Briggs, et al., 2001; 
Holliday & Tam, 2004; Lee, et al., 2009). Informatively, Samsung, a global 
multinational leader in consumer electronics, nurtured by an exercise of proactive 
National Agency in its infancy (Holliday & Tam, 2004, p. 761), acted a key industrial 
engine of domestic e-health innovation and implementation in South Korea (Briggs, et 
al., 2001).  
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Following a similar pattern of agency, Indian National government‘s incentives and 
investments have created domestic Satcom industry (Baskaran, 2005), which now 
supports its national telemedicine implementation (Mishra, et al., 2009). It is also 
evident in Japan‘s (Fujimoto & Miyazaki, 2000), Germany (A. Lang & Mertes, 2012; 
Achim Lang, et al., 2012) and US‘s (Johnston, et al., 2000; Spivack, 2005; Zuzek & 
Bhasin, 1996) national e-health implementation that its National government and 
domestic consumer electronic industries are in the driving seats. Malaysia (Mohan, et 
al., 2002), hitherto a technology laggard, initiated an ambitious and a world class e-
infrastructure, partly a as platform for its national e-health implementation. South 
Korea‘s progress provides a classical example of how state entrepreneurship and 
steerage can transform a hitherto laggard into a global technology leader. A similar 
exercise of National Agency is documented in China‘s recent astronomical rise to 
become a global economic giant (Fu, Pietrobelli & Soete, 2011).  
South Korea, Japan and India are noted as global rising stars in biomedical and 
biotechnology industries (Salter & Faulkner, 2011) and in (Macher, et al., 2007) 
semiconductors innovation and manufacturing. 
Evidently, with these frontier countries, innovation and implementation haven‘t been 
based on the Schumacher consumerist model that is implied by Sachs, 2003. This comes 
as a surprise, even that he also acknowledged the instrumental roles of National 
governments and domestic public and private sectors in technology acquisition and 
accumulation. Even so that in the areas of biomedicine and biotechnology that shares 
similar technological complexity and financial intensity with e-health, African countries 
are being encouraged (Al-Bader, et al., 2010; Chataway, et al., 2009; Frew, et al., 2006; 
Juma, 2010) to foster national innovation capacities and certain countries have made 
encouraging progress. 
Two types of national e-health implementation governance models we noted with global 
e-health frontiers are applicable to African countries. Such differentiation can determine 
how subnational experimentations or small-scale health service implementations evolve 
and accumulate. This is either centralist or federalist in configuration – how their 
National Health Service is administratively organised and financed. Though, African 
countries differ in their national governance, we reckon that most will share with either 
of the two types. Centralist type noted with England can be replicated in Uganda and 
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Kenya where their National governments finance and administer healthcare services in 
subnational constituents. In contrast, a federalist type noted with Germany and USA 
will better serve national implementations in Nigeria and South Africa, where their 
respective National governments have devolved power to constituent subnational 
governments.  
South Africa has shown itself to be head and shoulders above other African countries, at 
least in ICT (telecommunication and computing) research and industry, with a mobile 
telecom multinational as an evidence of its comparative strength (Kraemer-Mbula & 
Muchie, 2009). We also know that the challenges of e-health technology 
inappropriateness and regulation to address them are being recognised in the country 
(Kachienga, 2008; Poluta, 2006). The emergence of a computer hardware industry 
cluster in Nigeria, identified by the World Bank, is also an interesting and encouraging 
development (Abiola, 2008). Notwithstanding, there is no African country that got a 
mention as a rising industrial star in either the globalisation of biomedical technologies 
(Salter & Faulkner, 2011) or semiconductor (Macher, et al., 2007).  
Based on South Africa‘s relative progress, we can see that it is closer to the centre of 
technoglobalism than other African countries. The others are occupying peripheral 
positions in the context of techno-globalism. This emphasises that the exercise of 
National Agency by other African countries is urgently needed for them to catch up or 
leapfrog. Encouraging but slow progress being made in this direction is presented in the 
African Innovation Outlook report (Brundenius & Mawoko, 2010).  
To sum up, we emphasise that the exercise of National Agency must be a policy 
imperative for African countries, by arguing that the continental model of innovation 
advocated by (Muchie, 2004) may not suffice in the conduct of IeTTs. The narrative in 
Chapter 5 inform us that a smooth transfer of e-health technologies from global to 
national level can be hindered by the preference of global actors for regional and 
bilateral arrangements to the detriment of plausibly conducive multilateralism. More so, 
the unilateral decision taken by certain African countries in the conduct of IeTTs 
(Chapter 5), gives an indication that bilateral arrangements with global actors might be 
more favourable.  
Two areas are identified in which Schumpeter contrast with Schumacher in the 
development and utilisation of e-health technologies. The first is in the area of learning 
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in acquiring national e-health innovation capacity. The second is about nature of e-
health technologies: how they scale and how they come into being.  
7.5.1 Learning 
Learning in a Schumpeterian sense is an active assimilation of both explicit and tacit 
knowledge (Arocena & Sutz, 2003; Baskaran, 2005; Lall & Pietrobelli, 2005; Lundvall, 
2007). In Chapter 2, we noted that with Schumacher model, how recipient countries can 
acquire and assimilate of knowledge in the conduct of ITTs is not visibly evident. 
Especially, if, an agential asymmetry exists in a lopsided techno-globalism – a nations‘ 
innovation capacity determines its ability to address domestic digital divide.  
A historical linkage with past cosmopolitan transfers of Satcom technologies in the last 
four decade (Christol, 1974; Colino, 1968; Habib-Sy, 1992; Howell, 1988; International 
Space University, 1994; Pelton, 1987), is noted in the current conduct of IeTTs 
(including m-health) and ICT4D in Africa. Similar pattern is noted between past 
practice of biomedical technology transfers (Donald, 1999; Free, 2004; Quaye, 1996) 
and current Global Health policy. Yet, despite being perennial recipients, African 
countries still possess immature technical competence and industrial capacity (Al-
Bader, et al., 2010; Chataway, et al., 2009; Frew, et al., 2006) in these areas. 
Schumacher model is largely about using transferred implicit or tacit knowledge by 
global actors to develop technologies for recipient local users or consumers. There is no 
accounting for the explicit nature of tacit knowledge that is required for active 
acquisition and assimilation of domestic industrial competence in a Schumpeterian 
socio-technology sense. Cosmopolitan fixity with technology appropriateness subsumes 
that of innovativeness and production (Kaplinsky, 2011, p. 193). Moreover, the 
unproductive dependency of the recipients on the donors for radical and incremental 
knowledge in the medium to long-term is not taken into account in global policy.  
On the other hand, active or industrial learning is both to acquire technical competence 
from transfers and to domestically upgrade them, with an  eventual goal of  developing 
new ideas and knowledge needed to forge long-term technology accumulation. As with 
South Africa (BC) and with global e-health technology frontiers (Fujimoto & Miyazaki, 
2000; Halford, et al., 2009; Johannessen, et al., 2012; A. Lang & Mertes, 2012; Lee, et 
al., 2009; Spivack, 2005), learning is noted to occur though incremental domestic 
technosciences jointly carried out by both public and private sectors. Learning equips a 
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country to industrially develop and upgrade technologies for utilisation in its health 
service sector.  In a way that Kaplan, 1987 demonstrated in the case of the invention, 
commercialisation and utilisation of CT-Scan machines in the USA. 
We view learning as step towards becoming a Schumpeterian entrepreneurial or 
developmental state, for consumerist African countries. Even India, a country where 
Fritz Schumacher originally conceived his Small is beautiful idea from (Toye, 2012) 
now possess domestic competence in hi-tech, semiconductor-based Satcom industry 
(Baskaran, 2005). Such competence has gone into building its national telemedicine 
infrastructure.  
Transferred e-health technologies have, in some instances, saved and prolonged lives. 
For example, the life of a Swazi child was reportedly saved by expert advice provided 
by a UK based doctor (Section 4. 3.2). In general, in Africa this kind of virtual e-health 
service predominates over the transfers of material technologies; for example, a virtual 
teleconsultation service that operates in several developing countries (Cartwright, 2000; 
Edworthy, 2001; Geissbuhler, et al., 2007). Most of these virtual services employ open 
source software platforms, mostly designed and produced outside the continent. 
Though, a mention can be made of the transfer of e-health software design knowledge, 
which has led to the invention of open source platforms such as Open Medical Record 
System (Open MRS) and District Health Information System (DHIS), in several African 
countries.  
Even if software design skills can be acquired over these virtual platforms, the same 
cannot be said for e-health hardware and devices. The open-source movement draws 
inspiration from Schumacher. Interested individuals can freely join the movement so far 
they have a computing device and a connection to the Internet. Considering that 
personal Internet access in Africa is still below par with the lowest global benchmark 
(Bowman, et al., 2009; Kirigia, et al., 2005; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006), it is not 
surprising that most of the Open MRS and DHIS developers are based in frontier 
countries such as the USA and Norway respectively.  
Notwithstanding, a fixation on software development in the cosmopolitan conduct of 
IeTTs, might be drawing attention away from challenges being encountered with e-
health hardware. Even users of virtual e-health services require appropriate hardware 
such as videoconferencing and telecommunication devices. The narratives demonstrated 
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that the challenge of technology inappropriateness is one that most African countries are 
grappling with (Chapters 3 and 6). For example, in the case of AB, presented in Chapter 
3, we demonstrated how shortage or deficiency of domestic competence continually 
frustrated the accumulation of transferred e-health technologies and the implementation 
of its national e-health initiative.  
It is possible that useful expertise for domestic production of e-health software can be 
acquired via such virtual platforms can transfer, and  can in the process contribute to 
healthcare delivery in recipient African countries (Allen, et al., 2007; J. Braa, et al., 
2004). However, this is not suitable for repairing, maintaining and manufacturing e-
health devices and equipments. Never mind, considering the capacity to invent new 
ones from the scratch.  
Technical skills that are required for such more complex tasks are tacit knowledge, 
which we have found not to be easily transferred in the conduct of IeTTs. Moreover, 
these areas of knowledge are not freely available (they are not open source), but have to 
be deliberatively impacted by technology producers, and willingly learned by 
consumers.  
Accordingly, we view Schumacher‘s as not appropriate for inventing hi-tech 
combination and production of converging e-health technologies. A small-scale village 
industry model of producing dated technologies that Schumacher advocated 
(Schumacher, 1972) is at odds with the Schumpeterian engine of technology 
combination, dynamism, novelty and upgrading are being powered by domestic 
consumerism . Because of this reason, the technical competence that can be acquired 
from passive learning will not be enough to engineer a large-scale national e-health 
infrastructure. On this ground, we contend with Kaplinsky, 2011, p. 202, who following 
Schumacher, suggested that African countries will benefit from transfers of affordable 
and appropriate devices by the rising global East economies. Texts in Chapters 4 and 5 
demonstrate that such over-optimistic view will not translate into domestic acquisition. 
We contend that such Schumacher inspired Kaplinsky‘s cosmopolitanism will further 
push African countries into a retrogressive state of passive learning and consumerist 
recipient.  
Learning can only take place if the consumers and producers are closely linked together 
in a mutual exchange of knowledge and technologies. Such mutual learning occurs 
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when instrumental drivers of industrial capacity acquisition such as manufacturing and 
domestic consumerism are tightly and dialectically coupled with global innovation or 
value chain system (Caniëls & Romijn, 2009; Freeman, 2002; Juma, et al., 2001; 
Macher, et al., 2007; Salter & Faulkner, 2011). African countries should and can learn 
from the industrial model of national e-health technology development and 
implementation. This requires the possession of a mature national innovation system, 
which can, to a limited extent, be acquired from receiving IeTTs, but must largely, 
developed domestically. Accordingly, (Juma et. al., 2001 pp.637) admonished 
developing African countries not to forever depend on transferred biomedical 
technologies and ICTs for their survival and sustenance. Instead, he encourages 
technology lagging countries to emulate the industrial model, and advocates that 
recipient countries must forge domestic innovation capacity so as to leapfrog.  
In our view, Schumacher‘s innovation model cannot turn vicious cycle into a virtuous 
one in a low-income recipient African country. The acquisition of a hi-tech innovation 
and industrial capacity, that can power an engineering of a global standard of national e-
health implementation, is lacking. Only industrial learning can empower an African 
country to combine e-health technologies that requires a convergence of different 
technical and industrial competences.  
7.5.2 Nature of technology 
Virtuous cycle of domestic innovation system was demonstrated in countries AB, PE 
and KL as technology upgrading could not meet up with fastidious sun-national 
utilisations. With global e-health frontiers, a hi-tech and modern nature of e-health 
innovation (Aanestad & Jensen, 2011; Bergmo & Johannessen, 2006; Ellingsen & 
Monteiro, 2012; Fujimoto & Miyazaki, 2000; Johnston, et al., 2000; A. Lang & Mertes, 
2012; Spivack, 2005; Zuzek & Bhasin, 1996) is noted. Driven by a Schumpeterian 
creative destructionism powered by a domestic consumer market demands (Windrum & 
García-Goñi, 2008) explains how combinatorial, novel and incremental e-health 
innovations  come into being and scale. A convergence of consumer electronics and 
lifescience industries drives the combinations of biomedical, computing and 
telecommunication technologies. Rapid and intense digitalisation of health information 
and connectivity of devices are the hallmark of these technoeconomic changes. Perhaps, 
the turbulent cycles of viciousness and virtuosity, observed in less innovating AB, KL, 
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PE and relatively more innovating South Africa (Chapters 3 & 6), are patterns of an 
emerging creative destructionism.  Albeit, without an engine of domestic consumerism.  
Schumacher‘s model doesn‘t articulate how these cycles result in incremental 
accumulation and assimilation. But explains technology adaptation – existing and dated 
innovations are employed to create intermediate or lagging technologies. Schumpeterian 
engine, however, fits the dynamics of technology upgrading and novelty could have 
been instrumental for engineering the challenges of obsolescence and incompatibility 
encountered by AB, KL and PE. With Schumacher, agency for domestic engineering is 
un-developmentally cosmopolitan. As such, it will only produce low-tech innovations 
that might not meet Africa‘s harsh climatic and environmental ambience, and the 
fastidious nature of its rapidly changing and complex healthcare service provision 
needs.  
A policy concern is that, Schumacher‘s preference for less-capital intensive devices 
might not necessarily meet these needs or even becoming commercialised or attaining 
economies of scale. The combinatorial and converging nature of e-health technologies 
makes their manufacturing and engineering in national large-scale implementations, 
capital-intensive in a Schumpeterian techno- economic sense. As such, dynamic creative 
destructionist recombination required for attending to constant, fuzzy and uncertain 
ambient and health service, needs and demands, must be built on a foundational hi-tech 
industrial competence. At the moment, with a reasonable exception of South Africa, 
such competence is immature or absent in other African countries (Brundenius & 
Mawoko, 2010; Kraemer-Mbula & Muchie, 2009).   
Our view is that as combinatorial innovation in global consumer electronics and 
lifesciences industries persists, countries with industrial strength in semiconductor and 
biomedical technoscience and manufacturing will inevitably become frontier nations in 
fostering such convergence. If that is going to be a global technoeconomic trend, 
domestic knowledge will struggle to accumulate with the current practice of 
cosmopolitanism and consumerism. Implying that domestic industrial capacity will 
remain immature or absent in recipient countries, if, this practice persists.  
Schumacher vision for the production of less capital-intensive devices (Toye, 2012, p. 
395) might have been fulfilled with an availability of affordable mobile phones globally 
(Kaplinsky, 2011, p. 201 and Pippin & Qureshi, 2012); nonetheless, such industrial 
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capacity to design and manufacture them, is still visibly absent in recipient African 
countries.  
Mobile phones and to a very lesser extent Smartphones are widely utilised for essential 
public health m-health interventions in Africa and elsewhere; and, their  
implementations are usually presented as less-capital-intensive alternative to other e-
health ones (Fleishman, et al., 2010; Gerber, et al., 2010; Mechael, 2009). Though in a 
Schumacher sense, mobile phones can be regarded as an appropriate technology 
because they are less capital intensive to utilise, own and consume; nevertheless, the 
reality that they are high capital-intensive to design and manufacture is lost in global 
development policy. Moreover, limited policy interest has been indicated to make 
affordable presently expensive high performing Smartphones, which are more suitable 
for delivering combinatorial e-health services (Briggs, et al., 2012). As it is often taken 
for granted that the invention and production of even mobile phones is underpinned by a 
hi-tech semi-conductor or consumer electronics industry.  
On scaling e-health technologies, Schumacher is at odds with Schumpeter. Not least 
because scaling up of e-health service implementations is a policy and managerial 
challenge around the world (Briggs, et al., 2012; Coiera, 2009; Gulube & Wynchank, 
2002; Heeks, 2006; Kaplan, 1987; Kaplan & Harris-Salamone, 2009; Kellermann & 
Jones, 2013; Kifle, et al., 2008). Same kind of challenge is reported with m-health 
initiatives in developing countries (Tomlinson, et al., 2013). With these 
implementations, problem of scalability has been commonly and usually attributed to a 
lack of interoperability of amongst diverse and disparate technologies, actors and 
organisations. Thus, reflecting Schumpeterian sociotechnical and technoeconomics.  
The engineering of a large-scale national e-health technology infrastructure is in spatial 
and geographical spans and in functional sophistication (Aanestad & Jensen, 2011; 
Coiera, 2009; Ellingsen & Monteiro, 2012; Johannessen, et al., 2012; Larsen & 
Ellingsen, 2012). Civil and electrical engineering of a Schumpeterian large-scale 
infrastructure, is about building for mass service utilisation, and durable accumulation 
and functional adaptations, of e-health technologies, in a long period of national 
implementation. Such requires incremental and radical combinations of technologies 
and institutions underpinned by a nation‘s competent and attentive industrial and 
technocratic workforce and by the domestic mass consumerism. Meaning that large-
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scale implementation involves coalescing and managing complex institutional 
interactions of innovation and engineering (F.W. Geels, 2004; Frank W Geels, 2007; 
Juma & Bell Jr, 2006; Nelson, 2008; Nelson & Nelson, 2002; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 
2006; Windrum & García-Goñi, 2008). That is conditioned by entails a long wave of 
dynamic technoeconomic changes at both national and transnational levels and durable 
sociotechnical transformation at sectoral/subnational/service levels. 
We argue that Schumacher model is incapable of providing a satisfactorily 
understanding of how large-scale e-health engineering comes into being. Its utility for 
the production of small-scale single devices and largely designed for close-knit 
communal utilisation (Schumacher, 1972) cannot fit into Schumpeterian scales of 
national e-health implementation. It is a misfit with the complexity involved in 
combining and integrating diverse and perhaps un-interoperable e-health technologies, 
actors and organisations that span geographical and institutional spaces.  
Ethically, Schumacher‘s preference for high-labour intensive mode of technology 
production (ibid.) might also be at odds with the Schumpeter when it comes to utilising 
e-health technologies in a health service sector. A large-scale or intensive e-health 
utilisation can lead to a mechanisation and automation of healthcare processes, with a 
possible unintended consequence. For instance, it can result in a situation where less 
health professionals are needed, especially if implemented in a time of low-disease 
burdens. In Africa, where disease burdens are currently high and faces a chronic health 
human resources shortage, that might not be the case. However, the risk deskilling we 
noted with a conduct of an IeTT (Chapter 4, pp. 114-115), is an ethical concern. In the 
event of a sudden epidemic outbreak, demographic explosion and natural disasters, for 
instance, deskilling can prove catastrophic. Notwithstanding, teleconsultation services 
in such time of medical emergencies, can be life-saving in the early phases.   
To sum up Schumpeter and Schumacher meet up in how e-health technologies can be 
accumulated and adapted to address the challenges of technology incompatibilities and 
obsolescence. However, Schumpeter provides a more convincing model for 
understanding the evolutionary, scalar, combinatorial and converging nature of national 
e-health technologies and infrastructures. It explains how through an exercise of 
National Agency, tacit and explicit e-health knowledge can be learned and assimilated 
to domestically develop sectoral e-health services.  
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Schumpeterian model informs that national implementation is a large-scale, long-term 
engineering endeavour, involving the alignments of diverse and often competing 
sociotechnical and technoeconomic institutions. 
7.6 National Agency in e-health technology globalisation 
Most African countries‘ peripheral position in the context of technoglobalism puts them 
at risk of not acquiring innovation capacity in the conduct of IeTTs. This is more 
precarious, especially when governance at the continental level was shown to be 
fragmented and weak (Chapter 5) and when the interests of global corporatism, 
industrialism and mercantilism and ideological differences between the global West and 
East (Chapter 4) loom large in the conduct of IeTTs. More so, we cannot ascertain how 
disruptive global geopolitical and technoeconomic events and changes (Chapter 3 and 
4) will be on the acquisition of national e-health technology capacity in Africa. 
However, we analyse how national acquisitions differ amongst recipient African 
countries and how global development practise have fallen short in addressing the 
deficiency of national innovation capacity.  
7.6.1 Geographical-institutional network 
As regarding an exercise of National Agency in technoglobalism, being a technology 
laggard in a global peripheral position, need not a structural constraint to domestic 
acquisition. Though, we acknowledged that global mercantilism (Chapter 4) and 
industrialism and fragmented continental multilateralism and national unilateralism 
(Chapter 5) in both the hierarchical and diffuse interactions of IeTTs, can limit the 
agency of the recipients. As a consequence, these constrained an assimilation of tacit 
knowledge and accumulation of skills and craftsmanship. This implies that any 
domestic innovation learning in the recipients will take place within a complex 
symmetrical network of geographies, technologies, institutional power relations and 
distributed knowledge bases. That connotes complex interactions of diverse and 
multiple actors, institutions and technologies that will make this happen.  
Hence, we argue that the complexity of symmetrical interactions depends on, 
orientation size and intensity of the network. These network characteristics can 
determine if a recipient African country will either acquire more or less. 
The vertical orientation of hierarchical relationship of IeTTs, might not promote 
learning by interacting and doing. Neither would the diffuse horizontal one does. 
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Whether learning will occur is dependent on the degree of complexity of the network of 
interactions.  
In low degree of complexity, where the size of the network is small and there is a low 
intensity of interactions. The dynamics is that with few actors and organisations to deal 
and negotiate with, instead of floundering, learning can fledge or flourish. In a pattern 
demonstrated in recent China‘s rise (Fu, Pietrobelli & Soete, 2011), South Africa for 
example, acquired domestic innovation capacity following a telemedicine device co-
development with a global East country (Chapter 6). The opposite by contrast, was 
noted in the case of AB in Chapter 3. 
A higher degree of complexity was observed in AB, where the size of the network is 
relatively bigger. Hence, a higher intensity of interactions resulted in a lesser domestic 
acquisition. We noted that with too many chefs cooking the broth, an exercise of 
National Agency was frustrated and learning flounders. 
States of learning in CE, KL and PE (Chapter 4, 5 & 6) can be positioned along a 
spectrum of the South Africa and AB extremes. As regarding how they exercised 
National Agency as recipients of IeTTs, CE and PE will be positioned closer to AB in 
the spectrum, while, KL will be at a mid-point between the extremes.  
A relative better performance of South Africa suggests the possession of an extant 
domestic innovation capacity can determine how National Agency can be exercised. 
We, thus, maintain that a Schumpeterian industrial model of national e-health 
technology development and implementation is needed, to nationally scale-up 
transferred e-health technologies in Africa.  
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7.6.2 Global techno-developmentalism critique 
We come into a direct contention with the Schumacher cosmopolitan ‗doing it all for 
me‘ model that is currently defining the conduct of IeTTs in Africa. On this basis, we 
draw on the divergent view shared by Sachs, 2003, Juma, et al., 2001 and Kaplinsky, 
2011 on the suitability of international technology transfers for developing countries in 
the context of global development in the practices of ICT4D and Global Health. Hence, 
contending that Sach‘s policy preference is informed by Schumacher model of 
technology development and utilisation. In turn, mirrors that of Amartya Sen‘s global 
redistributive policy (Toye, 2012, p. 398 & 401) on a preference for communal/ small-
scale industrialisation.  
Cosmopolitanism limits recipient African countries to being passive consumers of 
transferred e-health technologies. Sachs (2003, p. 140) pragmatically advocated that a 
consumerist model of biomedical technology transfer, underpinned by a 
cosmopolitan/Schumacher approach, should be encouraged in developing countries.  
What is always taken for granted in global development is that digital divide is an 
innovation divide (Freeman, 2000; James, 2002). Semiconductor innovation and 
manufacturing competence are tacit knowledge (Macher, et al., 2007), which are not 
wilfully or easily transferred in a competitive age of technoglobalism. Moreover, we 
reckon that, the emergence of semiconductor-based hi-tech industries was a product of 
public-sector supported national technosciences in technology frontiers (Bauer, et al., 
2012; Freeman, 2000; James, 2002; Achim Lang, et al., 2012; Mazzucato, 2011; 
Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006; Pavitt, 1998). Most these innovations were spurred by their 
National governments‘ stewardship, ethical financing and markets organisation.  
Institutionally, this emergence has a historical linkage with similar investments made in 
the preceding decades into Satcom technology innovations; for example in the 
European Union (Dario, et al., 2005; Häusler & Simonis, 1985; Sweeting, 2000) and the 
USA (Lambright, 1994; Levy, 1975; Pelton, 1987; Peter, 2006; Zuzek & Bhasin, 1996). 
We noted that a less entrepreneurial sort of investments was made by PE and KL, as 
being recipients of IeTTs (Chapter 6); nonetheless, not by AB, in spite of being a long-
term recipient (Chapter 3); but was not directed at spurring domestic innovation. 
Instead, the consumerist adoption fostered a passive learning.  
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Hence, we reiterate the policy imperative of the essentiality and instrumentality of 
exercising National Agency in the conduct of IeTTs. Just as (Forje, 2006; Juma, 2010; 
Muchie, 2008; Ymele, 2011) have encouraged African countries to do, in the interest of 
fostering resilient socio-economic progress. Currently, such NIS principle is not evident 
in global development policy and practice, which is restrictively dominated by Sen 
Capability approach. 
The current Global Health and ICT4D policy and practice have not warmed up to a 
survival and prosperity imperatives of exercising National Agency in fostering domestic   
technology invention and manufacturing in the age of techno-globalism. At the 
moment, in global development practice, a Schumacher model of technology production 
predominates over a Schumpeterian one. Certainly, in the cosmopolitan implementation 
of e-health and m-health in Africa (Chapter 1), the former predominates.  
We noted in Chapter 2 that Sen‘s capability approach to individual but not national 
development is evident in the cosmopolitan agency ascribed to technology 
development, in the way implied in the e-health/m-health, Global Health and ICT4D 
literature (Chapter 1 & 2).  
The argument we presented in the preceding sections has advanced that such 
cosmopolitanism cannot foster large scale national e-health implementation in Africa. 
Besides, in respect to Africa‘s development, Muchie, 2008 eloquently challenged the 
instrumentality of the capability approach in the case of most African countries that are 
still proto-industrial states. He argued that, it is akin to putting the cart before the horse 
when a focus on individual capabilities takes precedence over acquisition of national 
innovation capacities, which determine whether the state can domestically provide 
quality healthcare services to its citizens. Though, implementing and utilising e-health 
technologies for example, telemedicine services for Africa‘s demographically and 
geographically dispersed population is in line, the reality of immature extant domestic 
innovation capacity can constrain citizens from benefiting from quality healthcare 
provision. Nonetheless, Sen Capability approach might be applicable for addressing the 
challenge of deskilling that might arise from an intensive e-health utilisation.  
Most African countries are still far from acquiring or developing measurable and 
tangible NIS indicators such as national economic size, hi-tech R&D institutes and 
manufacturing companies to become entrepreneurial or developmental states. 
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Capabilities on the other hand, are intangible and difficult to measure and compare 
across cultures and nations, as NIS indicators can be. Intangibility, therefore, might 
make it difficult for African policymakers to invest into domestic technology capacities 
that would create economic growth and citizens‘ wellbeing.  
We contend with Lundvall, 2007, p. 114 and Sismondo, 2010, pp. 200-202 in this 
regard. Though, Sen might be useful for understanding as (Howitt, 2005; van Zon & 
Muysken, 2007) have articulated, that the domestic provision of quality and effective 
healthcare to a nation‘s citizens can remarkably improve their individual innovation 
learning. Nevertheless, it must be understood that the observed improvements in 
individual learning capabilities, were identified in technology frontier countries whose 
NIS indicators are global pace-setters. 
Fittingly and perhaps, belatedly, the United Nations Development Programme, hitherto 
Senian in orientation, has finally woken up to Schumpeterian innovation. The Human 
Development Index 2013 titled The Rise of the South: Human progress in a diverse 
world highlighted the rapid and remarkable technoeconomic transformations of 
BRICS
21
 countries.  
7.7 Geopolitics and e-health innovation 
African countries can learn by acquiring technology capacity and appreciating that 
fostering domestic innovation is not a linear passive learning process, but that it requires 
navigating and negotiating barriers put up by complex and hierarchical global 
technology systems. Not least, the influences of global technoeconomic and geopolitical 
events (Chapter 3); global geopolitical contentions (Chapters 4); and regionalism and 
fragmented continental governance (Chapter 5) were demonstrated in the conduct of 
IeTTs.  
We demonstrated and examined in the narratives of the conduct of IeTTs (Figure 7.1), 
manifestations of institutional structures in complex and uncertain horizontal and 
vertical interactions. The manifested mechanisms of global geopolitics, continental 
fragmentation and national reticence can either symmetrically constrain or condition 
national learning. For instance, with AB in Chapter 3, we demonstrated these 
                                               
21 BRICS include Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa that are collectively increasingly account 
for a considerable chunk of global GDP outputs and trade volumes.  
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constraints in a technological path-dependency narrative. In contrast with South Africa 
(BC in Chapter 6), we demonstrated how the mechanisms can condition incremental 
acquisition when National Agency is exercised.  
NIS theory explains how the subnational, national, continental and global, are 
temporally, institutionally and geographically networked in the conduct of ITTs 
(Freeman, 1995 & 2002). Such structural link between the subnational and national are 
foundational creating domestic innovation, and are built on tight coupling between 
national and continental institutions essential for fostering mutually beneficial 
transnational cooperation.   
National-continental tight coupling is essential for domestic technology acquisition. 
However, geopolitical contention and competition amongst countries in a global 
innovation system can condition dynamics of acquisition (Contractor & Sagafi-Nejad, 
1981; Fritsch, 2011, p. 35-36; Lambright, 1994; Levy, 1975; Peter, 2006 & Sharif, 
2006, p. 760-761). For example, we demonstrated such in Chapters 3 and 4 in the 
conduct of Satcom IeTTs. In addition in Chapter 5, we demonstrated how fragmentation 
caused by national unilateralism and regionalism constrained the conduct of IeTTs at 
the continental level. In Africa, national-continental loose coupling to an extent caused 
by global and regional geopolitics is observed.  
Compare this with what is observable in other continents are regarding geographical e-
health innovation. The Asian tiger economies converging investments into 
semiconductor-based and consumer electronic industries, created an institutional 
foundation for engineering their national e-health infrastructures (Holliday & Tam, 
2004). Likewise, in Europe, a historical and contemporary accumulation in these 
industries (Freeman, 1995; Lang, Schneider & Bauer, 2012; Pavitt, 1998; Perez & 
Soete, 1998) has become a platform for transnational cooperation on a continental e-
health infrastructure (Karopka, Frank & Blank, 2012; Lang & Mertes, 2011). Moreover, 
a geopolitical cooperation between the Europe and US on e-health (Friedman, et al., 
2009), can also be explained by their sophisticated convergence in these industries.  
Despite optimism for collective innovations in biomedical and telecommunication by 
technology pan-Africanist (Bowman, et al., 2009; Chataway, et al., 2009; Habib-Sy, 
1992; Howell, 1988; Juma, 2006, 2010; Lall & Pietrobelli, 2005; Muchie, 2004; Ya'u, 
2005), rather than a national-continental tight coupling, our findings revealed that of 
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loose coupling. For example, national unilateralism, fragmented regionalism, global 
geopolitics and technoeconomic events, constrained the implementation of pan-Africa 
e-health initiatives (Chapters 3 & 4). We identified a fragmentation of continental 
multilateralism due to preference of international actors for bilateral cooperation with 
individual African countries. Therefore, what pan-African innovation optimist omits, is 
that, as (Freeman, 1995, 2002; James, 2002; Achim Lang, et al., 2012; Macher, et al., 
2007; Pavitt, 1998; Perez & Soete, 1988; Sachs, 2003) have noted with the Asian, 
European and North American countries, a tightly coupled national-continental 
innovation system underpinned their rapid industrialisation in computing and 
telecommunication innovations. The emphasis is that a strong transnational continental 
cooperation is essential for acquisition from a competitive and contested global 
innovation system.  
7.7.1 Global e-health innovation system 
We demonstrated in the case of AB in Chapter 3 and 4 how global technoeconomic 
(credit crunch) and geopolitical (Cold War rivalries) events, conditioned its exercise of 
National Agency. Such events that stifled a smooth transfer of Satcom e-health 
technologies to African countries in the past decades are observed in the current 
conduct of IeTTs (demonstrated in the implementation of pan-Africa e-health initiatives 
(Chapters 4 & 5)). Similar events are shaping the emergence of a global e-health 
innovation system.  
Emerging global trends inform us that combinatorial e-health innovations driven by a 
convergence of mobile, genomics and biomedical technologies are creating a boom of 
inventions and enterprises. Multinationals and global East state operated enterprises 
(SEOs) from pharmaceutical, telecommunication and biomedical industries are 
prominent in these interesting creative destructionism. Most are either acquiring or 
spinning out e-health-oriented and innovative companies and start-ups. These 
organisations are involved in the conduct of reverse innovation (Kaplinsky, 2001, p. 
201). In this conduct, developing countries are employed as ‗outsourced R&D labs‘ for 
inventing frugal e-health technologies, for example, in the case of AB (Chapter 3) and 
CE (Chapter 6). Oftentimes, in the conduct of global health and ICT4D, reverse 
innovation are financed by well meaning foundations, nations, IGOs and iNGOs.   
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A case in point is the emerging combinatorial m-health and medical diagnostic 
technologies (Briggs, et al., 2012), now a focus of global health innovations, as it was 
with past cosmopolitan biomedical ones (Free, 2004; Malkin, 2007). These have 
become a vehicle for conducting reverse innovations in recipient African countries 
(Chapter 4). Going by the immature but improving states of most African countries‘ 
domestic biomedical innovation capacity (Chataway, et al., 2009; Frew, et al., 2006; 
Juma, 2010) and that in the past national acquisition had not sufficed (Quaye, 1996), we 
are not too sanguineous about this prospect. Not least because the complex political 
economy of such global innovation system (Chataway, et al., 2010; Donald, 1999; 
Ngoasong, 2010), or that Schumacher model is now anachronistic (Free, 2004); 
nevertheless.  
In the face of such global conduct, as we demonstrated in the conduct of IeTTs (Section 
6.5), and in the absence of a coordinated continental governance mechanism, a 
Schumacher approach will not result in a desired accumulation of e-health technologies 
in recipient African countries. That African countries should be consumerist recipients 
of cosmopolitan ITTs is a preferred policy option by (Schumacher, 1978 & Kaplinsky, 
2011, p. 202). Loose national-continental coupling has created a situation in which 
African countries are peripheral contributors to the emerging global e-health innovation 
system. Their possessions of immature NISs would negate equal participation in any 
symmetrical global e-health innovations interactions.  
Notwithstanding, reverse innovation can contribute to the acquisition of national e-
health capacity in a proactive recipient country. In Chapter 6, we demonstrated how a 
bilateral cooperation between South Africa and a global East country resulted in e-
health technology accumulation and knowledge assimilation. Moreover, if 
multinationals and SEOs can wilfully transfer tacit knowledge, national acquisition can 
occur when domestic cognitive, regulative and normative innovation institutions are 
matured and receptive. For example, as (Corea, 2000; F.W. Geels, 2004)  have 
articulated.  
We identified in Chapter 6 that due to ‗Technology neoliberalism‘, multinationals are 
not transferring affordable e-health technologies to African countries as SEOs are 
doing. If that continues to be the case in this emerging context, there is a need to 
highlight that the technologies owned by multinationals, were developed on the back of 
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public finances of their host countries. The invention of the Smartphone is an example. 
In Chapter 2, we highlighted the exercise of National Agency in how frontier countries 
such as South Korea and USA, through state entrepreneurship steered the creation of 
Samsung and Apple respectively. Another example is the invention of CT-Scan by the 
US‘s National Institute of Health.  
Therefore, global diplomacy can be instrumentally employed by IGOs and foundations 
to encourage multinationals to transfer affordable e-health technologies. Such approach 
is to a certain degree of success, currently being used in global health to support 
affordable transfers of medicines to developing countries (Chataway, et al., 2010; 
Howitt, et al., 2012).  
An increasingly rise of multinationals‘ and SEOs‘ commercial interests in maturing 
developing countries‘ markets is an evident sign of economically converging 
globalisation (Kaplinsky, 201-202). Accordingly, we observe that global rapid e-health 
technoeconomic changes (Perez, 2010) framing, underpinned by incremental, radical 
and combination innovations and convergence of life science and consumer electronic 
industries is emerging. We speculate that these emerging global changes will with a 
Schumpeterian creation destruction engine, create new inventions and industries in the 
mould that (Freeman, 2000, pp. 157-158) predicted that ICTs would, at the dawn   of 
this century.   
7.7.2 National e-health innovation system 
Aspiring countries can acquire capacity by embracing and practising the principles of a 
National Innovation System (NIS); which, informs that domestic industrial capacity and 
local entrepreneurs drives socioeconomic progress (Section 2.3). The acquisition of e-
health technology competence is learning the capacity and possibility of making 
necessary technical and institutional changes nationally and globally. Possessing 
domestic industrial and technoscientific competences are needed and essential for 
coping with, and adapting to, global technoeconomic changes. Learning is for a 
recipient country is as becoming entrepreneurial or developmental – it is about a 
recipient country exercising its National Agency.  
Therefore, we argue that agency in the conduct of IeTT needn‘t be restricted to 
cosmopolitanism, which assumes a neoliberal view that countries interacting in 
globalisation have similar capacities to accumulate technologies in a cyclical interaction 
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(Fritsch, 2011, pp. 37). Neoliberalism views technology transfer in an ANT sense, as a 
cyclical interactive process, in which, nations interacting in globalisation possess equal 
or similar domestic innovation capacities.  
By not treating agential asymmetry in techno-globalism, it has resulted that the 
essentiality of possessing extant domestic innovation capacity in recipient countries are 
taken for granted.  In addition, the influences and effects of the institutional structures 
listed in Figure 7.1 on state entrepreneurship are foreign to mainstream ITT literature 
(Section 2.2) and in the conduct of IeTTs (Chapter 1).  
We, rather, demonstrated in the narratives that African countries will automatically 
acquire competence or assimilate knowledge from symmetrically complex IeTT 
interactions. Thus, by employing the cumulative advantage hypothesis, we argued that 
African countries can learn from global technology leaders, identified as ‗global e-
health leaders or frontiers‘ in Chapter 2. Being technology laggards and consumers of 
transferred e-health technologies, most African countries can consciously imitate these 
leaders. Implying that learning from these frontier countries, informs that their 
evolutionary national e-health initiative implementation, is an engineering process. 
This, to a large extent, is being powered by a Schumpeterian industrial engine and 
domestic techno-sciences. South Korea exemplifies this model. It has instituted a 
national e-health policy that promotes both domestic innovations and international 
collaborations, through the support of its private and public sector entrepreneurship 
(Briggs, et al., 2001; Holliday & Tam, 2004; Lee, et al., 2009).  
Individual entrepreneurship is also essential to domestic accumulation. With South 
Africa in Chapter 6, we demonstrated how local e-health entrepreneurs have created 
start-ups, and technology commercialisation funded by domestic public and private 
investors. Such was not demonstrated in AB in Chapter 3. The intrepidity of these 
individuals is the spark that ignites the Schumpeterian engine of combinatorial 
innovations. The creativity of these domestic actors stands a stronger chance of 
domestically retaining expertise and economic values; for example, as it is the 
established e-health innovation practice in the US and Norway (Halford, et al., 2009; 
Johannessen, et al., 2012; Johnston, et al., 2000; Spivack, 2005), than those of 
cosmopolitans‘.  
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In short, national entrepreneurship is driven by creative and intrepid individuals. 
Notwithstanding though, strong and competent normative and regulative institutions 
must be in place to harness, nurture and transform entrepreneurs‘ energy and skills.  
7.8 Symmetry – A framework for global collaboration  
We propose and present a multi-level framework, inspired by the STS concept of 
symmetry as we articulated in Chapter 2. This is to guide all involved institutional 
stakeholders in navigating and negotiating complex political, power and contested 
interactions in the conduct of IeTTs in Africa. The structural conditions we have 
identified in the thesis are collectively employed to develop a framework, (though in the 
narratives, they were shown to be constraints on the acquisition of national e-health 
technology capacity from technology transfers). The framework will inform an 
understanding of how e-health technologies can be sustainably acquired in African 
countries. The intention is to shift the locus of agency of e-health technology 
development from the cosmopolitan to the national. 
We reverse the focus of the institutional factors, and propose that the framework can be 
employed for informing policy at global, continental and national levels, as to how e-
health technologies can be successfully acquired from IeTTs in African countries.  
Figure 7.2 shows how both the vertical and horizontal dynamics will be aligned. It 
demonstrates how the institutional structures we have identified (Figure 7.1) inter-relate 
and how they can be aligned for ensuring that African countries can acquire e-health 
technologies from IeTTs. We propose that an alignment depends on a transformative 
reversal of the identities and forms of all involved actors and organisations.   
GLOBAL LEVEL 
CONTINENTAL LEVEL 
NATIONAL LEVEL 
SUB-NATIONAL LEVEL 
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Figure 7.2 Complex dual interactions in the conduct of IeTTs in 
Africa 
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7.8.1 Vertical and horizontal dynamics 
In the framework, we identified two dynamics of technology transfer in the complex 
interactions that occur among the involved diverse actors and organisation. The utility 
of the framework is illustrated with conjectures we preferably select from the narratives.  
This is to indicate and point out how the constitutive actors‘ and organisations‘ 
identities and forms can be aligned to serve the technological needs of recipient African 
countries. That is their exercise of National Agency. We show that Symmetry is needed 
amongst the diverse actors and organisations involved in the conduct of IeTTs in Africa.  
The first dynamic is vertical and hierarchical in nature and is shown on the left side. It 
mirrors the Schumpeterian interaction that occurs in the conduct of international 
technology transfers. The interaction mirrors the competitive and power driven 
relationships that characterise technology transfer in globalisation (Fritsch, 2011, 
Sismondo, 2010, pp. 198-200 & Muchie, 2008). In the relationship, technology flows 
vertically from global, continental, national, and down to subnational levels. The locus 
of agency is national; because, following the Schumpeterian model, National 
governments competitively put in place regulative and normative institutions that foster 
and forge domestic techno-science.  
The second dynamic is horizontal and diffuse in nature and is shown on the right side. It 
mirrors Schumacher‘s model of technology transfer that encourages and promotes 
cosmopolitanism. The interaction reflects the complexity of the interconnectedness of 
institutional identities and forms. In the relationship, a technology is transferred from 
the global level directly to the subnational level. The locus of agency is cosmopolitan. 
The horizontal and diffuse dynamics capture the manifested institutional identities and 
forms in the conduct of IeTTs. It presents complexity by capturing each level from the 
vertical dynamic, as occurring in fuzzy circles situated within a bigger fuzzy circle. The 
bigger circle captures politics, power, history, contestations and interests that mediate in 
the interactions of the constituent actors and organisations.  
In the framework, we take the view that the flow of technology is easier to manage in 
the first dynamic than the second, because fewer actors are involved.  
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Table 7.2 conjectures and reversal of roles and identities 
Conjectures  Actors and 
organisations 
Reversal of 
identities and 
forms 
Global identities implicit in the 
organisational form of global East-West 
geopolitical contentions can either 
constrain or enable acquisition of 
technologies from IeTTs (Chapter 6).  
IGOs, IDOs, i-NGOs, 
multinationals, 
philanthropists  
Ethical 
technology 
producer and 
donors at global 
level. 
Continental identities implicit in the 
organisational form of poor coordination 
of inter-departmental responsibilities 
contributed to hindering the hitch-free 
transfers to recipient African countries 
(Chapter 5).   
Multilateralism that binds countries 
together at the continental level can be 
employed to their advantage. However, 
as we demonstrated in the conduct of 
IeTTs, regionalism can result in the 
fragmentation of multilateralism and 
make countries take divisive unilateral 
decisions (Chapter 4).  
Policymakers, 
bureaucrats, 
consultants. 
Assured 
facilitator and 
moderator at 
continental level. 
Bilateral relationship between a recipient 
country and a global East or West 
country can translate into successful 
acquisition, if it works well for both. A 
country, such as BC, managed to co-
develop a telemedicine device with a 
foreign country (Chapter 6).  
In contrast, a country, such as AB, was 
not able to accumulate technologies from 
IeTTs because of global geopolitical and 
technoeconomic events (Chapter 3).  
National governments, 
ministries, 
policymakers, private 
sector, public sector, 
entrepreneurs, research 
centres and universities. 
Able and 
competent 
accumulator and 
assimilator at 
national level.  
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Low volume of utilisation of transferred 
technologies at the subnational level can 
either enable or constrain the 
development of appropriate e-health 
technologies. It can enable, if an 
incremental assimilation of competence 
from IeTTs occurs over time (Chapter 3 
& 6).  
Appropriate technologies can be made 
available for users at hospitals and 
clinics at the subnational level, if they 
utilise the technologies and generate 
clinical and technical data needed to 
improve them (Chapter 6).  
Health workers, 
hospitals, clinics, health 
centres.  
Receptive users 
and data 
generator at 
subnational level.  
 
7.8.2 Alignment 
In the framework, we present a reversal of identities and forms, based on the 
conjectures we have preferentially selected from the narratives in Table 7.2 on each 
level of the vertical dynamics. This reversal can make actors and organisations 
collaborate in ensuring that the conduct of IeTTs can translate into the accumulation 
and subnational utilisation in African countries. We show that an alignment between the 
vertical and horizontal axes can be attained, if there were Symmetry amongst the 
constitutive multiple actors and organisations on the horizontal axis.  
In the framework, the alignment depends on the dynamics of how the horizontal 
interactions in each small fuzzy circle, replicate themselves in the corresponding levels 
on the vertical axis. We select conjectures from the narratives – the forms, arrangements 
and identities that manifest in the interactions among actors and organisations within 
and across each level in the vertical dynamics. The conjectures are derived from the 
horizontal interactions, and are employed to show how the framework will work. We 
envisage reversal of roles for actors and organisations on each level of the vertical 
dynamics. For example, a reversal of national identities and forms implies that the right 
action is taken at the national level during the conduct of IeTTs. 
An alignment between the two inter-locking vertical and horizontal dynamics can occur 
when Symmetry is attained with diverse identities and forms in the latter. A scenario we 
envisage is that the politics, power, contestations and self-interests that characterise 
horizontal interactions can converge to ensure that e-health technologies flow 
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seamlessly from the global level to the subnational level. If an alignment can be attained 
between the two axes, then e-health technologies might be sustainably acquired in 
African countries. This is an optimistic scenario and can only become a reality if the 
actors and organisations at each level collaborate with each other.  
In the scenario, national actors can become able and competent accumulators of e-
health technologies and assimilators of competence in the tradition of a national 
innovation system. Recipient countries can achieve this, by financing and equipping 
their healthcare systems, by fostering domestic innovation and industry, and by 
facilitating entrepreneurship in their domestic private sectors. Subnational actors can 
become receptive users by utilising transferred e-health technologies, and by generating 
utilisation data that can be employed for making or re-inventing appropriate e-health 
technologies.  
Global actors can become ethical producers and donors of appropriate e-health 
technologies by understanding the domestic needs and being more open to transfer the 
technical knowledge needed for maintenance and repairs. Continental actors can 
become more assured in facilitating e-health technologies transfers and in the process 
act to moderate relationships between recipient countries and global actors.  
Collaboration is needed amongst the constitutive actors and organisations involved in 
the conduct of IeTTs in Africa that we are advocating with the framework. We are 
taking the view that such collaboration will galvanise the exercise of National Agency 
to foster domestic invention and manufacturing of e-health technologies. African 
countries might start emulating the industrial model for their national e-health 
implementations.  
The primary purpose for the framework is to advocate collaboration among all the 
involved actors and organisations, and to identify their roles and responsibilities in the 
conduct of IeTTs. We propose that the reversal of identities and forms at each level in 
the vertical dynamics, will serve well the involved actors‘ interests and intentions in the 
process of e-health technology transfers.  
In addition, policymakers, programme managers and potential donors from national and 
global levels need to identify and understand the potential risk and reward factors to be 
considered when conducting an e-health technology transfer in Africa. The institutional 
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factors that we have identified can be employed for the purpose of minimising risks and 
maximizing benefits from transferred e-health technologies.  
7.9 Contribution to knowledge 
We now highlight our contributions to academia and policy.  
7.9.1 Academia 
Our study is unique by taking an innovative combination of moderate and middle-range 
STS constructivism (Frank W Geels, 2007; Wyatt & Balmer, 2007), Deleuzian 
poststructuralist narrative (Gale, 2010; Sikes & Gale, 2006) and NIS institutionalism 
(Nelson & Nelson, 2002; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006) from the perspectives of global 
development and technoglobalism. By pragmatically and creatively explore 
convergence amongst these theories and methods to analyse the multiplicities and 
connections in messy plural qualitative and textual data. We demonstrated and 
examined how e-health technologies diffuse along global, continental, national and 
subnational multi-levels in Africa. The extent of the investigation we have undertaken 
to influence policy at global and national levels is unique when compared with similar 
work on international technology transfers in the context of globalisation from the 
information system (IS) and science on ICT4D policy, technology and innovation (STI) 
disciplines on Global Health policy.  
Those writing from the STI discipline such as (Chataway, et al., 2009; Chataway, et al., 
2010; Donald, 1999; Free, 2004; Howitt, et al., 2012; Malkin, 2007; Ngoasong, 2010) 
on the transfer of biomedical technologies in Global Health policy as well those we 
identified on ICT4D policy (including m-health ones)  attribute agency to the 
cosmopolitan rather than to the national.  
We contend that the Schumacher model of technology development and utilisation 
inspired by Sen Capability approach will not create long-term domestic innovation 
capacity acquisition. Global ICT4D and Global Health policies have neglected geo- 
political and -economic considerations of technoglobalism. Issues of reverse innovation, 
international trade and transfer of tacit knowledge that condition Schumpeterian 
national learning were treated with levity. Something the post-2015 Millennium 
Development Goals policy-setting agenda can take on board.  
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These bodies of work lack the depth and breadth of the diverse and conflicting factors 
we have identified at multi global, continental, national and subnational levels. They 
have narrowly focussed on investigating information or data exchange, so would not 
capture the complex and contested nature of e-health technology transfers in the age of 
globalisation. For example, none of the authors noted that global geopolitical contention 
and industrial ideological differences can influence the sustainable diffusion of e-health 
technologies in African countries. We have broadened the debate by capturing the 
extent and nature of the complexity and the interconnectedness of the involved 
technologies, actors and organisations. In general, these bodies of work lack the depth 
and breadth of the diverse and conflicting factors we have identified at multi global, 
continental, national and subnational levels.   
A key finding is geopolitics that runs through the narratives in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. The 
identification of a geopolitical contention between the global West and East in the 
conduct of IeTTs in Africa is presented as a novel finding from the perspective of health 
informatics literature. This was observed in historical global geopolitical events and 
manifestations of: corporatism; and industrialism and mercantilism of the transfer of 
Satcom and telemedicine devices and software. In contemporaneous transfers of similar 
technologies, manifestations of industrialism and mercantilism and technology 
liberalism were identified. We have yet to identify any study that explicitly associates 
geopolitical actions and events and technoeconomic events with e-health in this 
literature. Notably, we have yet to identify any study that highlights regionalism and 
fragmented continental governance in either the conduct of IeTTs or ITTs in general.  
We took an innovation-based approach to study the development and utilisation of e-
health technologies as opposed to the information society driven managerial and action-
orientation in the emerging literature on national e-health implementation in Chapter 2. 
The ICT4D literature such as (Gilhooly, 2005; Heeks, 2008; Mbarika, et al., 2005; 
Pfister, 1999; M. Thompson, 2004; M Thompson & Walsham, 2010; Ya'u, 2005) and 
those with a health informatics/e-health leaning such as (Bowman, et al., 2009; J Braa, 
et al., 2007; J. Braa, et al., 2004; Heeks, 2006; Kifle, et al., 2008; Kirigia, et al., 2005; 
Meso, et al., 2009; Nchise, et al., 2012; Ouma & Herselman, 2009; Ruxwana, et al., 
2010) and on the conduct of virtual IeTTs have followed suit. With an exception, 
(Avgerou, 2003; S. Cho & Mathiassen, 2007; Corea, 2000; W. L. Currie & Finnegan, 
2011) took a sectoral innovation-based approach in their studies in the frame of (Hwang 
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& Christensen, 2008) . Instead, we studied e-health as an innovation at transnational and 
national levels as informed by NIS theory and in the process engaged with all 
Schumpeterian market, product, organisational, input and organisational innovation 
types (Windrum & García-Goñi, 2008), which were not collectively treated in the health 
informatics literature. The information-based studies have narrowly focussed on 
relevant micro-level institutional constraints of power, politics and individual agency; 
but, as we have done on National Agency from macro-society.    
Our research is unique in the context of health informatics research. We associate 
successful national e-health implementation in Africa with national economic strength 
and the possession of domestic innovation capacity. Though (Bowman, et al., 2009; 
Gulube & Wynchank, 2002; Kachienga, 2008; Kifle, et al., 2008; Kirigia, et al., 2005; 
Meso, et al., 2009; Nchise, et al., 2012; Ouma & Herselman, 2009; Ruxwana, et al., 
2010) pointed out that certain cultural, infrastructural and organisational factors that 
might constrain scalability in African countries. We, on the other hand, have pointed out 
that the material possession of national e-health technology and financial capacities can 
determine a successful national e-health implementation in African countries. The 
World Health Organisation (World Health Organisation, 2007, 2011) has employed 
quantitative data on national income levels to rank how countries of the world compare 
with each other on e-health implementation. A recently released report from the WHO 
that encourages countries to formulate and implement National e-health strategy (World 
Health Organisation, 2012) did not consider the imperative of domestic innovation 
capacity. Neither, were similar policy reports (World Health Organisation, 2010a, 
2010b) from WHO Africa Regional Office.  
We expand this by using narratives to richly and explicitly demonstrate how important 
national economic size and national innovation domestic capacities are. The two 
national factors, were also taken for granted in the health informatics literature we 
presented on national e-health implementation. For example, Holliday & Tam, 2004 
(from health informatics literature on Asian countries) and Castro, 2009 (on global 
West countries from the perspective of innovation policy), did not explicitly identify 
these two structural factors in their analyses. Moreover, while we have focussed on the 
national level from a Schumpeterian NIS perspective, Holliday & Tam, 2004, had a 
sectoral approach, focusing on identifying factors that limit the diffusion of e-health 
technologies in Asian countries‘ health systems.  
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Our combination of theories and methods is in line with and build on  the notions of 
pragmatism and pluralism in health informatics discipline (Scott & Briggs, 2009), as we 
took a macro-societal/institutional perspective. Rather than the typical micro-individual 
and organisational focussed studies, that are based on either implicit or explicit actor-
network theory (ANT) or social construction of technology (SCOT) cyclical view of 
sociotechnical interactions, for example (Aanestad & Jensen, 2011; Chiasson, et al., 
2006; Sunyoung Cho, et al., 2008; W. Currie, 2009; Ellingsen & Monteiro, 2012; T 
Greenhalgh & Stones, 2010; Nicolini, 2010). We gave Symmetry to diverse and 
disparate institutions. The combination operated through Deleuzian poststructuralist 
narrative method (Gale, 2010; Sikes & Gale, 2006), enabled us to reveal hidden, and 
make connections with, politics, agential asymmetry, power, diversities, multiplicities 
and contestations. With this, we had in narrative Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 demonstrated a 
complex and rhizomatic nature of the conduct of IeTTs.  
Instead of a narrow focus on individual agency implied in ANT and SCOT theories, our 
employment of NIS institutionalism foregrounded the collective in exercising National 
Agency.  We gave not evenness to humans and technologies in a complex socio-
technical interactions; but, in as in the collaboration model, the equality of global, 
continental, national and subnational institutions.  
On these findings, we make contribution to the wider ITT literature such as (Christol, 
1974; Colino, 1968; Contractor & Sagafi-Nejad, 1981; Cowhey, 1990; Demerliac & 
Metzger, 1984; Goldsby & Boyd, 2001; Habib-Sy, 1992; Häusler & Simonis, 1985; 
Holmes, 1995; Howell, 1988; Lambright, 1994; Levy, 1975; Peter, 2006; Reddy & 
Zhao, 1990) and virtual IeTTs (Asamoah-Odei, et al., 2007; Blum, 2002; Cartwright, 
2000; Crump, 2006; Edworthy, 2001; Geissbuhler, et al., 2007; Geissbuhler, et al., 
2003; Gerber, et al., 2010; International Space University, 1994; International 
Telecommunication Union, 2007; Jongman, et al., 2005; Lacroix, et al., 2002; Mandil, 
1998; Nakashima, et al., 2004; Rigby, et al., 2000; Sinha, 2000). These take a neoliberal 
view that all countries will easily acquire national innovation capacity without an 
exercise of entrepreneurial agency and assumes linear vertical interactions. We contend 
that a constructivist or poststructuralist view that treats inherent complexities, 
uncertainties, multiplicities and horizontal interactions of ITTs. The constraints of 
national reticence, continental fragmentation, and global geopolitics as we identified in 
the narratives, are not usually recognised.  
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7.9.2 Policy 
We contend that without the possession of a mature domestic innovation capacity that 
any country will seriously struggle to engineer a large-scale national e-health 
infrastructure, as others outside the continent are doing at the moment. As such, we 
contribute to the on-going policy debate an insight that, implementing a national e-
health initiative, is a long-term national technoeconomic and sociotechnical engineering 
endeavour. 
 Engineering in the sense that in the African countries that we have studied, the lack of 
or immaturity of national e-health techno-science constrained their exercise of agency 
in addressing the challenges of technology inappropriateness and obsolescence. This is 
not to preclude that African countries should continue as recipients of cosmopolitan-
driven small-scale e-health experimentations. But such will only un-developmentally 
restrict them from moving towards an evolutionary large-scale e-health national 
implementation (Aanestad & Jensen, 2011; Ellingsen & Monteiro, 2012). Small-scale 
implementations at subnational hospitals and clinics can sustain, if well financed and 
regularly technologically upgraded by its sponsors; but might not scale spatially and 
functionally in a Schumpeterian sense. If the utilised technologies and expertise for 
regular maintenance and repairs were perpetually imported, then whether small-scale 
implementations will sustain and scale will depend on if consumerist countries must 
forever dependent on producers.  
A possession of a domestic hi-tech industrial capacity is instrumental in supplying 
timely combinatorial technologies to meet the fastidious demand of health service 
sector for innovations; we argue. We therefore contend that the implementation of a 
national e-health initiative is akin to building a large-scale technology infrastructure. 
The technology development models shared by Schumpeter and Schumacher are both 
useful for understanding how domestic e-health technology capacity can be acquired 
from IeTTs in Africa. In Chapter 6, we demonstrated how South Africa proto-industrial 
model is setting it apart from its neighbours. Therefore, engineering skills for lagging 
African countries can be acquired not only by learning by interacting, but also through 
learning by doing. The former emphasises knowledge assimilation, while skills and 
craftsmanship development required for electrical, mechanical and civil engineering in 
the latter.  
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Schumacher model is not designed for accumulating technologies and for assimilation 
of tacit knowledge required for a large-scale engineering; however, we contend. This is 
because, Schumpeterian creative destruction engine explains how diverse e-health 
technologies combine and accumulate in the process of an evolutionary national e-
health implementation. Schumacher can explain how small-scale implementations 
sustain; however. How incremental small technology adaptations made in solving the 
challenges of inappropriateness can accumulate in the long-run. However, a communal 
approach to solving such inevitable problems of subnational utilisation suggested by 
(De Laet & Mol, 2000, pp. 245-246) will not suffice for combinatorial e-health 
innovations.  
Ongoing policy debate on the performance and efficiency of national e-health 
implementations, is going to be a long-drawn battle; because of inherent complexity and 
uncertainty of the contentious marriage between technology and healthcare (Lehoux & 
Blume, 2000; May, 2006). We offer that instead of these never-ending debates, state 
investments into national e-health initiatives should be seen as a domestic innovation 
growth strategy. Such investments can create technologies which can be employed by 
businesses and sectors such as education and agriculture. The public should not baulk at 
the scale of financial investments being made, but as we demonstrated with BC in 
Chapter 6, public finances would in the long-run create societal economic and welfare 
values.  
Policy reviews of the implementation of NPFiT in England such as (Currie & Finnegan, 
2011 and Greenhalgh, et al. 2011) omitted to appreciate the successful world class 
engineering of BT built N3 – a dedicated and secured broadband telecom infrastructure. 
Undeniably, this national endeavour has suffered numerous setbacks. Perhaps, a more 
affirmative exercise of National Agency might have sufficed. For instance, policy could 
have supported an incremental development of the national EHR software by nimble 
and flexible domestic companies. 
Ironically, in Entrepreneurial State, Mariana Mazzucato omitted National government‘s 
intervention in UK‗s e-health industry, as a strategic area for domestic investment and 
innovation. In this light and with the benefit of hindsight, we see the outsourcing of the 
development and the procurement from foreign multinationals the EHR software 
implemented in the defunct NPFiT, as a poor policy choice. An alternative option was 
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to rather steer and finance domestic companies to innovate, in the mould of the USA‘s 
HITECH (Buntin, et al., 2010; Kellermann & Jones, 2013) and established practise in 
South Korea (Briggs, et al., 2001; Holliday & Tam, 2004; Lee, et al., 2009). 
Based on how global e-health leaders such as England, Germany, USA, and South 
Korea have acquired their domestic e-health industrial capacities, African countries 
must learn to emulate their Schumpeterian industrial model. By exercising their 
national agencies, these countries host world class technology multinationals and 
operate functional national e-health technoscientific normative and regulative 
institutions. These institutions have been incrementally built on the possession of world 
class competences in semiconductor and lifesciences industries. Whilst, Wendy Currie 
elevated individual agency termed institutional entrepreneurship in national e-health 
implementation (Currie, 2009, p. 74), we rather contend. An exercise of National 
Agency is broader than those of individuals such as doctors, nurses, managers or even 
ministry/department of health policy makers. These institutional actors are essential, but 
only from a narrow sectoral health service innovation perspective. Not in the sociology 
and economics of NIS institutions in the frame of the collectives (Corea, 2000; F.W. 
Geels, 2004; Frank W Geels, 2007; Nelson & Nelson, 2002; Oyelaran-Oyeyinka, 2006).  
The entrepreneurial behaviours and developmental ambitions of nations in building and 
developing innovation institutions, equip them in engineering large-scale technology 
infrastructures. This finding is similar to a suggestion provided by (De Laet & Mol, 
2000, p. 247) that domestic manufacturing is essential for ensuring dynamic technology 
upgrades in an African country. Though, how this can be achieved as we have 
articulated in the case of BC in Chapter 6 was not provided.  
Therefore, we propose an institutional engineering of large-scale e-health infrastructure. 
This is a long-term evolutionary engineering of complexity and uncertainty. That is a 
combination of sociotechnical and technoeconomic aggregation and configuration of 
constitutive diverse and disparate actors, institutions and technologies. Mechanical and 
electronics engineering is for making combinatorial e-health innovations and civil 
engineering for building the e-health infrastructure. Building a national e-health 
infrastructure and fostering requisite interoperability of diverse and diffuse hardware, 
software and architecture, requires an incremental accumulation of material engineering 
skills and craftsmanship.  
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Being a passive recipient of e-health hardware alone, without a possession of a domestic 
industrial capacity, might not be enough for e-health software engineering. A 
telecommunication infrastructure for example, can be built by a donor or a foreign 
technology company, as physical technologies can be mechanically assembled within a 
specific period of time. However, it is a different matter when it comes to building a 
virtual e-health software one. The fastidious technological needs of health service sector 
require inevitable long-term incremental fixes and upgrading are attended to by flexible 
and nimble domestic companies.  
We highlight the transfers of, and the need to regulate, material e-health technologies in 
the conduct of IeTTs in Africa. Existing research work has narrowly focussed on the 
transnational transfer of virtual e-health services. We pointed out in (Section 6.3), that a 
limited exercise of National Agency in the global regulation of e-health (m-health) 
technologies, contributes to the inappropriateness of transferred e-health technologies in 
Africa. Authors, such as Blum, 2002 and Mandil, 1998, that have given a passing 
mention to it, did not examine the conduct of IeTTs in Africa. In addition, none of the 
work we identified addresses the question of how recipient countries can acquire 
domestic e-health technology capacity from IeTTs. They did not also explicitly indicate 
that biomedical technologies such as connected biomedical devices (i.e. glucometer or 
X-ray machines) utilised for remote diagnoses and therapeutics are to be regulated 
alongside telecommunication and computing ones. However, we contend with Blum 
that the financial stakes of manufacturers and governments in e-health technologies are 
lower than of pharmaceuticals. These organisations are equally interested in financing 
e-health innovations. The HITECH is an example of a state financing, which is driving 
a triple-helix partnership amongst government, industry and academia in the USA. 
7.9.3 Contributions to practice 
1. Paper presented at UNECA at Science with Africa conference on the need for 
innovation in e-health in Africa published in the proceedings of the conference 
(http://new.uneca.org/Portals/swa2/documents/swa2proceedings.pdf). 
2. We are invited to contribute a presentation on e-health in Africa based on our 
contributions to development of policy on Europe-Africa ICT cooperation 
(http://euroafrica-ict.org/files/2010/03/EuroAfrica-ICT_Manifesto1.pdf).  
3. Delivered presentations on factors that can contribute to successful national e-
health implementation in developing countries at United Nations ESOSOC 
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conference in 2009 
(http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/amr2009ghanaprog.shtml). 
4. Delivered presentations on factors that can contribute to successful national e-
health implementation in Africa and at the Commonwealth Secretariat 
conference on national e-health policy development in Southern and West 
Africa in 2009 
(http://www.thecommonwealth.org/files/220414/FileName/Programme.pdf).  
5. Our definition for m-health, a sub-set of e-health and a recommendation that 
stresses the role of recipient‘s National governments was documented in a 
seminal publication on m-health in developing countries in 2008 
(http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/unpan/unpan037268.pd
f).  
6. We have been contacted and acknowledged for contributing to the global m-
health policy development by mHealth Alliance/United Nations Foundation 
(http://mobileactive.org/files/file_uploads/WHOHealthReviewUpdatedAug2220
08_TEXT.pdf and 
http://www.ghdonline.org/uploads/Barriers__Gaps_to_mHealth_in_LMICs_-
_White_Paper_-_May_2010.pdf) 
7. In 2011, at the invitation of the African Union, we contributed to the first 
convocation of e-health expert meeting, which culminated in the first declaration 
made by African Ministers of Health on e-health in Africa 
(https://sites.google.com/site/auehealth/).  
8. We jointly co-authored an evaluation report on the conduct of the 
Commonwealth Secretariat‘s technical assistance to English speaking 
developing countries on developing their national e-health policies 
(http://www.thecommonwealth.org/files/250663/FileName/EHealthintheCWJun
e2012_e-copy.pdf).  
9. One of our papers on m-health in developing countries is referenced by a World 
Bank publication 
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INFORMATIONANDCOMMUNICATION
ANDTECHNOLOGIES/Resources/mHealth_report_(Apr_2012).pdf).  
10. We were invited to a Chatham House conference to comment on how ICT can 
contribute to health in developing countries in 2008 
(http://www.josemariafigueres.org/documentos/Chatham_House_final_program
me.pdf). 
11. One of our publications was referenced in a policy document compiled for the 
European Commission on e-health development in developing countries, after 
we were contacted in 2008 
(http://zealot.mrnet.pt/govnet/images/articles/9986/assess-eh-dev-countries.pdf). 
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12. We were invited by the Chatham House Global Health programme to a panel 
discussion on the 10
th
 year review of the Macroeconomic Commission for 
Health  in 2011 
(http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Global%20He
alth/0112summary.pdf).  
7.9.4 Recommendations 
We make policy recommendations for global, continental and national institutions.   
Global 
We identify deficiencies in the current global regulation of e-health technologies that 
must be addressed in order to foster the acquisition of national e-health technology 
capacity in Africa. These – can limit or hinder how e-health technologies can be 
effectively utilised for healthcare services in African countries. Therefore, addressing 
these structural constraints can go a distance in addressing challenges of technology 
incompatibilities, inappropriateness and obsolescence. In addition, in order to foster the 
acquisition of national e-health technology capacity in Africa. 
A recommendation for global organisations is to collaborate to set standards for 
regulating the development of appropriate e-health technologies in a constructive and 
globally inclusive manner. International Standard Organisation (ISO), World Trade 
Organisation and the World Health Organisation must collectively address deficiencies 
in the current global regulation of e-health technologies. These deficiencies can limit or 
hinder how e-health technologies can be effectively utilised for healthcare services in 
African countries. Addressing such structural constraints can go a distance in addressing 
challenges of technology incompatibilities, inappropriateness and obsolescence.  
A recommendation offered by both Sachs, 2003 and Juma et al., 2001, that rigid 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) should be relaxed for biomedical technology transfers 
(i.e. transfers of drugs, vaccines) to developing countries, is applicable to the conduct of 
IeTTs. We highlighted in Section 6.5 that the IPRs that come out of co-development of 
e-health technologies between African countries and global actors as reverse 
innovations (Immelt, et al., 2009), require that the former‘s interests must be protected. 
African countries require protection, and deserve to share in any IPRs that come out of 
e-health technologies co-developed in their hospitals and clinics. We demonstrated in 
Chapters 3 and 4 that African countries past technoscientific contributions made to 
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global Satcom innovations, never translated into their domestic technology capacity 
acquisitions.  
Therefore, we recommend that an international regulation regime is also required for e-
health technologies. What is good for the goose is also good for the gander. E-Health 
technologies like medicine or vaccines are also essential for saving lives and for 
empowering health workers in Africa. As such, we highlight the need for regulating the 
transfers of material e-health technologies, which was not explicitly stated in the IeTT 
literature presented in Section 1.7. Another concern for global e-health regulation is 
how to make lagging African countries benefits from these emerging technologies. We 
demonstrated in Chapter 4 that constraints of affordability – and high costs of procuring 
e-health technologies from global markets can hinder African countries from acquiring 
them. Thus, we subscribe to a public health rationale in the scope of existing global 
regulation of medicines put forward by Blum (2002, p. 102) for e-health technologies. 
A responsive global regulation must be instituted in order to enhance affordable access 
to such e-health technologies in African countries, because they are essential for remote 
diagnosis of and treatment of geographically dispersed and rural African populations.   
 Continental 
At the continental level, efforts can be made to address the challenges of affordable e-
health technologies, in a manner suggested by (Blum, 2002), if constraints of 
institutional fragmentation, regionalism and unilateralism are addressed. Whilst (Blum, 
2002), specifically called for the creation of a ‗global development authority‘ for 
financing the production and transfer of e-health technology transfers, we, rather call for 
a continental equivalent in Africa. The African Union together with the NEPAD 
Planning and Coordinating Agency and the United National Economic Council for 
Africa, can emulate the European Union‘s (Karopka, et al., 2012; A. Lang & Mertes, 
2011) in using policy and financial instruments to stimulate domestic e-health 
innovations. Moreover, continental aggregation of demand could create economies of 
scale.  
National 
African countries must learn to navigate the complexity of global innovation systems in 
order to obtain fair access to appropriate e-health technologies, if perennial constraint of 
national reticence is addressed. They must aspire to become entrepreneurial or 
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developmental states by starting to finance and invest into national e-health research 
centres and institutes. Such an exercise of National Agency can go a long way in 
accumulating e-health technologies and assimilating technical competence. They can 
emulate how South Africa (Juma, 2001 & Blum, 2002) successfully strategically and 
tactically negotiated and navigated the global pharmaceutical regime, in order to ensure 
that its citizens had access to affordable and quality and life-saving medicines. A 
‗window of opportunity‘ (Perez & Soete, 1988) is presented to African countries, who 
aspire and desire to acquire, accumulate and assimilate competence in this emerging 
and strategic industry.  
Large-scale implementation of e-health technologies is needed by African countries to 
address the health challenges they are facing, so as to provide quality, accessible and 
effective healthcare to their geographically dispersed populations. As such, we 
encourage African countries that they must invest in fostering and forging domestic 
techno-sciences so as to self-reliantly solve their societal public and clinical health 
challenges.  
7.9.5 Future research  
There are four areas identified for future research work.  
1. The first is related to the framework. The multi-level interrelationship among the 
institutional factors can be modelled using an appropriate quantitative method 
from the field of health informatics. This modelling can be used to weigh and 
assess the impacts, relevance and relativity of different structural constraints and 
the identified institutional manifestations. For example, to model how political, 
economical, organisational, social and technological factors we have identified 
at global, continental, national and subnational levels interrelate to either 
constrain or enable the development and utilisation of e-health technologies. 
How to quantify these qualitative measures can be the focus of the research and 
a potential contribution to knowledge.  
2. The second is to investigate how the conduct of IeTTs in Africa can be studied 
from the perspective of the preferred STS Constructivism by using Social 
Construction of Technology (SCOT). To make material e-health technologies 
the focus of a similar narrative study, to trace and map how e-health 
technologies diffuse trans-nationally in the context of globalisation and how 
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their material properties shape, and translate into, national adoptions.  A form 
this investigation can take is to separate e-health into three technological 
components: -computing, telecommunication and biomedical. The diverse 
factors we have identified can be examined with each technology as a focus and 
explore how domestic innovation capacity in each influence the national 
development and utilisation of e-health technologies.    
3. The third is to employ quantitative measures to model how national e-readiness 
measures, national innovation capacity indicators and the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) national e-health index are combined to compare and 
contrast how African countries will measure up among themselves and with the 
rest of the world on national e-health implementation. The measures of e-
readiness of ICT utilisation and infrastructure sophistication are periodically 
published by the International Telecommunication Union and the World Bank 
for raking and comparing countries from around the world. The global 
comparisons of national innovation capacity in the same vein are published by 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and measures 
indicators of domestic capacities such as economic, research and industrial 
capabilities and outputs. The NEPAD Planning and Commissioning Authority 
publish similar data that are specific to African countries. The WHO 
periodically publishes global comparison of, and ranks its member states on 
their adoption of e-health technologies.  The indicators from the three can be 
modelled to compare and contrast and to identify how African countries are 
measuring up.  
4. The fourth is to fully explore the National Innovation System framework for 
investigating how a national e-health implementation can be successfully 
socially and technologically engineered. To further explore in-depth how a 
possession of domestic innovation capacities in telecommunication, computing 
and biomedical industries and infrastructures can determine and correlate with 
incremental national e-health implementation. A form this investigation can take 
is to select countries from around the world and compare and contrast them 
based on their national health system structure and configuration. For example, 
the public sector driven approach of the National Health Service in the UK can 
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be compared with the private sector driven approach employed in Germany and 
in the USA.  
7.9.6 Research limitations 
The data we have collected were mostly from participant observations and interviews of 
key stakeholders at meetings and conferences, transcribed notes and from privileged 
access to project and programme documents and meeting and technical reports obtained 
from stakeholders. We have extrapolated data from a small number of African countries 
and conducted field trips to these countries. With qualitative data, a limitation might be 
that the accounts we presented in the narratives were biased, for instance, for the 
purpose of attending to the research objectives (Sikes & Sikes, 2006). The data we 
collected were fitting and extremely suitable for investigating the conduct of IeTTs.  
We employed a combination of Deleuzian poststructuralist narratives and middle-range 
STS constructivism to balance the use of qualitative data with the literature, as 
(Sismondo, 2010, pp.152-153) has shown that using rhetoric merges objectivity with 
subjectivity (ibid, pp. 146-147).  
 Given that there was no precedent to follow in our research; the combination enabled 
us to narratively construct a new reality of the conduct of IeTTs in Africa (Sismondo, 
2010, p. 167). We were enabled to bring coherence and order to messy, multiple and 
unstructured qualitative data; and narratively constructed a deeper comprehension of the 
complex political nature, and the agential asymmetry (Jasanoff, 1996) of the conduct of 
IeTTs in Africa across time and space. In the process we have constructed new 
meanings of e-health technology development and utilisation in Africa through 
improvisation and contingency. We were enabled in such a way that an a priori 
structure was not imposed on the rich and diverse data we have collected. 
Perhaps a case study approach or the use of a quantitative method to compare countries 
might have sufficed. However, such approaches would not have captured the 
complexity and the diversity of views that we have identified at the multiple and policy 
levels. More field trips and interviews might have yielded more data or information; for 
instance, we might have excluded other relevant policy or programme documents or 
reports. However, the different countries we have studied were representative of diverse 
and contrasting states of e-health implementation and domestic e-health innovation 
capacities in Africa. The scale and richness of our data enabled us to capture and 
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connect the complexity and diversity of actors and organisations involved in the 
conduct of IeTTs at multiple levels.  
Poststructuralist narrative method can be seen as subjective, but that is its strength. It 
enables a researcher /ethnographer ‗to make sense of the world (subject matter) as she 
perceives and experiences it‘ and to relate to an audience what has been discovered 
(Sikes & Sikes, 2006). The boundary between becoming yourself and others in 
Deleuzian narrative requires a delicate act of balancing (Gale, 2010). Interpreting what 
transpired in interviews and decoding texts in documents or transcribed notes in folding 
process of writing is a creative and reflexive act of an ethnographer. The use of NIS 
institutionalism theory was influential in this act in our analytical and ethical focus on 
the development and utilisation of e-health technologies.  
A case-study approach will not be suitable for engaging with the rhizome of becoming 
and fold – interpreting diversities, multiplicities and divergences that we have 
demonstrated in the narratives (Wyatt & Balmer, 2007). This could have limited us to 
the study of one country and this would not capture and connect complexities, 
diversities and multiplicities. A quantitative study will not make these rhizomatic 
connections as well.  
We made policy judgements or recommendations in the narratives and in the 
conclusions we have drawn from them, which might come as controversial or subjective 
However, STS constructivism informs that in technology controversies of policy 
concerns, the knowledge produced is taken as an interpretation of the real world 
(Sismondo, 2010, p. 134). Narratively constructed knowledge uncovers hidden 
histories, politics and power so as to challenge or re-order existing or established stable 
practices and structures. According to (Jasanoff, 2006, p. 403) it is about the ‗politics of 
explanation‘ in which the reflexivity and creativity of an ethnographer plays a major 
part in this exercise of re-ordering. Therefore, making or prescribing policy 
recommendations is ‗part and parcel of STS critical enterprise‘ (ibid.); and, it is about 
engaging in the controversial or contentious interfaces of technology and society (Kling, 
1992; Lehoux & Blume, 2000; May, 2006; Roberts, 2012). This is about policy 
dilemma of siding either with technology determinism or social essentialism. Whether   
making technology choices and selecting options and alternatives are conditioned by 
path-dependencies intended and unintended consequences.   
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A non middle-range or moderate STS perspective could not have enabled us to engage 
with such concerns and controversies.  Such could have imposed on us predetermined 
views that could have constrained a full engagement with the diversity and richness of 
our data.  
7.10 Final words 
As, globally and nationally, technological advancement in the fields of genomics, 
antibiotics, mobile computing, vaccines and e-health continue and converge, African 
countries will certainly benefit. The rapid diffusion and the ever advancing mobile and 
wireless technologies and infrastructures are ubiquitous platforms can make this 
happen.  
We have identified and highlighted issues that require the urgent attention of national, 
continental and global policymakers and leaders. The thesis exposed the limitations of 
cosmopolitan driven consumerist model in the conduct of technoglobalism. The factors 
of political differences, widening technoeconomic divides, sociotechnical complexities, 
industrial lopsidedness and rapid technological changes and uncertainties in the age of 
technoglobalism, stresses the need for the exercise of National Agency. A particular 
constraint being faced by African countries – the lack and immaturity of domestic 
innovation capacity, must be recognised in the universal practise of cosmopolitanism 
that is defining the conduct of IeTTs in Africa. The current consumerist model is un-
developmental and will not result in an industrial e-health technology accumulation and 
knowledge assimilation.  
For African countries not to be left behind in the global trend of national e-health 
implementation, we foreground the relevance, importance and necessity of domestic 
technoscience and innovation in national and global policies. We assert that the global 
techno-optimism, which is underpinning the rush to implement national e-health 
initiatives, provides a window of opportunity for African countries to acquire 
technologies from IeTTs.  
Whilst not taking for granted that national e-health technology capacity is instrumental 
for African countries, we stress that collaboration amongst national, continental and 
global actors and organisations is urgently needed, so as to foster appropriate and 
affordable e-health innovations in, and to make e-health work in Africa.  
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Appendix A — List of policy meetings  
Participation & Meetings Details  
BEANISH- Europe-Africa Synergies 
on ICT Strengthening on Collaborative 
Networks 2007-2009 at the European 
Union Secretariat, Brussels [BE].  
  
 
 An European Union Directorate for 
Development sponsored eHealth 
technology and policy programme for 
Africa under University of Oslo Health 
Information System Programme. 
 A research and academic eHealth 
development and discussion forum that 
fostered the development of District 
Health information Software (DHIS). 
 Invited to speak on mHealth innovations 
in developing countries. 
EU-Africa ICT Policy & Programme 
Forum – 2008-2009 at the European 
Union Secretariat, Brussels [EU].  
 
 
 An European Union Directorate for 
Information Society sponsored eHealth 
technology and policy programme to 
foster international cooperation with 
Africa 
 An international forum for governmental, 
non-governmental, public and private 
forum on ICT innovation and development  
 Invited to speak at the 1st Summit in 2009 
on the implementation of large-scale 
eHealth initiatives in Africa 
 Contacted and interviewed on an EU 
report on eHealth for development in 
developing countries. 
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Participation & Meetings Details  
The UN ECOSOC eHealth Ministerial 
Meeting 2009.  Accra, Ghana [UN].  
 
 Organized by the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council with the 
World Health Organization and the 
National Government of Ghana and its 
Ministry of Health. 
 Focussed on articulating a common 
eHealth agenda for the UN system towards 
the achievement of  the MDGs 
 Invited to convene, chair and speak on 
mHealth innovations and eHealth policy in 
Africa 
Commonwealth Secretariat eHealth 
Strategies Ministerial Meetings and 
Policy Workshops 2009-2011 in 
South-East Asia and Africa [CM].  
 Organized by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat Social Transformation Division 
in concert with the Ministry of Health of 
her member states. 
 Assists member states in developing their 
National eHealth Policy and Strategy. 
 Invited to provide Expert and technical 
advice to the Secretariat and the member 
states on national eHealth policy 
development. 
Pan-African eHealth initiatives 
Meeting 2009-2010, The African 
Union, Ethiopia [AU].  
 
 A meeting organized by the African Union 
Commission to chart a future for the 
European Space Agency, the World 
Health Organization and the Indian 
Government sponsored eHealth initiatives 
in Africa. 
 Invited to give Expert opinions on policy 
and adoption issues.  
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Participation & Meetings Details  
eHealth in Low-resource setting 2009. 
Stockholm, Sweden [SP].  
 
 An international meeting organized by 
Swedish Program for ICT in Developing 
regions and Karolinska Technology 
Institute, and sponsored by Swedish 
International Development Agency. 
 Focussed on policy and programme 
development on eHealth in low-resource 
setting in view of a large-scale eHealth 
implementation in Uganda  
 Invited to speak and convene a workshop 
on the telecommunication aspects of 
eHealth implementation in developing 
countries 
International Year of Science and 
Technology for Africa: The 
importance of Telemedicine in fighting 
disease and promoting health 
conference 2007. Senato della 
Repubblica, Rome, Italy [IT].  
 Organized by the Italian Association on 
Telemedicine and Medical Informatics 
Organized and the Italian Parliament and 
other international organizations like 
UNESCO & WABT  
 Invited to speak on eHealth innovations 
and implementations  in Africa 
International Society for Telemedicine 
& eHealth, 2007. Luxembourg [IS].  
 An annual international conference of 
Experts and Industry on eHealth 
 Convened a group on 
eHealth/Telemedicine in low-resource 
settings  
 Co-convened a group on mHealth policy 
in developing countries 
 Co-founded an online discussion group on 
Telemedicine in low-resource settings 
Science with Africa workshops and 
conference. June 2010. UNECA, 
Ethiopia [UN-2]. 
 Organized by the United Nations 
Economic Commission on Africa with 
other development partners to foster 
science, technology and innovation 
programme and policy in Africa.  
 Invited to speak and chair meetings on 
Global Health and presented eHealth 
innovations.  
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Appendix B – list of data sources 
This is the list of the different and diverse sources of qualitative data used for writing 
the narratives in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6.  
1.  STRETCH- Strengthening Community Health in Uganda  Project 
Stakeholders' meeting, 27th of April 2011 at Ankrah Hotel in Mukono, 
Uganda 
2.  Finalization of the E-Health Policy and Development of an E-Health 
Strategy, Stakeholders Consultative Workshop, Ministry of Health, 2
nd– 
4
th
 May 2011, Najjera Uganda 
3.  Draft Health Sector ICT Policy Implementation Strategies & Action Plans, 
Republic of Uganda Ministry of Health, 2004.  
 
4.  Health Sector ICT Policy Final Draft, Republic of Uganda Ministry of 
Health, 2006.  
5.  National Health Information Resource Centre Vision 2012, Strategic 
Framework, Republic of Uganda Ministry of Health, 2009.  
6.  Unstructured interview conducted with a Senior Ministry of Health at the 
stakeholder meeting at [AB-2] 
7.  Technical report on Enhanced Access to Health Services and Information 
through ICTs in Uganda (EAHSI). Submitted to The International 
Development Research Centre (IDRC, Canada). IDRC Grant No: 055432. 
5 October 2000- 10 May 2005. 
8.  Report on Teleconsultation in Uganda Needs Assessment by Iga Matovu 
et al, Mulago Hospital Complex. 18 September 2009. 
9.  A qualitative baseline survey on development and practices of 
Telemedicine in Uganda: Draft Report. International Centre for 
International Technology and Development (ICITD) and Africa Telehealth 
Group, 2009.  
10.  EU-TeleInViVo 3D Ultrasound Telemedical Workstation. Resume of the 
TeleInViVo project. The UNESCO component in Kazakhstan and 
Uganda, 1999.  
11.  Mission Report on the Implementation of EU-TeleInViVo 3D Ultrasound 
Telemedical Workstation in Uganda. UNESCO Nairobi Office. August 
1999. 
12.  EU-TeleInViVo 3D Ultrasound Telemedical Workstation. HUC Medical 
Mission to Uganda Trial Sites in Kampala and Nakaseke. Hospitais da 
Universidade de Coimbra, Telematics Technologies Programme Project 
#HC4021. TeleInViVo Consortium, April 2000. 
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13.  EU-TeleInViVo 3D Ultrasound Telemedical Workstation. Technical 
Mission to Uganda Trial Sites in Kampala and Nakaseke. Centro de 
Computacao Grafica, Telematics Technologies Programme Project 
#HC4021. TeleInViVo Consortium, March 2000. 
14.  Pro-Poor Satellite Broadcasting Reality or Myth? Final Research Report 
commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID) 
by Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) (Practical 
Action). November 2003.  
15.  Report on Satellite Radio Research in Uganda by Naoh Lusaka et al. 
Commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID) 
by Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) (Practical 
Action). September 2002.  
16.  EU-TeleInViVo 3D Ultrasound Telemedical Workstation. Mission to 
Uganda Trial Sites in Kampala and Nakaseke. Telematics Technologies 
Programme Project #HC4021. TeleInViVo Consortium, September 1999. 
17.  EU-TeleInViVo 3D Ultrasound Telemedical Workstation. Deliverable 15- 
Report on field test (Uganda, KazaKhstan and Coimbra). Telematics 
Technologies Programme Project #HC4021. TeleInViVo Consortium, July 
2000. 
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Appendix C – summarises three pan-African e-health 
initiatives 
IeTTs Africa Health 
Infoway 
The Indian Pan African 
Telemedicine Network 
eHealth for 
Africa 
Transfer  
objectives 
To support the 
collection of sub 
national health data 
and statistics for 
analysis, 
dissemination and for 
supporting decision 
making in Health at 
the District level.  
To implement 
telemedicine 
infrastructures in selected 
tertiary hospitals of 53 
African countries. 
 
To pilot satellite-
based regional 
telemedicine 
infrastructure in 
the Eastern 
Africa.   
 
Implementation 
status 
Still in pre-
implementation 
planning. 
1. Conceived as one of 
three of the Pan-
Africa e-Network in 
2005.  
2. First presented at the 
India-African 
Summit by the then 
Indian Prime Minister 
in 2005. 
3. First pilot in Ethiopia 
in January 2006. 
A pilot in East 
and West Africa 
is currently 
underway since 
early 2011. 
 
Services  1. Epidemiological 
analysis and 
research.  
2. Health service 
monitoring and 
evaluation. 
3. Supply chain 
management 
medical stock 
inventory.  
1. International 
Teleconsultation 
services. 
2. Medical eLearning 
and Clinical 
mentoring. 
1. Medical 
eLearning 
and Clinical 
mentoring.  
2. Local and 
international 
teleconsultati
on. 
3. Remote 
clinical 
diagnostic 
and disease 
surveillance 
services. 
4. Health data 
Health 
Management 
Information 
System. 
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IeTTs Africa Health 
Infoway 
The Indian Pan African 
Telemedicine Network 
eHealth for 
Africa 
Partners 1. Global 
Telecommunicatio
n Standard setting 
and Regulatory 
Agency. 
2. Global Health 
Governance. 
3. Global ICT4D 
advocacy 
organization. 
4. An international 
development 
promotion agency. 
5. Global 
philanthropic 
organization. 
1. Indian External 
Affairs Ministry. 
2. Telecommunications 
Consultants India 
Limited (TCIL). 
3. Indian Elite 
Universities. 
4. Indian Space 
Research 
Organization (ISRO). 
1. Global Space 
Agency. 
2. Global 
Geopolitical 
Agency. 
3. Global Space 
Industry. 
 
